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Abstract 
The aim of this study is to provide economic evidence of the relevance of aggressive tax 
planning (ATP) structures for all EU Member States. The study relies on economic 
indicators available at macro-level and on indicators derived from firm-level data. The 
objective is indeed to look at the relevance of ATP for all Member States through these 
two complementary angles. For each indicator, the study identifies outliers based on a 
consistent methodology. None of the indicators provides per se an irrefutable causality 
towards aggressive tax planning. However, considered together, the set of indicators 
shall be seen as a "body of evidence". While there are some data limitation, the study 
provides a broad picture of which Member States appear to be exposed to ATP 
structures, and how it impacts on their tax base (erosion or increase).   
The discussed ATP structures can be grouped into three main channels: i) ATP via 
interest payments, ii) ATP via royalty payments and iii) ATP via strategic transfer pricing. 
In addition to general indicators assessing the overall exposure to ATP, we also derive 
specific indicators for each of the ATP channels. In combination, these indicators allow 
to classify entities within multinational enterprises (MNEs) into three types: i) target 
entities, where the tax base is reduced ii) the lower tax entities where the tax base is 
increased but taxed at a lower rate, and iii) conduit entities which are in a group with 
ATP activities but no clear effect on the tax base is observable.  
Résumé 
Le but de la présente étude est de fournir des éléments de preuve économique sur 
l’importance des structures de planification fiscale agressive (PFA) pour tous les Etats 
Membres de l’UE. L’étude utilise des indicateurs disponibles au niveau macroéconomique 
et des indicateurs dérivés de données à l’échelle des entreprises. L’objectif est ainsi de 
considérer l’importance de la PFA pour tous les Etats Membres à travers ces deux angles 
complémentaires. Pour chaque indicateur, l’étude identifie des valeurs anormales sur la 
base d’une méthodologie uniforme. Aucun des indicateurs en soi ne permet d’établir 
une causalité irréfutable quant à la présence de planification fiscale agressive. 
Cependant, pris dans leur ensemble, ces indicateurs sont à voir comme des ‘éléments 
de preuves’. Malgré le caractère limité de certaines données, l’étude fournit une vue 
d’ensemble sur les Etats Membres qui apparaissent exposés aux structures de PFA, et 
sur leur impact sur les bases d’imposition (érosion ou croissance). 
Les structures de PFA qui sont considérées peuvent être regroupées en trois canaux 
principaux: i) PFA à travers le paiement d’intérêts; ii) PFA à travers le paiement de 
royalties; et iii) PFA par une stratégie de prix de transferts.  Outre les indicateurs 
généraux évaluant l’exposition d’ensemble à la PFA, nous définissons des indicateurs 
spécifiques pour chacun des canaux de PFA. Par combinaisons, ces indicateurs 
permettent de classifier les entités faisant partie d’entreprises multinationales en trois 
types: i) entités cibles, dont la base d’imposition est réduite; ii) entités plus faiblement 
taxées, dont la base d’imposition est augmentée et taxée à un taux faible; et iii) entités 
relais, qui font partie d’un groupe multinational pratiquant la PFA sans que des effets 
clairs sur la base d’imposition soient observables. 
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Executive Summary 
The international corporate tax system aims to tax the profits of multinational 
enterprises (MNE) where they arise. However, MNEs have in some instances exploited 
mismatches and loopholes in the international tax framework to reduce their overall tax 
burden. This entails substantial problems, such as revenue losses, unfair competitive 
advantages or lower tax morale. Therefore, the Commission has made it a priority to 
fight aggressive tax planning (ATP).  
The aim of this study is to provide country-level indicators which potentially identify the 
relevance of ATP structures for all EU Member States, based on economic elements. This 
study builds on two previous studies by Ramboll and Corit (2015) and ZEW (2016) 
where typical ATP structures were identified and examined. These studies focused 
respectively on the tax rules (or absence thereof) that facilitate ATP, and the impact of 
ATP on the theoretical effective tax burdens. They did however not encompass any 
economic analysis based on observed empirical facts. The main objective of this study 
will therefore be to complement existing studies with empirical economic effects. 
We focus on the economic substance of the ATP structures, identified in the Ramboll 
and Corit (2015) and ZEW (2016) studies and group them into three ATP channels. 
 ATP via interest payments 
 ATP via royalty payments 
 ATP via strategic transfer pricing 
For each of these three ATP channels, we identify relevant economic measures which 
we link to publicly available data. We define a set of general indicators which can be 
indicative of exposure and general impact of ATP and a set of specific indicators which 
potentially yield information about a specific ATP channel. These indicators are used in 
two ways. First, we look at country-level distributions of these indicators to highlight 
the possible overall exposure and impact of ATP for each Member State. Secondly, we 
combine the specific indicators to clarify which "type" of entity within MNE groups is 
likely to be present in a country, according to the following three categories:  
 Target entity (firm within a MNE group, where the tax base is reduced) 
 Lower tax entity (firm within a MNE group, where the tax base is increased and 
taxed at a lower rate) 
 Conduit entity (firm within a MNE group, which seemingly engages in ATP, but 
where the tax base is not necessarily significantly affected) The label "conduit 
entity" may have a broader meaning than is generally understood in tax literature 
as it does not only encompass entities through which income flows transit. 
The analysis of the relative prevalence of these three types of entities across Member 
States complements the results from the country-level distribution of the indicators.  
The derived indicators can be grouped into four categories:  
 Country-level and bilateral indicators (Corporate tax rates and 
revenues, foreign direct investment and market structure, royalty flows, 
bilateral import prices and treaty shopping indicators)  
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 MNE group-level indicators (MNE geographical structure and relative tax 
burden, consolidated tax burden and profitability) 
 Firm-level indicators by firm types (Specific indicators such as 
profitability, debt shares, interest payments, intangible assets, patent 
applications by relative tax rate situation) 
 Combination of firm-level indicators (Shares of firms classified as 
target, lower tax or conduit entities) 
Methodology, data and caveats: 
The study relies on indicators available at macro-level and on indicators derived from 
firm-level data. The objective is indeed to look at the relevance of ATP for all Member 
States through these two complementary angles. For each indicator, the study identifies 
outliers based on a consistent methodology (with thresholds based on standard 
deviations away from the mean). However, there are some clear data limitations, 
notably in terms of availability and quality, which affect the choice of the indicators and 
the interpretation of the results. The data limitations are particularly true for firm-level 
indicators. Furthermore, some indicators are clearly influenced by other factors (e.g. 
general economic conditions) than ATP and none of the indicators provides therefore 
per se an irrefutable causality towards aggressive tax planning. Rather, considered 
together, the set of indicators shall be seen as a "body of evidence" that are consistent 
with the possible existence of an ATP structure. Being an outlier country for one (or 
several) indicators does therefore not suggest that the country is without any doubt 
used by MNEs in ATP structures. Instead, it indicates that such structure potentially 
exists. Another important limitation of the study is the impossibility to obtain reliable 
information to identify permanent establishments. 
Corporate tax rate and revenues: 
The statutory corporate tax burden varies substantially between the Member States, 
which implies scope for ATP practices. The corporate tax revenues only partly reflect the 
differences in the statutory rates and the data show that some small Member States like 
Cyprus, Malta and Luxembourg are able to raise more corporate tax revenues relative 
to their GDP than others. The decomposition of the corporate tax revenues into size, 
profitability and implicit tax burden of the corporate sector, reveals that some countries, 
in particular Ireland, seem able to attract substantial tax base. In other Member States, 
a profitability of the corporate sector well below the EU average, could indicate an 
erosion of the tax base owing to ATP, although other factors may of course be at play. 
Profitability of the corporate sector is found to be particularly low in France, Croatia, 
Slovenia and the United Kingdom.  
Foreign direct investment (FDI) and market structure: 
The FDI stocks measured as a percentage of GDP shed some light on the importance of 
MNE activities in the Member States and therefore can give a broad impression whether 
a Member State is potentially exposed to ATP. In some countries, extraordinarily high 
values could indicate that substantial ATP activities take place. Both inward and outward 
FDI stocks are several times higher than GDP in Cyprus, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta 
and the Netherlands. Together with Hungary, those countries have actual FDI stocks 
significantly above those predicted by our gravity model. These large numbers are 
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primarily due to FDI through special purpose entities (SPEs), which could also be an 
indication of ATP through the use of SPEs.  
Large market shares of large corporations suggest that some Member States like 
Germany or the United Kingdom are more vulnerable to ATP because of high 
concentration among the corporate tax payers. The extraordinarily high share of 
foreign-controlled firms in Estonia and Luxembourg might possibly reflect some tax 
driven behaviour. Equally, the high share of gross operating surplus in foreign-controlled 
firms in Ireland, Hungary, Luxembourg and Romania can also be consistent with a high 
profitability of the corporate sector in these countries, which could in turn indicate ATP. 
Royalty flows: 
The country-level information of royalty payments and receipts draws a very clear 
picture. Ireland stands out as the Member State with the highest net royalty payments 
(as a percentage of GDP), which is consistent with a potential ATP channel using royalty 
payments. Other Member States with significant royalty inflows and outflows (and 
positive net outflows) are Luxembourg, Malta and the Netherlands. Sweden, Finland, 
Denmark and the United Kingdom have the highest net royalty receipts.  
Bilateral import prices: 
The analysis of bilateral import price anomalies shows that larger, and often higher tax 
countries, such as Germany and France tend to have more inexplicably high import 
prices than low ones. This might be an indication of transfer mispricing that erodes tax 
bases in those countries. Spain, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Italy also 
have a relatively high number of price anomalies, which suggests that strategic transfer 
pricing strategies could affect the base in these countries.  
Treaty shopping indicators: 
The treaty shopping indicators identify some countries like the United Kingdom, 
Luxembourg, Estonia and the Netherlands as central on dividend repatriation routes. 
Overall, treaty shopping is of particular relevance for repatriation from outside the EU. 
MNE geographical structure and relative tax burden: 
In several European countries (Belgium, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg and Italy) all 
MNE entities have at least one subsidiary in a country with a lower tax burden. This 
indicates that these Member States are potentially more vulnerable to ATP. Being 
exposed to ATP does however not necessarily mean that a country's tax base is eroded. 
It can also be an indication that the country's tax rules are being used to shift profits 
but with limited direct impact on the tax base. In comparison, in Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
Ireland, Lithuania and Latvia, i.e. the countries identified among those having the lowest 
statutory tax rates, the MNE entities are in most cases the lowest tax entities. This could 
indicate that these Member States are more likely to benefit from ATP structures shifting 
tax base into these entities. Furthermore, looking at the share of MNE entities which are 
in MNE groups with a presence in a zero/no corporate tax country, the Netherlands, 
France, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Bulgaria and Latvia stand out with the strongest 
links which may be an indication that these countries are more exposed to ATP, albeit 
in different ways.  
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Consolidated effective tax rates (ETR) and profitability: 
The comparison of the consolidated ETRs finds a clearly higher ETR for MNEs than for 
domestic companies, which is at odds with the expectation of MNEs being able to reduce 
their tax burden through ATP. That said, looking at the profitability measures one can 
clearly see that MNE groups have a substantially higher operating profitability than 
domestic firms. In contrast, the consolidated pre-tax profitability of MNEs is comparable 
to the one of the domestic firms. This reflects the ability of MNE groups to reduce their 
tax base through financial losses (or other extraordinary deductions). The analysis of 
consolidated account does at the same time not reveal clear patterns across Member 
States. 
ATP-Specific indicators at entity level: 
The study looks a set of indicators (such as profitability, debt shares, interest payments, 
intangible assets, patent applications) which are relevant to understand which ATP 
structures may be more prevalent in a given Member State. These indicators are 
provided per Member State and for three types of entities: domestic companies, MNE 
entities located in relatively higher tax countries, and MNE entities located in relatively 
lower tax countries. Those indicators show patterns which are generally consistent with 
at least some ATP taking place. For 25 out of 28 Member States, we see a higher pre-
tax profitability in MNE entities located in countries with a relatively low statutory tax 
burden. A similar picture for operating profitability indicates the importance of ATP 
structures using royalty payments or strategic transfer pricing. In a majority of 
countries, on average, MNE entities post financial losses. However, we see on average 
financial profits for the MNE entities in some Member States, including the Netherlands, 
Sweden, Austria and Denmark. This may suggest that some MNE groups relocate 
corporate tax base to their entities in these Member States via ATP structures using 
interest payments. The result of lower debt shares in lower tax MNE entities is broadly 
in line with the predictions of the ATP via interest payments which sees debt being 
allocated in higher tax entities. For a subset of companies where we can match patent 
ownership information we see a concentration of patent holdings in countries with patent 
boxes, most notable France, Belgium and the Netherlands, as well as Germany (that 
does not have a patent box). 
Roles in ATP structures: 
The study aims at identifying for each of the three ATP channels what is the function (if 
any) of a given entity in a given Member State. The objective was to confirm with firm-
level information some pattern that emerges from macro-data. However, limited data 
availability means that the results need to be interpreted with caution. Furthermore, the 
statutory corporate tax rate of a country plays an important role in the classification, 
thereby possible over/under-stating the relevance of ATP.  
The analysis of roles within the three different ATP channels find consistently that MNE 
entities in France, Belgium and Malta are most often classified as target entities. While 
this could partly be driven by the high tax rate in these Member States, this can also 
reflect that relative profitability in these MNE groups could be consistent with ATP taking 
place. The countries with the largest share of lower tax entities are consistently Bulgaria, 
Poland, Slovenia, Hungary and Latvia, which again may be driven by the low tax rates. 
Additionally, we find a large share of conduit entities in Hungary, the Netherlands, 
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Ireland, the United Kingdom and Austria. This indicates that these Member States are 
likely to be more exposed to ATP. Since our definition of conduit entities implies that at 
least one entity of the MNE group is classified as a target entity, the classification as a 
conduit entity may also partly reflect incomplete information about lower/no tax entities 
outside the EU. 
For the ATP channel using interest payments the number of entities classified as target 
or lower tax entities is only moderate. This is partly driven by the combination of data 
quality and requirements for the classification in the types of entities. In comparison, 
for the ATP channel using royalty payments we are able to classify a larger share of the 
MNE entities into roles within the ATP structures. This partly reflects better data quality 
for operating profitability in comparison to the financial profitability, but also confirms 
that the distribution of intangible assets at the firm level is broadly consistent with ATP 
via royalty payments. The analysis of the role in strategic transfer pricing ATP channel, 
finds for three quarters of the MNE groups that the firm-level distribution of pre-tax 
profitability and operating profitability is consistent with tax-motivated relocation of 
profits in some part of the MNE group.  
  
European Commission 
 
Aggressive tax planning indicators 
 
October 2017 | 14 
Sommaire 
Le cadre de la fiscalité internationale des entreprises vise à l'imposition des profits des 
entreprises multinationales là où ils sont générés. Cependant, les entreprises 
multinationales ont exploité dans certains cas les écarts et les lacunes du cadre fiscal 
international pour réduire leur charge fiscale globale.  Des problèmes substantiels 
s’ensuivent, tels que pertes de revenu fiscaux, avantage compétitif déloyal ou 
diminution de la morale fiscale. La Commission européenne a par conséquent fait de la 
lutte contre la planification fiscale agressive (abrégé par la suite en PFA) une priorité. 
Le but de la présente étude est de fournir des indicateurs à l’échelon national qui 
identifient potentiellement l’importance des structures de PFA pour tous les Etats 
Membres de l’Union européenne, en se basant sur des éléments de nature économique. 
Cette étude s’appuie sur deux études précédentes, l’une par Ramboll et Corit (2015) et 
l’autre par ZEW (2016), où les structures types de planification fiscale agressive sont 
identifiées et examinées. Ces études mettent respectivement l’accent sur les règles 
fiscales (ou leur absence) facilitant  la PFA et sur l’impact de la PFA sur les charges 
fiscales effectives théoriques. Ni l’une ni l’autre ne comprennent toutefois d’analyse 
économique basée sur des observations empiriques. L’objectif principal de la présente 
étude est donc d’apporter ce complément, à l’aide d’analyses de données économiques 
empiriques. 
Nous nous concentrons sur les structures de planification fiscale agressive identifiées 
par les études de Ramboll et Corit (2015) et ZEW (2016), que nous regroupons en trois 
canaux: 
 PFA à travers le paiement d’intérêts 
 PFA à travers le paiement de royalties 
 PFA par une stratégie de prix de transferts  
Pour chacun de ces trois canaux, nous identifions les indicateurs économiques pertinents 
et les mettons en lien avec des données publiquement disponibles. Nous définissons 
ainsi un ensemble d’indicateurs généraux qui peuvent mettre en lumière une possible 
exposition à la PFA et les impacts globaux, ainsi qu’un ensemble d’indicateurs 
spécifiques qui peuvent fournir des informations sur les canaux de PFA. Ces indicateurs 
sont utilisés de deux manières. Premièrement, nous considérons la distribution par pays 
de chacun de ces indicateurs afin de révéler l'exposition potentielle et l’impact potentiel 
de la PFA dans chacun des Etats Membres. Deuxièmement, nous combinons des 
indicateurs spécifiques afin d’identifier et de classifier les types d’entités de groupes 
multinationaux dont la présence dans l’une des trois catégories suivantes est probable: 
 Entité cible (entreprise d’un groupe multinational dont la base d’imposition est 
réduite) 
 Entité plus faiblement taxée (entreprise d’un groupe multinational dont la 
base d’imposition est augmentée et taxée à un taux faible) 
 Entité relais (entreprise d’un groupe multinational semblant impliquée dans la 
PFA mais dont la base d’imposition n’est pas affectée de manière sensible; au-
delà de la compréhension courante de la littérature sur la fiscalité, l'entité relais 
couvre d’autres entités que celles où des flux de revenus transitent) 
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L’analyse de la prévalence de ces trois types d’entités dans chacun des Etats Membres 
complète  les résultats issus de la distribution des indicateurs par pays. 
Les indicateurs définis pour les besoins des analyses peuvent être regroupés en quatre 
catégories : 
 Indicateurs nationaux et bilatéraux (Taux et revenus des impôts sur les 
sociétés, investissements directs étrangers et structure du marché, flux de 
royalties, prix des importations et indicateurs de « chalandage fiscal ») 
 Indicateurs au niveau des groupes multinationaux (Structure 
géographique des groupes multinationaux et charge fiscale relative, charge 
fiscale consolidée et rentabilité) 
 Indicateurs par types d’entreprises (Indicateurs spécifiques tels que 
rentabilité, distribution de l’endettement, paiement d’intérêts, immobilisations 
incorporelles, dépôts de brevets en fonction de la situation fiscale relative des 
entités) 
 Combinaison d’indicateurs de niveau entreprise (Proportion d’entreprises 
classifiées comme cible, plus faiblement taxée ou relais) 
Méthodologie, données et réserves : 
L’étude exploite aussi bien des indicateurs de niveau macroéconomique que des 
indicateurs à l’échelle des entreprises. L’objectif est en effet de considérer l’importance 
de la planification fiscale agressive pour tous les Etats Membres à travers ces deux 
angles complémentaires. Pour chaque indicateur, l’étude identifie des valeurs anormales 
sur la base d’une méthodologie uniforme (à l’aide de seuils basés sur les écarts types 
par rapport à la moyenne). Cependant, le caractère limité des données, notamment en 
termes de disponibilité et de qualité, affecte le choix des indicateurs et l’interprétation 
des résultats. Les limitations dues aux données sont particulièrement vraies pour les 
indicateurs à l’échelle des entreprises. De plus, certains indicateurs étant clairement 
influencés par d’autres facteurs (p.ex. les conditions économiques générales) que la 
PFA, aucun des indicateurs en soi ne permet d’établir une causalité irréfutable quant à 
la présence de planification fiscale agressive. Par contre, pris dans leur ensemble, ces 
indicateurs sont à voir comme des ‘éléments de preuves’ qui correspondent à l’existence 
possible de structures de PFA. Être identifié comme un cas particulier ("outlier") pour 
un ou plusieurs indicateurs n'indique ainsi pas qu'un pays est utilisé sans doute aucun 
par les multinationales pour des activités de PFA. Il s’agit plutôt de signaler l’existence 
possible de telles structures. Une autre limitation importante de cette étude est 
l’impossibilité d’obtenir des informations fiables qui permettent d’identifier les 
établissements stables. 
Taux et revenus des impôts sur les sociétés : 
Le taux d’imposition légal sur les sociétés varie de manière substantielle d’un Etat 
Membre à l’autre, ouvrant la porte à des pratiques de planification fiscale agressive. Les 
revenus de l’impôt sur les sociétés ne reflètent que partiellement les différences de taux 
nominaux et les données montrent que certains Etats Membres de taille plus modeste, 
comme Chypre, Malte ou le Luxembourg, sont capables de générer plus de revenus de 
l’impôt sur les sociétés par rapport à leur PIB que d’autres. La décomposition des 
revenus de l’impôt sur les sociétés selon la taille, la rentabilité et la charge fiscale 
implicite des entreprises révèle que certains pays, en particulier l’Irlande, semblent 
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capables d’attirer une base fiscale considérable. Dans d'autres Etats Membres, une 
rentabilité des entreprises bien inférieure à la moyenne de l’Union européenne pourrait 
révéler une érosion de la base fiscale qui soit due à la PFA, même si d’autres facteurs 
peuvent bien entendu entrer en jeu. La rentabilité du secteur privé se trouve être ainsi 
particulièrement basse en France, en Croatie, en Slovénie et au Royaume-Uni. 
Investissements directs étrangers (IDE) et structure du marché : 
Les stocks d’IDE, mesurés en pourcentage du PIB, donnent une certaine vision de 
l’importance des activités des groupes multinationaux dans les Etats Membres et 
peuvent ainsi donner une impression générale de l’exposition d’un Etat Membre aux 
pratiques de PFA. Dans certains pays, des valeurs extraordinairement élevées 
pourraient potentiellement révéler une pratique substantielle de PFA. Aussi bien les 
stocks d’IDE depuis l’étranger que les stocks d’IDE vers l’étranger ont des valeurs qui 
sont plusieurs fois supérieures au PIB à Chypre, en Irlande, au Luxembourg, à Malte et 
aux Pays-Bas. Les stocks d’IDE observés dans ces pays et en Hongrie sont largement 
supérieurs aux stocks théoriques calculés à l'aide de notre modèle gravitationnel. Ces 
valeurs élevées sont principalement dues aux IDE réalisés par l’intermédiaire d’entités 
ad-hoc spécialisées, ce qui pourrait signaler la réalisation de PFA à l’aide de ces entités.  
Des secteurs fortement concentrés, avec donc des grandes entreprises qui ont de fortes 
parts de marché, suggèrent que certains Etats Membres, comme l’Allemagne et le 
Royaume Uni, sont plus vulnérables à l’ATP; les revenus de l’impôt sur les sociétés étant 
très concentrés sur certaines entreprises contribuables. La proportion 
extraordinairement élevée d’entreprises contrôlées par des multinationales étrangères 
en Estonie et au Luxembourg pourrait refléter des comportements motivés par le 
système fiscal. Par ailleurs, le niveau élevé des excédents bruts d'exploitation des 
entreprises contrôlées par des multinationales étrangères en Irlande, en Hongrie, au 
Luxembourg et en Roumanie peut également coïncider avec une grande rentabilité du 
secteur privé dans ces pays, ce qui pourrait signaler des pratiques de PFA. 
Flux de royalties : 
Les informations disponibles à l’échelon national sur les paiements et la réception de 
royalties fournissent une image très claire. L’Irlande se démarque comme l’Etat Membre 
au volume de paiement net de royalties le plus élevé (en pourcentage du PIB), ce qui 
est potentiellement cohérent avec des pratiques de PFA utilisant ces royalties. Les autres 
Etats Membres à volume de royalties entrants et sortants significatifs (pour un volume 
net sortant) sont le Luxembourg, Malte et les Pays-Bas, tandis que la Suède, la Finlande, 
le Danemark et le Royaume-Uni ont les volumes nets de royalties entrants les plus 
élevés. 
Prix des importations : 
L’analyse des anomalies de prix des importations et exportations révèle que des pays 
de grande taille et à haut niveau d’imposition, comme l’Allemagne et la France, sont 
plus souvent confrontés à des prix d’importation inexplicablement élevés que confrontés 
à des prix bas. Cette observation peut être une indication de manipulation des prix de 
transferts destinés à réduire la base fiscale dans ces pays. L’Espagne, le Royaume-Uni, 
les Pays-Bas et l’Italie sont également confrontés à un nombre relativement élevé 
d’anomalies de prix, ce qui suggère que des stratégies de prix de transferts pourraient 
affecter la base fiscale de ces pays. 
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Indicateurs de chalandage fiscal : 
Les indicateurs de chalandage fiscal identifient quelques pays, comme le Royaume-Uni, 
le Luxembourg, l’Estonie et les Pays-Bas, comme étant centraux sur les parcours de 
rapatriement des dividendes. Dans l’ensemble, le chalandage fiscal apparait comme 
particulièrement important pour le rapatriement des dividendes venant de pays situés 
hors de l’UE. 
Structure géographique des groupes multinationaux et charge fiscale relative : 
Dans plusieurs pays Européens (la Belgique, l’Allemagne, la Hongrie, le Luxembourg et 
l’Italie), tous les groupes multinationaux disposent d’au moins une filiale dans un pays 
où la charge fiscale est plus basse. Cela peut révéler une plus grande vulnérabilité de 
ces Etats Membres aux pratiques de PFA. Être exposé à la PFA ne veut cependant pas 
dire que la base fiscale du pays est réduite. Cela peut aussi être une indication que les 
règles fiscales sont utilisées pour déplacer des profits, tout en ayant un impact direct 
limité sur la base fiscale. En comparaison, en Bulgarie, à Chypre, en Irlande, en Lituanie 
et en Lettonie, c’est-à-dire dans les pays caractérisés par les taux d’impositions 
nominaux parmi les plus bas, les entités des groupes multinationaux sont dans la plupart 
des cas les entités les plus faiblement taxées. Cela pourrait révéler le fait que ces Etats 
Membres ont une plus grande chance de bénéficier des structures de PFA qui déplacent 
les bases fiscales des multinationales dans ces entités faiblement taxées. De plus, si on 
considère la proportion d'entités qui font partie d’un groupe multinational qui est présent 
dans des pays sans impôts sur les sociétés (ou avec un taux nul), les Pays-Bas, la 
France, l’Irlande, le Royaume-Uni, la Bulgarie et la Lettonie se démarquent par leur 
grand nombre de liens, ce qui peut être une indication que ces pays sont exposés de 
manière plus forte à la PFA, de façons toutefois différentes. 
Taux d’imposition effectifs (TIE) consolidés et rentabilité :  
La comparaison des TIE consolidés mène à un TIE clairement plus élevé pour les 
entreprises multinationales que pour les entreprises dont l'activité est nationale, 
contrairement aux attentes qu’il est possible d’avoir, les groupes multinationaux ayant 
en théorie moyen de réduire leur charge fiscale par des pratiques de  PFA. Cependant, 
les mesures de rentabilité montrent que les groupes multinationaux ont une rentabilité 
opérationnelle qui est plus élevée que celle des entreprises dont l'activité est purement 
nationale et ceci de manière substantielle. Par contraste, la rentabilité consolidée avant 
impôt des groupes multinationaux est comparable à celle des entreprises dont l'activité 
est purement nationale. Cela reflète la capacité des groupes multinationaux à réduire 
leur base fiscale à l’aide de pertes financières (ou autres déductions extraordinaires). 
L’analyse des comptes consolidés ne révèle toutefois pas de différences systématiques 
d’un Etat Membre à l’autre. 
Indicateurs spécifiques à la PFA au niveau des entités : 
L’étude considère un ensemble d’indicateurs (tels que rentabilité, distribution de 
l’endettement, paiement d’intérêts, immobilisations incorporelles, dépôts de brevets) 
qui sont pertinents pour comprendre quelles structures de PFA sont les plus présentes 
pour un Etat Membre donné. Ces indicateurs sont produits pour chaque Etat Membre et 
pour chacun des trois types d’entités suivants: entreprises dont les activités sont 
uniquement nationales; entités multinationales situées dans des pays à charge fiscale 
relativement plus élevée; et entités multinationales situées dans des pays à charge 
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fiscale relativement plus faible. Ces indicateurs révèlent des configurations qui en 
général peuvent permettre de mettre en évidence une certaine activité de PFA. Pour 25 
des 28 Etats Membres on constate une rentabilité avant impôt plus élevée dans les 
entités multinationales qui se situent dans des pays dont les taux d’impositions 
nominaux sont comparativement plus faibles. Une configuration similaire pour la 
rentabilité opérationnelle montre l’importance des structures de PFA qui utilisent les 
paiements de royalties ou les stratégies de prix de transferts. Dans la majorité des pays, 
en moyenne, les entités multinationales affichent des pertes financières. Cependant, 
des profits financiers sont en moyenne visibles pour les entités multinationales dans 
quelques Etats Membres, incluant les Pays-Bas, la Suède, l’Autriche et le Danemark. 
Cela peut suggérer que certains groupes multinationaux déplacent leur base 
d’imposition dans leurs entités qui se trouvent dans ces Etats Membres, à l’aide de 
structures de PFA basées sur les paiements d’intérêts. L'observation d’une part 
d’endettement plus faible des entités multinationales plus faiblement taxées correspond 
dans l’ensemble aux prédictions de structures de PFA basées sur les paiements 
d’intérêts qui allouent la dette aux entités taxées plus fortement. Pour la partie des 
entreprises où il est possible d’exploiter les informations sur les propriétaires de brevets 
se voit une concentration de la détention des brevets dans les pays où existent des 
régimes fiscaux favorables aux brevets (boîtes à brevets ou patent boxes), surtout en 
France, en Belgique et aux Pays-Bas, ainsi qu’en Allemagne (qui n’a pas de régime fiscal 
spécifique favorable aux brevets). 
Rôles dans les structures de PFA : 
Pour chacun des trois canaux de PFA, l’étude vise à identifier la fonction (si tant est 
qu'elle existe) d’une entité donnée dans un Etat Membre donné. L’objectif est de 
confirmer avec des données empiriques à l’échelle des entreprises certaines 
observations qui émergent des données à l’échelle macroéconomique. Toutefois, la 
disponibilité limitée de certaines données invite à la prudence dans l’interprétation des 
résultats. De plus, le taux d’imposition nominal sur les sociétés d’un pays joue un rôle 
important dans la classification, ce qui peut ainsi soit surestimer soit sous-estimer 
l’importance de la PFA. 
L’analyse des rôles pour chacun des trois canaux de PFA montre de manière récurrente 
que les entités multinationales situées en France, en Belgique et à Malte sont le plus 
souvent des entités cibles. Bien que ce résultat puisse en partie être dû aux taux 
d’imposition élevés de ces pays, le résultat peut également refléter une rentabilité des 
entités relatives à leur groupe multinational qui correspondrait à des pratiques de PFA.  
Les pays comprenant la part d’entités plus faiblement taxées la plus large sont de 
manière récurrente la Bulgarie, la Pologne, la Slovénie, la Hongrie et la Lettonie, ce qui 
là aussi peut être la conséquence de taux d’imposition faibles. Par ailleurs, nous 
observons une grande part d’entités relais en Hongrie, aux Pays-Bas, en Irlande, au 
Royaume-Uni et en Autriche. Cette observation indique une plus grande probabilité pour 
ces pays d’être exposés aux pratiques de PFA. Etant donné que notre définition des 
entités relais implique au minimum une entité cible dans le même groupe multinational, 
la classification comme entité relais pourrait en partie refléter un manque d’information 
sur les entités faiblement ou non taxées situées en dehors de l’UE. 
Pour le canal de PFA basé sur le paiement d’intérêts, le nombre d’entités classées 
comme des entités cibles ou des entités plus faiblement taxées est faible. Cet état de 
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fait est en partie dû à une combinaison de problèmes de qualité des données avec le 
besoin des données nécessaire à une classification dans l’une des deux catégories. En 
comparaison, pour le canal de PFA basé sur les paiements de royalties, il est possible 
de classifier un plus grand nombre d’entités multinationales dans des rôles au sein des 
structures de PFA. Cette observation reflète en partie une meilleure qualité des données 
sur la rentabilité opérationnelle que sur la rentabilité financière, mais confirme 
également le fait que la distribution des immobilisations incorporelles au niveau des 
entreprises peut correspondre dans l’ensemble à des pratiques de PFA à base de 
paiements de royalties. L’analyse des rôles dans le canal de PFA à base de prix de 
transferts identifie dans trois quarts des groupes multinationaux, à l’échelle des 
entreprises, une distribution de la rentabilité avant impôts et une distribution de la 
rentabilité opérationnelle qui sont possiblement cohérents avec un déplacement de 
profits au sein du groupe motivé par des considérations fiscales. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The notion that corporations, in line with all other taxpayers, should pay their fair 
amount of taxes is widely shared. At the same time, it is also evident that especially 
Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) have more opportunities to reduce their corporate tax 
burden. Under the term aggressive tax planning (ATP), defined as “taking advantage of 
the technicalities of a tax system or of mismatches between two or more tax systems” 
the European Commission (2012) subsumes the excessive use of the opportunities to 
reduce the corporate tax burden. Widespread aggressive tax planning implies fewer 
revenues for countries and leads to unfair contributions by some taxpayers, thereby 
reducing tax morale and creating distortions of competition between companies.  
These issues are increasingly recognised in the policy debate and the Commission has 
made it a priority to fight tax avoidance. Actions taken include the June 2015 Action 
Plan for a fair and efficient corporate tax system in the EU, the automatic exchange of 
information on tax rulings and advance pricing arrangements as well as of country-by-
country reports, and the adoption of the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directives. The relaunch of 
the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) further contributes towards the 
achievement of the goal of a fairer and simpler tax system for MNEs. Furthermore, in 
the context of the European Semester, the importance of fighting tax abuse has been 
repeatedly stressed, and a number of country reports have highlighted the risk that 
some Member States’ tax rules might be used in ATP schemes. There is also a much 
broader international policy debate, with initiatives like the Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting (BEPS) of the G20/OECD.  
A solid understanding of the extent and channels of ATP is fundamental to draw policy 
conclusion and recommendations for the fight against unfair tax practices. To this end 
the European Commission (DG TAXUD) has commissioned a study on Structures of 
Aggressive Tax Planning and Indicators (Ramboll Management Consulting & Corit 
Advisory (2015)), hereafter the “ATP study”. The ATP study provides a legal analysis of 
common ATP structures. The objectives of the study were threefold: (i) identification of 
model ATP structures; (ii) identification of ATP factors (i.e. critical tax rules and practices 
that facilitate or allow ATP); and (iii) individual assessment of the prevalence of such 
factors across Member States. Concretely, the study identifies seven legal structures 
that are most commonly used by MNEs that engage in ATP. These are: (1) Offshore loan 
ATP structure, (2) Hybrid loan ATP structure, (3) Hybrid entity ATP structure, (4) 
Interest-free loan ATP structure, (5) Patent box ATP structure, (6) Two-tiered IP ATP 
structure, and (7) ATP structure based on IP and cost contribution agreement. 
A subsequent study by ZEW (2016), hereafter the “ZEW study”, uses three of the basic 
mechanisms of the ATP structures and calculates the effective tax burdens for 
hypothetical cross-border investment projects of MNEs in the European Union and the 
United States.1 This allows to theoretically quantify the potential tax savings of the 
different tax planning strategies. Both studies allow assessing all Member States in a 
                                          
1 The two structures "offshore loan ATP structure" and "hybrid loan structure" of the ATP study 
are combined in an ATP channel labelled "profit shifting via interest payments". 
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consistent manner and enable the identification of those tax rules, which could - 
potentially- be used in aggressive tax planning structures.  
Both the ATP study and the ZEW study focus on a subset of national tax rules and 
practices and exclude issues such as international rules regarding the allocation of taxing 
rights.  
1.2 Objectives 
The overarching objective of this study is to complement the existing legal evidence 
base and theoretical considerations about ATP in the EU Member States with economic 
substance. The ATP study enhances the understanding of how countries’ tax rules can 
be used in ATP schemes and which Member States have tax rules which are most 
vulnerable to be used in ATP. The ZEW study uses the tax law provisions and calculates 
theoretical effective tax burdens incorporating ATP structures. Both studies focus on the 
possibilities of ATP but do not encompass any economic analysis based on observed 
empirical facts. The main objective of this study will be to substantiate the legal analysis 
of the ATP study and the results of the theoretical effective tax burdens in the ZEW 
study with economic evidence.  
The economic importance of tax avoidance has been addressed in several recent studies 
(e.g. OECD, 2015 and the European Commission 2015b).2 However, examining the 
relevance of ATP in all EU Member States thanks to a set of comparable indicators largely 
remains an unresolved issue. Hence, the main objective of the study is to assess which 
Member States’ tax rules are effectively being used in ATP structures. Since ATP 
structures involve at least two countries, the Member States’ tax rules can be used in 
different ways in these structures. Therefore, another key aim of this study is to identify 
how Member States’ tax rules are used within ATP structures. Building on this 
information, this study furthermore has the goal to have a broad assessment as to 
whether Member States seem to gain or lose corporate tax base through these tax 
practices. 
  
                                          
2 The terms aggressive tax planning and tax avoidance both describe behaviour against the spirit 
of the law to reduce the tax liability and therefore may be used interchangeably for the purpose 
of this report.  
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2 Characterising aggressive tax planning 
Active management of the tax affairs by (multinational) corporations does not in itself 
result in aggressive tax planning. A number of Member States have actually 
implemented tax provisions which allow firms to lower their overall tax burden if they 
change their behaviour in the desired way (e.g. invest more in qualifying R&D 
expenditure). To separate these aspects from aggressive tax planning, this section first 
clarifies the boundaries of ATP used for this report. Based on this definition, we describe 
the main channels of tax planning and how model ATP structures relate to them. 
Subsequently, we illustrate in which different ways the tax systems of the Member 
States can be used within the various ATP structures. Finally, we outline the potentially 
important role of third country jurisdictions.  
2.1 Definition and boundaries of aggressive tax planning 
In line with the ATP study (2015, p. 23), we start with the definition of the European 
Commission (2012), which describes aggressive tax planning as “taking advantage of 
the technicalities of a tax system or of mismatches between two or more tax systems 
for the purpose of reducing tax liability.”  
While it is theoretically possible to draw a line between acceptable tax planning and 
aggressive tax planning, the boundaries will in reality be somewhat blurred.  
Figure 1 presents some firm behaviour on a continuum of tax aggressiveness. The 
continuum ranges from activities, which are clearly in the spirit of the law e.g. claiming 
tax credits or using loss carry forwards etc., to behaviour which is clearly illegal, i.e. tax 
evasion.  
Figure 1: Boundaries of ATP definition 
Source: own illustration 
The bracket in Figure 1 highlights the boundaries of ATP for the purpose of this study, 
i.e. behaviour of MNEs, which substantially reduces their tax burden and runs against 
the spirit of the law. Such a definition still aims to exclude tax planning by domestic or 
standalone companies and tax reductions, which are clearly intended by the policy 
makers. Furthermore, in line with the ATP study, it excludes all illegal measures to lower 
the tax burden. 
The use of a continuum in Figure 1 highlights the difficulties of defining sharp boundaries 
of ATP. This also implies that several of the indicators will partly include non-aggressive 
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tax planning and their outcome. Since we rely on publicly available information and are 
not always able to fully identify the underlying causes of reallocations or reductions of 
the corporate tax base, the proposed indicators are most likely to partly include non-
ATP behaviour. That said, the current analysis provides a partial analysis of ATP, since 
we are necessarily excluding relevant issues in international taxation (e.g. lack of 
reliable coverage of permanent establishments in publicly available information), due to 
data constraints. In this light, the results of the study should be interpreted with some 
caution.  
2.2 Main channels and defining features of aggressive tax planning 
The empirical economic literature identifies different channels used by MNEs to lower 
their corporate tax burden. A recent survey by Heckemeyer and Overesch (2017), 
identifies two main strategies: i) the use of both internal and external debt and ii) the 
use of transfer pricing and licensing of intellectual property.3 Overesch (2016) 
distinguishes along the same line, but also separates the relocation of intellectual 
property and the corresponding use of royalty payments from general strategic transfer 
pricing. Additionally, Overesch (2016) discusses tax reducing repatriation strategies as 
a part of tax planning by MNEs. The restructuring of the corporate group in order to 
benefit from bilateral tax treaties is also discussed under the term treaty shopping.4 
Furthermore, the tax law literature has a stronger focus on more complicated ATP 
structures, and also stresses the importance of hybrid structures. The European 
Commission (2012) and consequently the ATP study also refer to this channel as 
“mismatch” highlighting that the same transaction or entity is legally treated differently 
in two countries.  
We group the channels into three broad categories based on the main mechanism at 
work. Broadly following the logic of the ZEW study, Table 1 summarises the relation 
between the three ATP channels and the specific ATP structures.5 
  
                                          
3 Dharmapala (2014) reviews similar empirical evidence with a focus on the BEPS initiative and 
has a much stronger focus on profit shifting. 
4 See also Avi-Yonah and Panayi (2010) for a discussion about treaty shopping. 
5 We present the main ATP channels and examples of specific ATP structures in the main text and 
refer interested readers to the more detailed description in the Appendix A. 
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Table 1: ATP, main mechanisms and corresponding ATP structures  
ATP channel Economic mechanisms at work 
Corresponding ATP structures 
ATP study ZEW study 
Tax planning via 
interest payments 
Interest costs are deducted in 
target entity and not taxed/taxed 
at zero rate in offshore entity 
Offshore loan Financing via Offshore 
Interest costs are deducted in 
target entity and taxed at a lower 
rate in lower tax entity 
n.a. Financing via Average a 
Interest costs are deducted in 
target entity and treated as 
dividend income (and exempted) in 
other entity 
Hybrid loan 
Hybrid financing 
via Offshore 
/Average 
Interest costs are deducted in 
target entity, while interest cancels 
out because target entity is 
transparent for other entity 
Hybrid entity n.a. 
Deemed interest costs are 
deducted in target entity, while no 
interest is paid/received by other 
entities 
Interest-free 
loan n.a. 
Tax planning via 
royalty payments 
Royalty costs are deducted in 
target entity and not taxed/taxed 
at zero rate in offshore entity 
n.a. IP tax planning via Offshore 
Royalty costs are deducted in 
target entity and taxed at a 
reduced rate in patent box entity 
Patent box  
IP tax planning 
via IP-box 
countries 
Royalty costs are deducted in 
target entity and taxed at a 
reduced rate in lower tax entity 
n.a. IP tax planning via Average a 
Royalty costs are deducted in 
target entity and royalty income is 
not taxed in receiving entity which 
is legal but not tax resident 
Two-tiered IP n.a. 
Royalty costs are deducted in 
target entity, and income arises in 
tax free entity 
IP and cost 
contribution 
agreement 
n.a. 
Strategic transfer 
pricing of goods 
and services 
Prices for intra-firm transactions 
are distorted to increase profits in 
lower tax entity at the expense of 
higher tax entities 
n.a. n.a. 
Notes: a The ZEW study uses the average rates as a technical assumption. But without a lower tax rate 
the mechanism of this ATP channel does not deliver tax benefits. See also the higher average tax burden 
under this channel in Table 2. 
Source: Own considerations based on ZEW study (2016) and ATP study (2015)  
The ATP channel based on income shifting through interest payments is at the 
heart of several ATP structures presented in the ATP study and the ZEW study. The most 
obvious ATP structures falling into this category are the offshore loan ATP structure and 
the corresponding financing via offshore/average structures. Additionally, we include 
the hybrid loan ATP structures, the hybrid entity ATP structure and the interest free loan 
ATP structure in the income shifting through interest payments channel. The main 
reason is that the tax base in the target entity is reduced via the interest deduction. In 
contrast to the offshore/average loan ATP structures the interest payments are not 
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received in a lower or no tax country. Due to a legal mismatch of the treatment of the 
interest payment in the receiving entity, the financial flow is exempted from taxation.  
The ATP channel based on the income shifting through royalty payments have in 
common that the tax base in the target entity is reduced through a deduction of royalty 
costs. The tax saving in most ATP structures using this channel results from lower 
taxation of the royalty payments in the receiving lower tax entity. This lower tax burden 
on the royalty received is either due to a generally lower corporate tax rate or to a 
specific regime benefitting income from intellectual property (a patent box).  
The ATP channel of using strategic transfer pricing of goods and services for internal 
transactions is not directly presented in any of the specific ATP structures in the ATP or 
the ZEW study. By mispricing internal transactions, corporate tax base is reallocated to 
jurisdictions where lower taxes are levied. 
Finally, it is worth noting that treaty shopping is not included as separate ATP channel 
in this study. Under the term treaty shopping, we subsume the diverting of dividend 
flows with the aim to reduce/eliminate the tax burden on the repatriation of the profits. 
Nevertheless, treaty shopping may remain an important part of offshore ATP structures 
since the repatriation of profits from non-Member States may still be subject to 
withholding taxation.  
Before discussing the different channels in more detail Table 2 summarises the main 
findings regarding the impact of profit shifting on the Cost of Capital (CoC) and the 
Effective Average Tax Rate (EATR) of the ZEW study (2016).  
Table 2: Cost of Capital and Effective Tax Rate in ZEW study (2016) 
      Mean CoC Mean EATR 
Baseline      5.7 21.1 
Profit shifting via 
interest 
payments 
Financing via ‘offshore treaty’ 4.1 16.2 
Financing via ‘offshore no treaty’ 6.0 36.4 
Financing via ‘EU average’ 5.8 21.6 
Hybrid financing via ‘EU average’ 3.8 14.3 
Profit shifting via 
royalty payments 
IP via ‘offshore treaty’  
only intangible 4.7 2.0 
all assets 5.5 17.5 
IP via ‘offshore no 
treaty’ 
only intangible 11.4 40.7 
all assets 6.9 25.2 
IP via ‘EU average’  
only intangible 5.1 18.2 
all assets 5.6 20.7 
IP via ‘most beneficial IP 
regime in EU’ 
only intangible 2.3 -0.9 
all assets 5.1 16.9 
Source: ZEW study (2016) 
The results in Table 2 show a strong reduction in the average CoC and EATR for both 
channels. At the same time, the reduction only materialises if the tax planning is done 
through a country with a lower tax burden and a tax treaty in force.  
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2.2.1 Income shifting through interest payments 
The fact that interest costs are usually deductible from the tax base, allows for an 
internal financing structure, to reallocate corporate income to a lower tax jurisdiction. 
The European Commission (2015b) refers to the meta-analysis of Heckemeyer and 
Overesch (2013), which attributes up to one third of the observed profit shifting to the 
debt shifting channel.6 Using a combined empirical framework, Loretz and Mokkas 
(2015) find the debt channel being dominant for their subsample of European firms. The 
importance of debt financing to reduce the corporate tax burden is well known and 
several countries have already established legal measures to reduce aggressive tax 
planning using this channel such as e.g. interest limitation rules.7 For example, Büttner 
and Wamser (2013) investigate the role of internal debt in tax planning for Germany 
MNEs, and find that the CFC rules have successfully reduced the extent of tax revenue 
losses for Germany.8  
Figure 2 depicts an ATP structure relying on the financing via an offshore loan.9 An 
offshore subsidiary is set up in country B (with lower or no corporate taxation) and 
financed by the parent company in Member State A. The money is lent on to the target 
subsidiary in Member State C, which pays interest in turn. The interest payments are 
deductible from the profits in the target entity and thereby reduce the tax burden there. 
The interest income is taxable in the offshore subsidiary, but since the tax rate in this 
country is zero (or significantly lower), the overall tax burden is reduced.  
On the right-hand side of Figure 2 we identify the main characteristics we can observe 
in the different entities of the MNE engaged in ATP structure based on interest 
payments. Additionally, Table 3 summarises the information and links the characteristics 
to the indicators in Section 3. 
                                          
6 The revised version of the paper (Heckemeyer and Overesch, forthcoming, p. 18f) finds “[…] a 
share of profit shifting that can be attributed to non-financial shifting mechanisms of at least two-
third or above”. 
7 The anti-avoidance directive (Council directive (EU) 2016/1164) also provides for CFC rules in 
Article 7 and interest limitation rules.  
8 They conclude that “the upper limit for the implied tax-elasticity of reported profits due to profit 
shifting is around 0.11 percent” (Büttner and Wamser, 2013, p. 84) compared to estimates of 1.3 
to 2 in the previous literature. However, Büttner et al. (2012) find that CFC rules have resulted 
in a shift towards external debt.  
9 This builds on the financing via offshore structre in the ZEW study and shares the main 
characteristics with the offshore loan ATP structure in the ATP study. See also the Appendix A for 
a detailed description. 
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Figure 2: ATP structures - Tax planning via interest payments 
 
Source: Own illustration based on ZEW study (2016) and ATP study (2015)  
Table 3: Summary characteristics ATP via interest payments 
Level of 
information 
MNE Group - 
Headquarter country 
Offshore Company – 
Lower Tax country 
Subsidiary – Target 
country  
MNE group 
level 
[5b] Ownership structure: at least one subsidiary in a lower tax country 
[6a] Consolidated ETR is lower than the statutory tax rate in the 
headquarter country 
[6b] Gap between consolidated pre-tax profitability and consolidated 
operating profitability 
Country level [5a] No binding/effective CFC rules 
[1a] No / zero CIT rate / 
lower CIT rate 
 
Subsidiary 
level  
  [7a] [7b] Higher pre-tax profitability  
[7a] [7b] Lower pre-
tax profitability  
 [9a] [9b] Higher 
financial profitability 
[9a] [9b] Lower 
financial profitability 
 [10a] [10b] Lower 
interest payments  
[10a] [10b] Higher 
interest payments  
  [11a] [11b] Lower debt share 
[11a] [11b] Higher 
debt share 
Notes: The numbers in squared brackets refer to the indicators as described in Section 3. 
Source: Own consideration based on ZEW study (2016) and ATP study (2015)  
Successful ATP strategies should be reflected in a lower consolidated tax burden for 
the MNE group overall. One obvious candidate for the measurement of this feature is 
a lower effective tax rate (ETR) observed in the consolidated accounts of the MNE. When 
comparing the consolidated ETRs of MNEs to similar domestic corporations, the use of 
ATP structures should be reflected in a significantly lower tax burden. As empirical 
approach to compare MNEs and domestic companies, we can follow the logic of Egger 
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et al. (2010) and match on observable characteristics.10 However, there are number of 
other reasons for lower effective tax burden, so the reverse conclusion that a lower 
effective tax burden is always due to ATP is not generally possible. Furthermore, the 
expectation of a lower consolidated ETR builds on the assumption that the ATP 
structures primarily affect the tax liabilities but leave the tax base unchanged. In 
contrast, if the ATP structure reduces the corporate tax base, we will not necessarily 
see a difference in the effective tax burden, but rather see a difference in the pre-tax 
profitability. Hence, an alternative indicator of successful ATP structures is a larger gap 
between operating profitability and pre-tax profitability in the consolidated MNE 
accounts.11  
The second characteristic for the headquarter entity originates directly from legal 
analysis in the ATP study. The financing via offshore loan ATP structure demand that 
the headquarter country has no (binding and effective) CFC rules. Most of the 
ATP channels include an intra-firm transaction, which results in the taxable income being 
transferred to a zero or lower tax country. If the headquarter country has binding CFC 
rules, these ATP channels are closed down by including the foreign income in the 
headquarters tax base. Hence for the offshore financing ATP structure and for most of 
the other ATP structures a headquarter country not imposing CFC rules is a pre-
requisite. 
The next key feature of the financing via offshore loan ATP structure is the fact that the 
MNE group has a subsidiary in a zero/lower tax country. All ATP channels 
designed to relocate the tax base to a country with no respectively a significantly lower 
tax burden require that at least one of the MNE subsidiaries is located in such a country. 
The use of financial transactions to relocate the corporate tax base to the zero/lower 
tax country will be reflected in a higher (financial) profitability in the offshore entity.  
The relocation of the tax base via the financial transaction is also evident through a 
lower (financial) profitability in the target entity. This indirectly reflects the 
deduction of the interest payments. Likewise, we should see a higher debt share and 
higher interest payments. These characteristics of the target entity hold true also for 
the ATP structures using hybrid instruments and for the interest-free loan ATP structure. 
All these ATP structures have the deduction of interest payments and the corresponding 
lower (financial) profitability in the target entity in common. The differences to the 
offshore loan ATP structure lie in the mismatch in the legal treatment in the receiving 
entity. See Appendix A for a more detailed description of the mechanisms in ATP 
structures based on hybrid instruments and mismatches.  
2.2.2 Income shifting through royalty payments 
Early empirical evidence for the link between intangible assets and tax planning has 
been established by Grubert and Slemrod (1998), who show that intangible assets are 
                                          
10 Egger et al. (2010) use a propensity score matching approach, which identifies the likelihood 
of a firm becoming a MNE. The comparison between MNE and domestic firms which were originally 
equally likely to become an MNE then allows separating the self-selection effect from the effect 
of being a MNE.  
11 Economic theory and empirical tests (e.g. Maffini and Mokkas, 2011) suggest that more 
profitable firms select to become MNE groups. Therefore, the consolidated profitability measures 
are not used as indicators for the identification of roles of entities.  
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a key determinant for investment and profit shifting between US and Puerto Rico. 
Similarly, Grubert (2003) finds that R&D intensive subsidiaries engage in a greater 
volume of intercompany transactions, which is seen as indirect evidence for tax 
planning. More directly Desai et al. (2006) show that R&D intensive firms are more likely 
to use tax havens, and Grubert and Mutti (2009) highlight that check-the-box rules in 
the US have fostered the setup of hybrid entities to move intangible assets to lower tax 
jurisdictions. Lipsey (2010) even starts from the assumption that intangible assets are 
by nature not bound to a jurisdiction and as a result the final reported location is mainly 
due to legal and tax reasons. Using European data, Dischinger and Riedel (2011) find a 
significant negative tax effect on the location of intangible assets within MNEs.  
More recent contributions shift their focus from the broader concept of intangibles, to 
the location of intellectual property, specifically patents. Starting with Karkinsky and 
Riedel (2012), the analyses build on firm-level data linked to the information from the 
European patent office. Karkinsky and Riedel (2012) find a negative effect of corporate 
taxes on the location of patent holdings within MNEs, while at the same time a strong 
tendency towards holding the patent at the headquarter is observed. The negative effect 
of corporate taxation on the holding of patent is also found in Ernst and Spengel (2011) 
and Griffith et al. (2014). The latter are also taking into account a quality measure of 
the patents. The strong negative impact of taxation on the quality rather the simple 
quantity of patent applications is central to the studies of Ernst et al. (2014) and Böhm 
et al. (2015).  
Yet another angle of the impact of taxation on the patenting activities of firms is 
investigated in Evers et al. (2015) and Alstadsæter et al. (2015) who particularly focus 
on the role of patent boxes. While Evers et al. (2015) calculate the effective tax 
reduction offered because of the various patent box regimes, Alstadsæter et al. (2015) 
are the first to comprehensively investigate the impact of the patent boxes on the 
location of patents. 
The fast-growing literature on the impact of corporate taxation on the location of 
intangible assets and the recent focus on patent boxes already indicate that intangible 
assets and the related royalty payments may be used in aggressive tax planning 
strategies. Figure 3 describes an ATP structure which uses royalty payments.12 Central 
to the ATP structure using royalty payments is the lower tax rate on royalties received 
in country B. In combination with the tax deduction of the royalties paid by the 
subsidiary in country C, this significantly lowers the overall tax burden of the MNE. 
Country B in Figure 3 can represent two types of countries. When we refer to a patent 
box country, the lower tax burden on the royalty income in country B is the result of a 
reduced tax rate for royalty income in a patent box. Alternatively, if we refer to a no/zero 
or lower income tax rate country, country B taxes all types of income at a lower rate. 
The right-hand side of Figure 3 again identifies the main features of the ATP channel 
using royalty payments and Table 4 summarises the link to the indicators of the next 
section. 
                                          
12 This reflects the mechanism of the patent box ATP structures presented in the ZEW study, while 
the corresponding ATP structures from the ATP study are once again described in the Appendix 
A. 
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Figure 3: ATP structures – Tax planning via royalty payments 
 
Source: Own illustration based on ZEW study (2016)  
Table 4: Summary characteristics ATP via royalty payments 
Level of 
information 
MNE Group - 
Headquarter country 
Offshore Company – 
Lower Tax country 
Subsidiary –  
Target country  
MNE group 
level 
[5b] Ownership structure: at least one subsidiary in a lower tax country 
[5d] Ownership structure: at least one subsidiary in a patent box country 
[6a] Consolidated ETR is lower than the statutory tax rate in the 
headquarter country 
Country level [5a] No binding/effective CFC rules 
[1a] No / zero CIT rate 
[1b] Patent box in place 
 
Subsidiary 
level  
  [7a] [7b] Higher pre-tax profitability  
[7a] [7b] Lower pre-
tax profitability  
 [8a] [8b] Higher 
operating profitability 
[8a] [8b] Lower 
operating profitability 
 [12a] [12b] More 
intangible assets  
[10a] [10b] Less 
intangible assets  
  [13a] [13b] More patents granted 
[11a] [11b] Less 
patents granted 
Country-pair 
level  [15] Royalty inflow [15] Royalty outflow 
Notes: The numbers in squared brackets refer to the indicators as described in Section 3. 
Source: Own consideration based on ZEW study (2016) and ATP study (2015)  
For the headquarter country and the MNE group overall, the features are similar to the 
other ATP structures. First, the lack of a binding CFC rule ensures that profits taxed in 
a lower tax jurisdiction are not included in the tax base of the headquarter. Secondly, 
the use of an ATP structure should be reflected in a lower consolidated tax burden for 
the MNE. A pre-requisite for the patent box ATP structure is a subsidiary in a country 
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which offers lower rates through a patent box. In the lower tax entity we should see 
more patents/intangible assets and a higher (operating) profitability. In line 
with the ATP structure using interest payments, we expect a higher pre-tax profitability 
in the lower tax entity. Due to the different ATP channel, the higher profitability should 
also be present in the operating profitability, while the financial profits are not affected.  
The target entity in Member State C is characterised through a lower (operating) 
profitability. The deduction of the royalty costs result in a lower operating profit as well 
as in a lower profit and loss before taxation. Again, in contrast to the offshore loan ATP 
structure the financial profits are not affected through the patent box ATP channel. 
Finally, it is worth noting that instead of relocating the royalty bearing intangible assets 
into a country which offers lower rates through a patent box, it is also possible to achieve 
the overall tax savings by using a zero tax/lower tax country. Since the zero tax 
countries are outside the EU, the lack of a binding CFC rule and the ability to repatriate 
the dividends without additional repatriation taxes become more relevant. 
2.2.3 Strategic transfer pricing 
The strategic pricing of intra-firm cross-border transactions can be one of the most 
direct channels of tax planning.13 MNEs are able to relocate their profits by over-pricing 
exports from subsidiaries in lower tax jurisdictions or under-pricing imports in high tax 
jurisdiction. This general principle applies to all intra-company transactions including 
payments for the use of intangibles assets or debt payments. However, because of low 
data availability for these categories, we specifically focus in this subsection on the 
mispricing of intra-firm sales of goods.  
Early empirical evidence about the economic importance of strategic transfer pricing is 
mostly dealing with transactions between US-based MNEs and their tax haven affiliates. 
While early papers provide indirect evidence by looking at differences in profitability, 
Clausing (2003) is the first to use firm-level export data to compare prices of intra-firm 
transactions to the prices of arms-length transactions.14 She finds that intra-firm import 
prices change by 1.8 percent as a reaction of a one percent change in the tax rate. This 
finding is in line with Bernard et al. (2006) who use a more sophisticated approach, and 
find that, while prices of intra-firm trade are significantly below arms-length 
transactions, they differ according to the tax rate of the subsidiary country. The overall 
tax loss for the US Treasury is estimated to be 4.8 billion US dollars.15 There is also 
evidence for European countries. Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) use industry level 
data for OECD countries and find the very strong result that up to 65 percent of 
additional tax revenues following a corporate tax increase may be lost through transfer 
pricing. In contrast, using firm-level trade data from French firms, Davies et al. (2015) 
find that only a small number of firms (about 7% of multinationals) engages into transfer 
pricing, via exports to at most ten countries, and is responsible for a tax revenue loss 
of up to 1 percent of the total French corporate tax revenues. Based on a less precise 
                                          
13 Most MNE groups are at least to some extent vertically integrated and sell intermediate inputs 
to other entities within the MNE group. In consequence, no further structure needs to be set up 
to use this channel of ATP.  
14 See Hines (1997) for a survey of early empirical papers on profit shifting by US MNEs. 
15 This is much lower than the estimate of Pak and Zdanowicz (2002) who simply compare the 
unit prices of good across destinations and find an estimated tax loss of 53.1 billion US dollar for 
2001.  
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identification strategy, Vicard (2015) finds that strategic transfer prices translate into a 
loss of French corporate tax base of around 8 billion US dollar.16  
Figure 4 describes the mechanism of the strategic transfer pricing ATP structure and 
Table 5 links the characteristics to the indicators of Section 3.  
Figure 4: ATP structure - Strategic transfer pricing  
 
Source: Own illustration 
The pre-requisite for this ATP channel is the presence of a subsidiary in a country with 
a zero or lower corporate tax rate. This lower tax entity then is engaged in intra-firm 
sales to a subsidiary, i.e. the target entity, in a country with a higher tax rate.  
By strategically mispricing this intra-firm transaction, corporate tax base is relocated 
from the target entity in the higher tax country to the lower tax entity in the zero/lower 
tax country. The prices will be set artificially high for imports from zero/lower tax 
countries or artificially low for imports from the target entity. This results in a higher 
operating profitability in the zero/lower tax entity and a lower operating profitability in 
the target entity. These features are similar with the patent box ATP structure. However, 
in contrast to the ATP channel using royalty payments, we see no abnormal distribution 
of patent of intangible assets, but only distorted import prices.  
  
                                          
16 Specifically, Vicard (2015) assumes that all transactions to a country where the MNE has a 
subsidiary are intra-firm and thereby the study is likely to overestimate the extent of intra-firm 
transactions.  
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Table 5: Summary characteristics ATP via transfer pricing 
Level of 
information 
MNE Group - 
Headquarter country 
Offshore Company – 
Lower Tax country 
Subsidiary –  
Target country  
MNE group 
level 
[5b] Ownership structure: at least one subsidiary in a lower tax country 
[6a] Consolidated ETR is lower than the statutory tax rate in the 
headquarter country 
Country level [5a] No binding/effective CFC rules 
[1a] No / zero CIT rate / 
lower CIT rate 
 
Subsidiary 
level  
  [7a] [7b] Higher pre-tax profitability  
[7a] [7b] Lower pre-
tax profitability  
 [8a] [8b] Higher 
operating profitability 
[8a] [8b] Lower 
operating profitability 
Country-pair 
level  [14] Import price anomalies 
Notes: The numbers in squared brackets refer to the indicators as described in Section 3. 
Source: Own consideration 
In line with the other ATP structures which relocate the corporate tax base to a 
zero/lower tax entity, it is important for the MNE group to be able to repatriate the 
profits without additional taxation. To highlight the importance of international 
repatriation strategies, we include separate indicators for treaty shopping. The 
international corporate tax environment can be seen as a network of jurisdictions. MNEs 
can exploit differences in the national tax codes and bilateral tax treaties in several 
ways, among them the practice of tax treaty shopping. This involves MNE’s funneling 
investment through a third country, rather than investing directly in a host country, to 
take advantage of treaty provisions not found between the host and the home country 
of the investment. More than one conduit country can be involved in such tax minimizing 
routes. This ATP practice leads to a tax revenue loss for national governments.  
The literature on treaty shopping has so far mainly considered its effect on FDI, and 
then direct evidence is scarce. Weyzig (2013) makes use of micro data of Dutch Special 
Purpose Entities (SPE’s) from 2007. By relating these flows to the direct FDI flows from 
the Balance of Payment statistics, he finds structural FDI diversion via the Netherlands. 
Weichenrieder and Mintz (2010) construct for German multinationals in 2001 the chains 
of corporate structures across various countries and relate these to the underlying fiscal 
motives. The level of withholding taxes is found to be important in determining, which 
countries are used as investment platforms in repatriation strategies. 
Van’t Riet and Lejour (2014) apply a network analysis to investigate worldwide treaty 
shopping. They find that the potential reduction of dividend repatriation taxes for MNE’s 
by using tax minimizing routes is on average six percentage points. 
MNE’s respond to the tax parameters of the international system set by the Members 
States and other national governments. These parameters are the rates of the corporate 
income tax and withholding taxes as well as double tax relief methods. In addition, 
countries engage in signing bilateral tax treaties with reduced rates and sometimes 
preferential double tax relief. The entirety of the tax parameters of an individual country 
determines its role in the international corporate tax system and its potential for 
accommodating tax treaty shopping, i.e. the role of a conduit country. Van’t Riet and 
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Lejour (2014) identify potential conduit countries with a measure that captures 
centrality in the international tax network. 
This network analysis focuses on dividend repatriation routes, which seek to minimise 
taxation on dividend payments. Such tax planning can be combined with strategic 
location of intangible assets and intellectual property or debt shifting. The network 
analysis however takes the host country taxation of corporate income as given, while 
royalty payments or interest payments typically reduce this tax base, and hence is not 
suited to address the interaction. The use of interest or royalty payments is covered by 
two separate model ATP structures, discussed above.  
2.3 Use of Member States’ tax rules in aggressive tax planning 
From the above described ATP structures, we can identify different roles the entity 
located in the Member States can take. We distinguish four different roles. First there is 
the role of the headquarter. This role is mostly characterised through the fact that the 
headquarter country has no binding and effective CFC rules. Furthermore, the tax 
rules applicable in the headquarter country also affect the tax treatment of repatriated 
profits, which in turn affects the relevance of tax treaty shopping strategies. E.g. if the 
headquarter country has only signed few tax treaties, rerouting of dividend flows can 
be a tax optimal strategy. Per definition, we only treat the country of the global ultimate 
owner as the headquarter country. This implies that we do not consider intermediate 
owners as headquarters, i.e. we do not classify companies owned by other corporate 
owners as headquarter entities. Consequently, only one country per MNE group can be 
identified as a headquarter country.  
The role of a headquarter differs from the other roles because it is the only role which 
is not exclusive. We allow for the headquarter entities to also take the other roles with 
the same criteria applicable than for other entities within the MNE group. This reflects 
that there is nothing to prevent from the situation that the headquarter country is also 
gaining or losing corporate tax base. On the contrary, once the ATP structures are 
reduced to their bare minimum, it is often the case that, there are just two entities in 
two countries involved. In consequence, the country where the headquarter is located 
is then either the target country or the lower tax country.  
A Member State can be identified as the target country. For the purpose of this study, 
we define the target country as the country losing corporate tax base as a result of the 
ATP structures. There are two different ways to lose corporate tax base. First, there is 
a deduction which reduces the taxable profits and second there is the non-inclusion of 
taxable income. In most of the ATP structures considered in this study, both aspects 
play a role. However, treating both countries as target countries would result in double-
counting in most instances.17 Therefore, we treat an entity as a target entity, only if it 
sees a reduction in corporate tax base because of a deduction directly related to the 
ATP channel.  
                                          
17 Consider for example the offshore loan ATP structure as depicted in Figure 3. The target entity 
in Member State C sees a reduction of the corporate tax base because of the deduction of the 
interest costs. In the headquarter entity in Member State A, this tax base is not included because 
the CFC rules are not binding. Treating this entity as target entity as well, would result in counting 
one transaction twice.  
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The lower tax country hosts lower tax entities, which are defined as entities that 
attract corporate tax base through the ATP structures. Here it is necessary to draw a 
distinction between a typical zero/no corporate tax country, which is a country that is 
not taxing corporate profits at all, and a lower tax country. Since there is no Member 
State with a corporate income tax rate of zero the zero/no tax countries are per 
definition always third countries. Whether a country can be used in the role of a lower 
tax country is even less trivial. Being a lower tax country does not only depend on the 
characteristics of the country itself, but also on the group structure of the MNE. For 
example, a subsidiary in Ireland (12.5 % corporate tax rate) may take the role of a 
lower tax entity if parts of the MNE are located in Austria (25 % corporate tax rate). At 
the same time, if the MNE is in addition to the Irish subsidiary only located in Bulgaria 
(10 % corporate tax rate), the entity in Ireland does not qualify as a lower tax entity. 
To operationalise this, we take a 5-percentage point difference to a higher tax country 
within the same MNE, as the pre-requisite for qualifying as a lower tax country.  
Some ATP structures include entities which are not gaining or losing significant tax base 
themselves, but are nonetheless needed for an ATP structure to exist. We name 
countries with subsidiaries playing this role conduit countries. It is important to note 
that the role of a conduit country can be very different, depending on the ATP structure. 
It can be an intermediate subsidiary, which allows tax efficient repatriation, or it can 
also be an entity which channels through profits to disguise the mechanisms of the ATP 
structure role as described in the ATP study. Given that we concentrate on the main 
channels of ATP and combine ATP structures which use the same mechanism, this poses 
the problem that we subsume very different types of entities under the term conduit 
entities. Together with the lack of detailed information about intra-firm transactions this 
complicates the clear definition of conduit entities. Therefore, we operationalise the 
definition of conduit entities as those entities which are neither target nor lower tax 
entities within a MNE group where we find at least one target entity. This primarily 
highlights the exposure to ATP of this entities and demands for more detailed future 
research for a more complete understanding of the roles of conduit entities. Since ATP 
takes place at the corporate group level and not at the Member States level, it will be 
possible that Member States’ tax rules are used in different roles by different MNEs.  
2.4 Use of third countries in aggressive tax planning 
The scope of this study focuses on the Member States. However, several of the ATP 
structures clearly include non-Member States. Therefore, it is appropriate to extend the 
analysis, at least to some extent to non-Member States. While it is outside the scope of 
the study to fully capture all non-Member States, we will include third countries when 
relevant. In particular, the complete group structure including non-EU Member States 
will be used when identifying the opportunities for ATP structures. Since the coverage 
for non-EU Member States is often less complete, the inclusion of third countries may 
also be achieved by classifying them into functional categories, such as developed 
zero/no tax countries, geographic regions (such as Asia or Africa) and by income level 
regions. Specifically, such consideration of third countries will also build on current work 
by the European Commission (2016) providing a scoreboard for a common EU list of 
non-cooperative tax jurisdictions.  
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3 Economic indicators for aggressive tax planning 
The economic indicators aim to shed some light on the extent and impact of ATP at the 
Member States level. This includes an assessment of how Member States’ tax rules are 
used in ATP structures. This section therefore presents (i) general indicators, which give 
an indication about the overall extent of ATP, and (ii) specific indicators which allow to 
distinguish between the various ATP channels. Further, this section, presents how 
combining several indicators allows to identify the roles of entities within MNE groups in 
the different ATP structures. The methodological considerations about the aggregation 
to country level indicators are complemented by a discussion about data sources and 
limitations.  
3.1 General indicators 
The first category of indicators paints a broad picture of the situation in the Member 
States and does not distinguish between the ATP channels. We therefore refer to them 
as general indicators. Some of the indicators are country-specific by nature, such as 
legal aspects in the Member States, and therefore readily available at country level. 
Other general indicators in contrast are available at the bilateral country-pair level or 
even at the MNE group level and need to be aggregated to the country level.  
3.1.1 General indicators: country level 
Table 6 summarises the country-level indicators and groups them into four categories. 
First, there are the various measures of the statutory tax burden giving an indication 
about the overall corporate tax system in each country. Second, there are the measures 
of corporate tax revenues and the corporate tax base in each country, which give an 
overview of the macro economic situation of the corporate sector. Third, there are some 
measures of the likely exposure to ATP in each Member State. Finally, there are treaty 
shopping indicators which are derived from both the statutory tax system and the 
optimised repatriation routes.  
1. Statutory tax burden  
One obvious starting point is the statutory corporate tax burden. The statutory tax 
burden can be measured with various degrees of complexity, taking into account 
different aspects of the tax base definition. Hence, we define four indicators related to 
the legal definition of the statutory corporate tax burden.  
1a Top statutory corporate tax rate: We use the information from ZEW (2015) about 
the top statutory corporate income tax rate. This measure also includes either averages 
or a typical rate for local profit tax rates and therefore is representative for the tax rate 
a large corporation needs to pay in the respective Member States. Even if the headline 
statutory top corporate tax measure is only an imprecise measure for the actual tax 
burden, it is still the most salient reference point for most tax planning structures. The 
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marginal unit of corporate tax base is usually subject to the top statutory tax rate and 
therefore it is considered as a very important indicator.18 
1b Statutory corporate income tax rate in a patent box: A number of Member 
States offer a lower tax rate for income derived from intellectual property, which is 
captured in the second indicator. Using the information from the ZEW study (2016) and 
Alstadsæter et al. (2015), we define this indicator as the applicable tax rate for the 
income qualifying for the patent box.19  
Table 6: Description of general indicators - country-level 
Indicator Unit and definition Source 
1. Statutory tax burden 
1a Top statutory corporate tax rate In % including local profit taxation ZEW (2015) 
1b Statutory corporate income tax 
rate in a patent box In % ZEW (2016) 
1c Effective average tax burden 
In %, measuring the tax burden 
on a hypothetical investment 
project with 20 % pre-tax profit 
ZEW (2015) 
1d Lack of CFC rule Indicator (binary) for absence of a general CFC rule ATP study (2015) 
2. Corporate tax revenues and base 
2a Corporate tax revenues  In % of GDP  European Commission (Taxation Trends) 
2b Decomposition of Corporate 
income tax revenues 
In %, ratios of corporate income 
tax revenues, gross value 
added, operating surplus, and 
GDP  
Eurostat: AMECO 
database,  
(own calculation) 
3. Exposure to aggressive tax planning 
3a Foreign direct investment  In % of GDP, excluding SPE Eurostat/IMF 
3b Unexplained FDI  
Ratio FDI to FDI predicted 
through GDP and bilateral 
distance 
Eurostat, Mayer and 
Zignago (2011)  
(own calculation) 
3c Activities in foreign controlled 
companies 
Ratio turnover, value added and 
surplus in foreign controlled 
companies to total value added 
Eurostat: Foreign 
affiliate statistics 
3d Market concentration Share of output by firms with more than 250 employees 
Eurostat: Structural 
Business Statistics 
(own calculation) 
4. Treaty shopping indicators 
4a No. Tax Treaties Sum of bilateral tax treaties in force Own calculation 
4b Average repatriation tax direct 
flows 
In %, average of 108 direct 
bilateral repatriation taxes Own calculation 
4c Average repatriation tax 
optimised flows 
In %, average of 108 treaty 
shopping repatriation taxes Own calculation 
4d Attractiveness for treaty 
shopping 
In %, share of optimal 
repatriation strategies which 
involve this country 
Own calculation 
 
Source: Own consideration  
                                          
18 This statement greatly simplifies the complexity of corporate tax planning and ignores separate 
tax treatment for specific types of income, such as a reduced tax rate for income from royalty 
payments in a patent box.  
19 See Table 52 in the appendix for a description of the situation of the patent boxes in Europe. 
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1c Effective average tax burden: The main headline statutory tax rate may give an 
incomplete picture of the generosity of the tax system because it does not take into 
account the tax base definition. Therefore we follow the economic literature and also 
use the effective average tax burden, calculated according to the Devereux and Griffith 
(1998) methodology. The data is available from the European Commission, calculated 
by ZEW. A variant of the effective average tax burden is the tax efficient bilateral 
effective average tax burden. As a development of the standard Devereux and Griffith 
effective tax rate, the ZEW study (2016) calculates bilateral effective tax rates taking 
into account the tax planning opportunities. We use the bilateral information available 
and calculate the most tax efficient effective tax burden for each Member State.20  
1d Lack of a CFC rule: The ATP study provides useful legal information at the Member 
State level. For the purpose of this study we concentrate on the legal indicator which 
identifies the lack of a CFC rule.21 This indicator still needs to be seen with caution, since 
it only looks into the existence of a legal rule and is not measuring its effectiveness.  
2. Corporate tax revenues and base 
2a Corporate tax revenues in % of GDP: One of the main concerns about ATP is the 
undermining of the ability to raise revenues from corporate income taxation. Therefore, 
we use a general indicator measuring the corporate income tax revenues as a 
percentage of GDP. To this end, we use the data available from the European 
Commission (2017) publication about the taxation trends in Europe. 
2b Decomposition of Corporate income tax revenues: Corporate tax revenues 
depend on a series of factors: the tax policy implemented by the government (through 
the choice of the tax rate, the definition of the tax base and the intensity of tax 
enforcement), the profitability of the corporate sector and its size, as well as the 
intensity of ATP. We will try to disentangle the relative contribution of each factor by 
separating the ratio of corporate income tax revenues to GDP into its component parts 
following the approach of Sørensen (2006), Clausing (2007) and Piotrowska and 
Vanborren (2008). As shown below, corporate tax revenues as a percentage of GDP is 
equal to the multiple of the tax rate, the fraction of corporate income that is taxed, the 
ratio between overall corporate income and income from ordinary business transaction 
(excluding profits or losses due to financial transactions) and the share of the corporate 
income in GDP 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺
=  𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
×𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
× 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝑂𝑂𝐺𝐺
× 𝑂𝑂𝐺𝐺
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺
 
where CIT are corporate tax revenues, CB is the corporate tax base, CI is corporate 
income and OP is net operating surplus of the corporate sector. Given that, data on the 
tax base are not readily available we will use a simplified version of the decomposition 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺
=  𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
× 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝑂𝑂𝐺𝐺
× 𝑂𝑂𝐺𝐺
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺
 
                                          
20 We are not using the tax efficient bilateral effective tax rates as separate indicators, but rather 
used them as input for the gravity regression presented in the appendix. 
21 It is worth noting that the ATP study provides a much more comprehensive set of legal rules. 
However, since the strict combination of the legal indicator in Table 28 would rule out most ATP 
structures in most Member States, we concentrate on a general indicator looking at the presence 
of CFC rules. 
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The first term on the right-hand side measures the implicit tax rate on corporate income. 
It is a synthetic indicator of the tax policy implemented by the government. The second 
term measures the relevance of profits and losses from financial transactions. The third 
term measures the weight of corporate profits in GDP.22 
ATP strategies that exploit internal financing or mismatches should have an impact on 
the second term in the product. Furthermore, to the extent that such strategies 
relocated the tax base from higher to lower tax countries, we should observe a negative 
correlation between the implicit tax rate and CI/OP.  
3. Exposure to aggressive tax planning 
3a Foreign direct investment in % of GDP: In line with the OECD (2015) we also 
include the value of FDI as a percentage of GDP as an indicator.23 However, even in the 
BEPS initiative (OECD 2015, p. 20) it is warned that “FDI include both real and BEPS-
related investment and returns, which are difficult or impossible to separate”. Therefore, 
we are conservative with the use of this indicator. Without an adequate control for non-
tax reasons for FDI, we primarily see this indicator as an indication about the exposure 
to ATP. The larger the inbound or outbound FDI stock of a country is, the more we 
expect the Member State being at risk to play any role in ATP structures.  
3b Unexplained Foreign direct investment: In an attempt to disentangle standard 
economic factors from tax reasons, we build on a gravity model for the bilateral FDI 
stock and simulate a FDI position which is predicted only be the geographical location 
and the relative country size (measured by GDP). Comparing this simulated FDI position 
to the observed FDI position will give an indication about the potential impact of taxation 
on FDI.24 Since this measure will also include real responses to taxation, we interpret 
this general indicator still with some caution. But overall strong positive (negative) 
deviations from the bilateral inward FDI positions should indicate that a country benefits 
(loses) from tax induced changes in firm behaviour. ATP is one important but not the 
only one of such tax-induced activities.  
3c Activities in foreign controlled companies: The size of the FDI stock in a country 
does not take into account the extent of the activities and gross profitability of the firms 
held by foreign corporations. To take this into account we define three indicators 
measuring the share of turnover, value added and operating surplus in foreign controlled 
companies. This indicator is derived from the Eurostat foreign affiliates statistics (FATS) 
and aggregated at the country level. Like the share of FDI this indicator serves as a 
measure of exposure to ATP, in the sense that more value added in foreign controlled 
firms increases the impact of potential ATP. The Eurostat FATS outbound data would in 
principle provide the mirror indicator by reporting the activities in subsidiaries abroad 
controlled by firms in the reporting Member State. Since it does not matter for the 
                                          
22 Although this indicator is based on National accounts data and therefore not directly comparable 
to a profit and loss account, one could think of the following analogies: OP ~ turnover, 
CI ~ EBITDA, CIT ~ tax liabilities. 
23 An important aspect is the choice of data source for FDI stocks because they differ with respect 
to the inclusion of Special Purpose Vehicles. See the discussion of the data sources in Section 
3.4.2 for more details.  
24 An alternative approach is to estimate a full structural gravity model to isolate the tax effects. 
See Appendix D for a description of the gravity model and the results from the estimation of a 
simple structural gravity model.  
European Commission 
 
Aggressive tax planning indicators 
 
October 2017 | 40 
mechanisms of ATP structures whether the tax base is relocated from the parent to the 
subsidiary or vice versa, the interpretation of this indicator is identical to the previous 
one. However, due to incomplete country coverage in the FATS outbound data we only 
concentrate on the activities in foreign controlled companies from the inbound statistics. 
3d Market concentration: Typically, the corporate sector and in consequence the 
corporate tax payments are characterised through a very skewed distribution. This 
implies that a large fraction of tax revenues is paid by a few corporations.25 Additionally, 
larger companies are expected to be in a better position to engage in ATP. Therefore, 
the revenue loss is much bigger if larger companies engage in ATP. In sum, we interpret 
a higher value of this indicator as more exposure to ATP for the Member States. 
4. Treaty shopping indicators 
The final group of indicators are the treaty shopping indicators. MNEs respond to the 
tax parameters of the international system set by the Members States and other national 
governments. These parameters are the rates of the corporate income tax and 
withholding taxes as well as double tax relief methods. In addition, countries engage in 
signing bilateral tax treaties with reduced rates and sometimes preferential double tax 
relief. Specifically, we use the following set of indicators.  
4a No. of bilateral tax treaties: The number of bilateral tax treaties, which are in 
force is a simple and easily available indicator. The more bilateral treaties a country has 
signed, the more likely it is that one of the treaties can be used for access to favourable 
conditions to repatriate profits. Therefore, it gives a broad indication about the 
attractiveness of a country for treaty shopping. 
4b Average repatriation tax rate for direct flows: For each individual Member 
State, we compute the repatriation tax rates for inbound and for outbound dividends, 
for direct tax routes for 107 partner countries. The country average of these direct 
bilateral repatriation taxes gives a first indication about the extent a country aims to tax 
dividend flows. Connected to that, it also gives a broad quantification whether this 
country is vulnerable to lose significant tax revenues as a result of tax treaty shopping.  
4c Average repatriation tax rate for tax optimised flows: We use a network 
analysis to identify the optimal – in the sense of tax-minimal - repatriation route for 
dividends. This analysis uses the tax parameters for 2013 in 108 countries.26 We 
calculate then the average repatriation tax for each Member State, when the MNEs are 
able to realise the full potential of treaty shopping. The comparison to the average 
repatriation tax burden for direct flows highlights the importance of treaty shopping. 
The larger the difference is, the more a country could be harmed by treaty shopping.  
4d Attractiveness for treaty shopping: How attractive a Member State is for treaty 
shopping depends on the entirety of the tax parameters. To capture the potential for 
accommodating tax treaty shopping, we use the measure of the centrality in the 
network. This is defined as share of treaty shopping repatriation routes which use the 
Member States. In consequence, a higher value for the centrality measure indicates 
more attractiveness for treaty shopping.  
                                          
25 See for example Devereux and Loretz (2011) for a description of the characteristics of corporate 
taxpayers based on administrative data for the United Kingdom.  
26 See van’t Riet and Lejour (2014) for more detailed description of the network analysis. 
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3.1.2 General indicators: MNE group-level 
The second group of general indicators are at the MNE group-level. We define these 
indicators with the aim to point at the likelihood of ATP at the MNE group level. The 
indicators in this category, broadly summarised in Table 7, build on two main sources 
of information: the ownership structure of the MNE groups – also in combination with 
the legal information of the countries – and information about the tax liabilities and 
profitability in the consolidated accounts.  
The backbone of the MNE group specific indicators will be firm-level information about 
the ownership structure and the financial accounts from Bureau van Dijk.27  
Once a comprehensive overview about the ownership structures of corporate groups is 
established, one can link further firm-specific and country level information. First of all, 
only corporate groups, which have a legal entity in more than one country and in at 
least one EU Member State, are considered in the analysis. In addition to that, all of the 
ATP structures require combinations of countries with certain legal characteristics. 
Therefore, an ownership structure which allows the respective ATP structure is a pre-
requirement.  
5. Ownership structure 
5a Headquarter country has no effective and binding CFC rules: The first of the 
indicator builds on the ATP study and takes into account that a binding and effective 
CFC rule will rule out most of the ATP structures. Combining the legal information with 
the information about the ownership structure from Bureau van Dijk, we can derive the 
first specific indicator.28 For the purpose of this study, we operationalise the headquarter 
company as the highest corporate owner with a majority shareholding we can identify 
in the Bureau van Dijk data. In cases where a public authority or government is listed 
as the global ultimate owner, we use one owner below as the headquarter company.  
5b MNE group has a subsidiary in a lower tax country: The second specific 
indicator combines the ownership information with the general indicator [1a] statutory 
corporate income tax. Since the reduction in the tax liabilities is achieved by relocating 
tax base into an entity which faces a lower statutory tax burden, several of the ATP 
structures require at least one subsidiary in a country with a lower corporate tax rate.29 
In line with the discussion above, we consider a country only as a lower tax country if 
the tax rate is at least 5 percentage points lower than in other parts of the MNE group. 
                                          
27 Bureau van Dijk collects balance sheet, profit and loss account from different national sources 
and brings them into a standardised format. There are different products available, this report 
draws on a comprehensive download from the worldwide database ORBIS and complemented with 
a current download from the European subset Amadeus. See Section 3.4.2 for a discussion of the 
data sources. 
28 There is some ambiguity in the ATP study concerning what constitutes a headquarter company. 
From the description of the ATP structures, one could interpret any corporate entity having control 
over the relevant subsidiaries as the headquarter company. However, from the fact that the 
absence of CFC rules is seen as necessary for the ATP structures we rule any intermediate owner 
out. 
29 It is worth noting, that the ownership information in the Bureau van Dijk data does not allow 
to distinguish whether a subsidiary is also tax resident in the country. 
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Table 7: Description of general indicators - MNE group-level 
  Unit and definition of  
Indicator underlying ratio indicator 
5. Ownership structure 
5a Headquarter country has 
no CFC rules 
Indicator [1d]: country has 
no CFC rule 
Indicator (binary), 1 if ultimate 
owner is in a country with no CFC 
rule 
5b MNE group has a 
subsidiary in a lower tax 
country 
Difference between statutory 
tax rate in entity and highest 
tax rate in MNE group 
Indicator (binary), 1 if tax rate in 
entity is at least 5 pp lower than 
highest in MNE group 
5c MNE group has a 
subsidiary in a no/zero 
tax country 
Lowest tax rate in MNE 
group 
Indicator (binary), 1 if MNE group 
has a subsidiary in a no/zero tax 
country 
5d MNE group has a 
subsidiary in a country 
with a patent box regime 
Presence in a country with 
patent box  
Indicator (binary), 1 if entity is in 
a country offering reduced tax 
rates in a patent box 
5e Conduit entities in 
countries with favourable 
tax treaty conditions 
Presence in a country 
attractive for treaty shopping 
Indicator (binary), 1 if MNE group 
has subsidiary in country which is 
attractive for treaty shopping 
6. Consolidated Effective tax burden and profitability 
6a1 Consolidated effective 
tax burden gap  
In %, Ratio between tax and 
PLBT, by MNE status 
Indicator (binary), 1 if 
consolidated ETR is lower than 
statutory tax rate in headquarter 
country 
6a2 Consolidated effective 
tax burden gap  
In %, Ratio between tax and 
EBIT profit, by MNE status 
6b1 Consolidated profitability 
gap 
In %, ratio between PLBT 
and total assets, by MNE 
status 
6b2 Consolidated profitability 
gap 
In %, ratio between EBIT 
and total assets, by MNE 
status 
Notes: Ratios [6b1] and [6b2] are not considered as indicators because of the difficulty to separate generally 
different profitability of MNEs from the impact of ATP. The ratios only used in the country level distributions.  
 Source: Own consideration 
5c MNE group has a subsidiary in a zero/no tax country: Some of the structures 
in the ATP study require a subsidiary in a country with zero corporate tax rate. 
Therefore, we define an indicator which identifies the presence of a MNE group in a 
country with zero or no corporate income tax. 
5d MNE group has a subsidiary in a country with a patent box regime: Some of 
ATP structures including intangible assets require at least one subsidiary in a patent box 
countries country with a lower corporate tax rate. Akin to the previous indicator, this 
indicator combines the ownership information from Bureau van Dijk with the information 
from the general indicator [1b] statutory corporate income tax in patent box.  
5e Presence in countries with favourable tax treaty conditions: Most of the ATP 
structures require that the intra-company flows of dividends are not subject to additional 
repatriation taxes. For dividend flows within the EU this is in most situations fulfilled 
through the parent subsidiary directive.30 At the same time, several of the ATP 
structures involve non-Member States, where the absence of repatriation taxes is not 
                                          
30 Council directive 2003/123/EC amends the Directive 90/435/EEC with the objective exempt 
dividend payments from withholding taxes to eliminate double taxation at the parent level. 
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trivial. MNEs can opt to re-route their repatriations in a tax efficient manner, a strategy 
also referred to a treaty shopping. We use indicator [4d] about the attractiveness for 
treaty shopping and match this information with the ownership information from the 
Bureau van Dijk data. 
6. Consolidated effective tax burden and profitability 
The main aim of ATP structures is to reduce the tax burden of the MNEs, which should 
be reflected in a lower effective tax rate (ETR) in the consolidated accounts of the MNE 
engaged in ATP. Alternatively, if the ATP channels work through a non-inclusion of 
taxable income, the consolidated profitability of the MNE group should be reduced.  
6a1 Consolidated effective tax burden gap: As a first indication whether MNEs are 
indeed able to reduce their effective tax burden, we use the effective tax burden based 
on the tax liabilities in the consolidated MNEs account. There are several important 
aspects to consider with such an indicator. First, regarding the denominator, we use the 
pre-tax profit and losses (PLBT) as reported in the balance sheet. This denominator has 
the benefit that it is the closest possible approximation to the taxable profit. At the same 
time, the profits and losses before taxation may also be distorted through large 
extraordinary income positions. The second important limitation is due to the loss carry 
forwards. Losses do not result in immediate negative tax liabilities, but rather in a future 
tax reduction. This rules out using observations with losses since the ETR is not 
meaningful in this case. Furthermore, the loss carry forward can result in a clearly 
reduced effective tax burden, even in the absence of ATP. To reduce the impact of the 
timing issues we use an average over full sample period. To separate potential ATP 
activities by MNEs from country specific characteristics which lower tax the effective tax 
burdens for all companies we compare the consolidated ETR measure to domestic firms. 
This highlights in which Member States MNEs are more able to lower their tax burden. 
The comparison, however, is only a rough approximation of ATP since different statutory 
tax rates in the subsidiary countries are affecting this comparison. 
6a2 Consolidated effective tax burden gap: To avoid problems because of large 
extraordinary income positions we also use an alternative definition of ETR based on the 
denominator earnings before interest and taxation (EBIT). This consolidated ETR 
measure will also identify firms which generate overall financial losses as a result of ATP 
structures.  
6b1 Consolidated profitability gap: Several of the ATP channels affect the overall 
(i.e. the consolidated) profit level. In consequence, the consolidated ETR will not 
necessarily reflect ATP strategies. To capture the impact of these ATP structures, we 
also include two measures of consolidated profitability. This approach also helps to 
overcome the drawback of ETRs not being properly defined in the case of non-positive 
profits. In line with the two other consolidated indicators we base the profitability 
measures on two profit measures. The first consolidated profitability indicator is 
therefore based on the PLBT as a share of total assets. We compare once more the 
consolidated profitability measures of MNEs to the consolidated profitability measures 
of purely domestic groups. In this case, however, it is worth noting that the international 
trade literature suggests a selection effect of more profitable firms being more likely to 
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become MNEs. Therefore, the observation of more profitable MNEs may not be 
interpreted as necessarily reflecting the presence of ATP.31 
6b2 Consolidated profitability gap: The second consolidated profitability indicator is 
based on the operating profits and uses EBIT divided through total assets. Following the 
same logic as before, we contrast the consolidated profitability measures with their 
domestic counterparts. Again, the same caveat of MNE groups generally being more 
productive applies. At the same time, the comparison between the two consolidated 
profitability indicators allows to see whether MNEs are able reduce the pre-tax profits 
more than the purely domestic groups. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the consolidated effective tax burden of MNE groups can 
be influenced by numerous aspects unrelated to ATP. Therefore, we take a conservative 
approach and only define one indicator based on the consolidated ETR. Specifically, we 
define an indicator which is unity if the ETR is lower than the statutory tax rate in the 
headquarter country. This indicator is intended to filter out companies with reported 
liabilities apparently inconsistent with ATP. The consolidated profitability measures are 
additionally used in the analysis in Section 4.1. 
3.2 Specific indicators 
The specific indicators are more directly linked to the characteristics of the ATP 
structures, and aim not only to identify the presence of ATP, but also the ATP channel 
and the role played by the specific entity within the MNE. As such, the specific indicators 
are primarily at the level of the individual firm (i.e. parent or subsidiary) within the MNE 
group. In case the relevant information is not available at the firm-level, we complement 
the set of specific indicators with country-pair specific indicators.  
3.2.1 Specific indicators: firm-level 
The specific firm-level indicators - as summarised in Table 8 - are helpful to identify the 
various roles of the entities in the different Member States. At the same time, the simple 
identification of the roles of the entities will fall short of describing the overall extent of 
the ATP activities. Firm specific ratios on their own also reveal little about ATP structures, 
unless we use them in the correct context. Therefore, we evaluate the ratios in 
combination with the relative tax position within the MNE to draw a broader picture at 
the country level.32 Table 8 shows first the definition of the ratios used and then how 
the indicator is defined by comparing the ratio in the specific entity to both the rest of 
the MNE group and to a comparison group based on domestic firms.  
The various ATP structures have the goal to reduce the overall tax burden of the MNE 
by either relocating the tax base to lower tax jurisdictions, or by exploiting the mismatch 
in the qualification of income or entities across different jurisdictions. Either way, the 
distribution of corporate profits will be affected by the use of ATP structures. In the case 
of relocating profits the expected outcome is a reduction in pre-tax profits in MNE 
entities located in high tax countries and a corresponding increase in pre-tax profits in 
MNE entities located in lower tax countries. If a mismatch in tax treatment is exploited, 
                                          
31 See Maffini and Mokkas (2011) for a discussion of this issue. 
32 See subsection 3.4.1 for a discussion about the aggregation and subsection 4.1.5 for the 
results. 
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the overall tax base is reduced because an intra-group transaction produces a deductible 
cost that is not matched by a corresponding taxable income elsewhere. In sum, the 
profit levels in the different entities will be affected differently. Therefore, we start with 
several measures of the profitability of the MNE entities.  
7. Pre-tax profitability 
7a Pre-tax profitability gap within MNE: The most obviously affected profit measure 
is the pre-tax profitability (PLBT) of the firm. Relating the PLBT to the amount of total 
assets gives a measure of the pre-tax profitability of the firm. Alternatively, we also 
relate PLBT to the number of employees to account for the fact that capital stock of a 
firm might be affected by the tax regime as well.33 In the description of the ATP 
structures we find the common feature that the pre-tax profitability of an entity will be 
higher in lower tax countries. The flipside of the coin is a lower profitability in higher tax 
countries. This directly implies that we need a reference point to establish what 
constitutes a lower or higher pre-tax profitability. We take two different approaches to 
define an indicator for lower (higher) profitability. First, we have a comparison between 
the pre-tax profitability in the entity and the average pre-tax profitability of the MNE 
group as a whole. Secondly, we also define the indicator 7b Pre-tax profitability gap 
to domestic companies, which identifies a lower pre-tax profitability by comparing 
the value of the entity to the median value of domestic companies. To reduce the non-
tax reasons for differences in pre-tax profitability, we define the relevant comparison 
group as domestic firms being in the same industry, country and year. At the same 
time, we make sure that the comparison group consists of at least 20 observations, 
from which we take the median value as reference, to rule out a strong impact of outliers 
in the comparison group.34  
8. Operating profitability 
8a Operating profitability gap within MNE. The second pair of indicators follows the 
same logic but use earnings before interest and taxation (EBIT) as measure for the 
profitability of the MNE entity. Again, we use both total assets and number of employees 
as denominator to derive the profitability. The use of two different measures of 
profitability allows to distinguish between ATP structures which only affect pre-tax 
profitability but leave operating profit unchanged and ATP structures which also affect 
operating profits. In line with the previous indicators we first establish what a lower 
operating profitability is, by comparing the value to the average of the MNE group. 
Additionally, we define the 8b operating profitability gap to domestic companies 
indicator by comparing the profitability the domestic counterparts. 
  
                                          
33 See Loretz and Mokkas (2015) for a discussion how profit shifting and tax induced relocation 
of investments are reflected in profit measures.  
34 For most of the Member States coverage is not a big issue. In contrast, for non-Member States 
the coverage is less good. In these cases, we define the comparison group broader to ensure at 
least 20 observations. See Appendix for a more detailed description which industry-country-year 
cells were finally used. 
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Table 8: Description of specific indicators - firm-level 
  Unit and definition of   ATP channel 
Indicator underlying ratio indicator 
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7. Pre-tax profitability   
7a Pre-tax profitability gap 
within MNE in % PLBT divided  
by total assets  
(by no. of employees) 
binary indicator, 1 if PLBT/ASSETS is 
lower than the average 
PLBT/ASSETS of the MNE 
 
X X X 
7b Pre-tax profitability gap 
to domestic companies 
binary indicator, 1 if PLBT/ASSETS is 
lower than the median PLBT/ASSETS 
of comparison group 
 
X X X 
8. Operating profitability   
8a Operating profitability 
gap within MNE in %, EBIT divided  
by total assets  
(by no. of employees) 
binary indicator, 1 if EBIT/ASSETS is 
lower than the median EBIT/ASSETS 
of comparison group 
 
 X X 
8b Operating profitability 
gap to domestic 
companies 
binary indicator, 1 if EBIT/ASSETS is 
lower than the median EBIT/ASSETS 
of comparison group 
 
 X X 
9. Financial profitability    
9a Financial profits gap 
within MNE in %, financial profit/losses divided  
by total assets 
(by no. of employees) 
binary indicator, 1 if FIN_PL/ASSETS 
is lower than the average 
FIN_PL/ASSETS of the MNE 
 
X 
  
9b Financial profits gap to 
domestic companies 
binary indicator, 1 if FIN_PL/ASSETS 
is lower than the median 
FIN_PL/ASSETS of comparison group 
 
X 
  
10. Interest payments   
10a Interest gap within 
MNE 
in %, interest payments 
divided  
by total assets 
(by no. of employees) 
binary indicator, 1 if interest 
payments are lower than the 
average interest payments of the 
MNE 
 
X 
  
10b Interest gap to 
domestic companies 
 
 X   
11. Debt share   
11a Debt share gap within 
MNE in %, current + non-
current liabilities divided 
by total assets 
binary indicator, 1 if debt ratio is 
lower than the average debt ratio of 
the MNE 
 
X 
  
11b Debt share gap to 
domestic companies 
binary indicator, 1 if debt ratio is 
lower than the median debt ratio of 
comparison group 
 
X 
  
12. Intangible assets    
12a Intangibles gap within 
MNE 
in %, intangible assets 
divided by total assets 
binary indicator, 1 if intangible 
assets ratio is lower than the 
average intangible assets ratio of the 
MNE 
 
 X 
 
12b Intangibles gap to 
domestic companies 
binary indicator, 1 if intangible 
assets ratio is lower than the median 
intangible assets ratio of comparison 
group 
 
 X 
 
13. Patent holdings   
13a Patent gap within MNE 
No. of granted patents 
held by firm 
binary indicator, 1 if no. of patents 
held is lower than the average no. of 
patents of the MNE 
  
X   
13b Patent gap to domestic 
companies 
binary indicator, 1 if no. of patents 
held is lower than the median no. of 
patents held of comparison group 
  
X  
Notes: All indicators build on the data from Bureau Van Dijk, see Appendix for more detailed description of 
the definitions. 
Source: Own consideration   
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9. Financial profitability 
9a Financial profitability gap within MNE: Akin to the pre-tax profitability measures, 
we repeat the exercise with the financial profit and losses and use total assets and the 
number of employees as denominator. The financial profit and losses item in the profit 
and loss account contains generally income respectively losses from all financial 
transactions. A substantial part of these profits and losses is expected to be interest 
payments, respectively interest income. Therefore, this indicator will indirectly capture 
flows originating from ATP structures involving internal financing. The comparison to the 
average financial profit in the MNE, will help to identify low financial profits or substantial 
financial losses in one subsidiary. This is especially true if financial losses in the observed 
entity are coinciding with high financial profits in other parts of the subsidiary. If this is 
the case, it points towards an ATP structure using internal debt. If financial losses in 
one country are not coinciding with financial profits in other countries, an ATP structure 
based on a hybrid mismatch may be the underlying cause.35  
9b Financial profitability gap to domestic companies: The indicator comparing the 
financial profits and losses over total assets within MNEs is complemented by the same 
comparison between the MNEs subsidiaries and domestic companies in the respective 
countries. This allows to judge whether the observed financial profits and losses are 
unusually high or low in comparison to the relevant domestic firms. Together with the 
previous indicator, this allows the distinction between financial profits and losses simply 
being reallocated within the MNE, or whether they are higher or lower than from 
domestic companies. Again, it is worth mentioning that the strict interpretation of the 
two indicators in combination crucially depends on an adequate coverage of all relevant 
subsidiaries within the MNE.  
10. Interest payments 
10a Interest gap within MNE: Since financial profit and loss may be too broad as an 
indicator, we also use the item interest paid. While this only covers one side of the 
financial transaction of potential ATP structures using internal debt, it has the benefit of 
measuring the flow more precisely. Previous experience with Bureau van Dijk data has 
however shown that the coverage of interest paid may be less complete. Therefore, we 
do not want to solely rely on the interest gap indicator, but rather see it as a backup of 
the other indicators using financial profit and debt share. The comparison between 
subsidiaries within the same MNE provides now an even clearer picture since the item 
interest paid is one-sided.  
10b Interest gap to domestic companies: The one-sided nature of interest paid 
implies that the comparison to domestic companies should by and large confirm the 
finding of the previous indicator. 
11. Debt share 
11a Debt share gap within MNE: To get more directly towards the ATP channel using 
internal debt financing we also define two indicators based on the liabilities of the 
subsidiaries. Defining the debt share as the ratio between total liabilities (i.e. the sum 
of current and non-current liabilities) and total assets is in line with large parts of the 
                                          
35 That said, missing information about the subsidiary in the target country could bias our results 
away from ATP using internal debt towards ATP structures based on mismatches. 
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literature (e.g. Huizinga et al., 2008). This is a very broad measure of debt and likely 
to overestimate the relevance of internal debt. To have indicators, which clearly identify 
ATP structures using internal financing structures, one would need to distinguish 
between intra-company and external debt. Unfortunately, there is no cross-country 
dataset available, which contains the information about internal and external debt. For 
some countries, confidential datasets including the distinction between different forms 
of debt exist. See for example Büttner et al. (2012) for an analysis using the German 
MIDI dataset and Blouin et al. (2014) using the BEA data for the United States. It would 
be a useful avenue for further research if it would be possible i.) to extend the number 
of countries providing dataset with the distinction between internal and external debt 
and ii.) to link the different national dataset to an international one. But since this is 
clearly outside the scope of this study, we stick to the simple definition of the debt 
share, which we – in line with the approach described above – first compare between 
the different subsidiaries within the same MNE.  
11b Debt share gap to domestic companies: Following the exact same logic as for 
the previous indicators, we also compare the debt share in the MNEs subsidiaries with 
their domestic counterparts. Like the indicator based on interest payments, the debt 
share only looks at one side of the transaction, and therefore the comparison to 
domestic firms should primarily verify the insights from the indicator looking at a 
comparison within the MNE.  
12. Intangible assets 
12a Intangibles gap within MNE: The balance sheet item intangible assets as an 
indicator aims to capture the ATP structures involving the holding of royalty bearing 
assets. Bureau van Dijk does not further specify what is included in the balance sheet 
item intangible assets, so we need to assume that it is a rather broad measure. 
Therefore, we have to bear in mind that it may also include non-royalty bearing items 
such as acquired goodwill. Therefore, the indicator may only be seen as a crude 
approximation. We measure our intangible assets indicator as fraction of total assets in 
order to filter out pure size effects. The comparison between subsidiaries within the 
same MNE follows the logic introduced above. However, it is additionally worth pointing 
out that we expect a tendency of MNEs to keep intangible assets in the headquarter 
country.36 
12b Intangibles gap to domestic companies: The second comparison of the location 
of intangible assets is again with domestic companies. Similar to the argument raised 
by comparing the profitability of domestic companies to MNEs one has to bear in mind 
that we would expect MNEs to have a large share of intangible assets. Nevertheless, in 
combination with the information about the tax burden, we should be able to detect tax 
driven behaviour.  
13. Patent holdings 
13a Patent gap within MNE: Since the balance sheet item intangible assets is only a 
crude approximation we will also look at the information about patent holdings by MNEs. 
Again, in addition to the comparison within the MNE we also define a second indicator 
                                          
36 See Dischinger et al. (2014) for an empirical study about the home bias in profit shifting in 
general and Karkinsky and Riedel (2011) for evidence that patents being held at the headquarter 
country over-proportionally. 
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13b Patent gap to domestic companies, looking at the difference in comparison to 
domestic firms.  
3.2.2 Specific indicators: country-pair-level 
The last group of indicators are specific to ATP structures but not available at the firm-
level. To this end, we match bilateral country-pair level and product-country-pair-level 
data on the firm-level data. Table 9 collects the indicators related to bilateral import 
price anomalies and to royalty payments. Table 9 also follows the logic from the 
description of the firm specific indicators and presents first the underlying ratios which 
are evaluated at the country level. In a second step the bilateral (and industry level in 
the case of import price anomalies) information is matched to the ownership structure 
and condensed in one indicator.  
14 Bilateral import price anomalies: Using bilateral product specific trade data we 
can detect significant deviations from standard prices. Although our data is not able to 
distinguish between internal and arms’ length transactions, we are still in a position to 
identify anomalies in bilateral import prices in the spirit of Pak and Zdanowicz (2002). 
That is, for products where sufficient bilateral trade flows are observed we are able to 
compare the bilateral average price level to the overall median price level. Each 
transaction can be seen from the importing or exporting country to identify price 
anomalies. Therefore, we first identify the number of products which have a suspiciously 
high or low unit price and count them by importing or exporting country. Specifically, 
we treat value five times higher or lower than the median value as suspicious.37  
In a second step, we combine the information of price anomalies with the relative tax 
position in the MNE groups. We define a binary indicator which takes the value of one if 
a too high import price coincides with an entity being a lower tax entity. 
Correspondingly, the indicator is also unity if the import prices are too low and the entity 
is a higher tax entity. For completeness, we also define the indicator from the exporter 
side. This measures the same transactions on the exporter side and should by and large 
be already covered by the import price anomalies.38 
15 Bilateral royalty flows: To complement the analysis of the ATP structures using 
intellectual property we also define an indicator measuring bilateral royalty flows. We 
follow Dudar et al. (2015) and use the trade in services dataset.39 Specifically, we use 
the item “Charges for the use of intellectual property n.i.e” which has superseded the 
classification “Royalties and license fees”. While the new classification suggests that this 
item may be somewhat broader than pure royalty payments, this bilateral flow meets 
the economic criteria of the royalty payments and therefore should reflect ATP 
strategies. We use different levels of details of the royalty flows. First, we start with the 
sum of royalty receipts and royalty payments by Member States and calculate the net 
                                          
37 The exact threshold is arbitrary, but a threshold set at larger than 500 percent or smaller than 
20 percent of the median unit price should to a large extent rule out price variations because of 
other factors, e.g. quality differences.  
38 The difference lies in the reference value for a ‘normal’ price, which is either the median import 
price at the importing country or the median export price at the exporting country. 
39 The data for the trade in services statistics is provided by several institutions, most notably 
Eurostat, the OECD and the Worldbank, which in turn refers to the IMF. Since the data from the 
different sources is consistent but varying in coverage we combine the different sources.  
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royalty receipts by country. Relating this net position to GDP controls for pure country-
size effects and gives an overall impression of the fiscal impact of ATP. 
Table 9: Description of specific indicators - country-pair-level 
Source: Own consideration 
  Unit and definition of  ATP channel 
Indicator underlying ratio Indicator 
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14. Bilateral import price anomalies   
14a. Bilateral 
import prices 
are too high 
binary indicator, 1 if import price 
is more than 500 % of median 
import price in importing 
country 
binary indicator, 1 if at least 
one good of the industry 
has too high import price 
and entity is a lower tax 
entity 
    X 
14b. Bilateral 
import prices 
are too low 
binary indicator, 1 if import price 
is less than 20% of median 
import price in importing 
country 
binary indicator, 1 if at least 
one good of the industry 
has too low import price 
and entity is a higher tax 
entity 
    X 
14c. Bilateral 
export price are 
too high 
binary indicator, 1 if export price 
is more than 500 % median 
export price in exporting country 
binary indicator, 1 if at least 
one good of the industry 
has too high export price 
and entity is a lower tax 
entity 
    X 
14d. Bilateral 
export price 
are too low 
binary indicator, 1 if export price 
is less than 20 % of median 
export price in exporting country 
binary indicator, 1 if at least 
one good of the industry 
has too low export price 
and entity is a higher tax 
entity 
    X 
15. Bilateral royalty flows   
15a Royalty 
receipts 
In % of GDP, sum of royalty 
receipts from all countries 
divided by GDP Indicator (binary), 1 if the 
bilateral net royalty receipts 
are bigger than 0.01 % 
(lower than -0.01 %) of GDP 
and receiving entity is a 
lower (higher) tax entity 
  x   
15b Royalty 
payments 
In % of GDP, sum of royalty 
payments from all countries 
divided by GDP 
  x   
15c Net Royalty 
flows 
In % of GDP, difference of sum of 
royalty payments and sum of 
royalty receipts from all 
countries divided by GDP 
  x   
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In a second step, we look at the bilateral net royalty flows and define a country as net 
recipient if the bilateral flow is larger than 0.1 percent of the GDP of the receiving 
country. Combining this net position with the relative tax status of the MNE entity we 
define a binary indicator which highlights patterns which are consistent with ATP channel 
using intellectual property. Since the bilateral information about royalty flows is not 
complete, we make a broad approximation for missing bilateral royalty flows. 
Specifically, we treat the Member States as receiving (paying) countries if the net 
royalty flow is positive (negative). Then we treat the country pair as consistent with the 
ATP structure if a receiving country is matched with a paying country. However, since 
this only a crude approximation, we will only place moderate importance on this 
indicator. 
3.3 Combinations of indicators 
On their own the specific indicators are only shedding light on particular aspects, but in 
combination with each other and the information about the tax situation in the countries, 
they allow an allocation of each entity within a MNE to one of the roles (i.e. target, lower 
tax or conduit entity) in the various ATP structures. Alternatively, if the specific 
indicators show no suspicious patterns, we can allocate the MNE group to the category 
“inconsistent with ATP structure”. This implies that this category is negatively defined, 
i.e. we subsume those firms where we fail to find evidence for an ATP structure. In 
consequence, the category “inconsistent with ATP structure” may only be interpreted as 
lack of evidence for an ATP structure and not as evidence against its presence. 
3.3.1 Relative tax situation of MNE entities 
One of the key indicators to identify which is the role of an entity is the relative tax 
situation of entities within the MNE group. Therefore, a first step of aggregation is to 
allocate entities into subgroups according to the relative tax rate they face. Denote the 
individual entity with the subscript 𝑖𝑖 and the country where the entity is incorporated as 
𝑐𝑐.40 For all entities, which we allocate to a relevant MNE group we denote the group with 
the subscript 𝑔𝑔. Using the information about the country where the entities are 
incorporated, it is possible to define both the highest 𝜏𝜏𝑔𝑔𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 and lowest 𝜏𝜏𝑔𝑔𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 statutory 
corporate tax rates within each MNE group. Additionally, we can use the binary indicator 
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁_𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑔𝑔  which takes the value 1 if the MNE group has an entity in a zero/no corporate 
income tax country.41 We also construct a binary indicator 𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿_𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 which takes the 
value 1, if the entity within the MNE group faces a relatively lower statutory corporate 
tax rate, i.e. if 𝜏𝜏𝑔𝑔𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝜏𝜏𝑚𝑚 > 5. Furthermore, we define the binary indicator 𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡_𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 if 
the entity is in the country with the lowest tax of the MNE group, i.e. 𝜏𝜏𝑔𝑔𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 𝜏𝜏𝑚𝑚. Averaging, 
these three indicator variables over the Member States represent the share of entities 
which are within MNEs group with a zero/no corporate income tax subsidiary, which are 
facing relatively low tax burden or the lowest tax burden of the MNE group.  
                                          
40 For simplicity, we abstract from the time index in this description. Throughout the study the 
analysis will be based on the yearly observations. 
41 This binary indicator is derived directly from the indicator [5c]. Technically, we can also define 
it as 𝜏𝜏𝑔𝑔𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 0. 
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3.3.2 Identifying roles in ATP channels 
To identify the roles of the entities in the ATP channel presented in Section 2.2 we 
combine the indicators presented in this Section. Following the logic of the presentation 
of the indicators we have general indicators which are identifying the presence of the 
ATP channel at the MNE group level and specific indicators which attribute the entities 
within the MNE to particular roles.   
In many instances, a strict application of all possible indicators may be too conservative 
and fail to capture the real extent of ATP. Therefore, we use two levels of strictness to 
attribute entities to the respective roles within the ATP channels. First, we define criteria 
for a strict classification into roles which uses all available indicators regardless of the 
precision and data availability of the indicator. Alternatively, we also define a standard 
classification, which uses combinations of indicators which are clearer in their prediction 
and less data demanding and therefore produce a baseline allocation into roles. In the 
following descriptions this is reflected by the higher priority which is attributed to the 
indicators which are included in the standard classification. The additional indicators for 
the strict classification are given lower priority.42   
Tax planning via interest payments 
To identify the roles of the entities in the ATP channel using interest payments as 
described in Figure 2 we combine the indicators which measure the characteristics 
identified in Table 3. For a detailed description see also Table 38 in the appendix. First, 
there are two specific indicators which are not related to a role, but rather to the ATP 
structure generally. There is an indicator based on the ownership structure, which 
reflects the specifics of the ATP structure. In the case of the ATP via interest payments 
this is simply that the MNE group needs to have at least one [5b] subsidiary in a lower 
tax country. Since this is absolutely central for the mechanism of the ATP structure, this 
indicator has the highest priority. Secondly, the indicator [6] measures to what extent 
the MNE as a whole is able to reduce the tax burden through the effective tax burden 
of the consolidated accounts of the group. The lowering of the effective tax burden is 
equally a defining feature of any ATP structure. However, due to the difficulty of finding 
a reliable comparison group, and due to the uncertainty how well the tax liabilities in 
the accounts reflect the actual tax liabilities we only attribute a low to moderate 
importance to this indicator.43 
The role of the headquarter country is basically limited to the fact that the headquarter 
of the MNE is located in a country without CFC rules. The headquarter location is given 
through the ownership information and in combination with the legal indicator we can 
determine whether the MNE group is in a country with no CFC rule. However, a binding 
and effective CFC rule should rule out the ATP structure in the first place. If we still find 
evidence for the ATP structure in other indicators, we interpret the CFC rule as not 
binding or ineffective and therefore only attribute a moderate importance to this 
indicator, implying that we only use it for the strict categorisation.  
                                          
42 See Appendix B for a comprehensive description of the combination of indicators and the 
classification of entities into roles within ATP structures.   
43 The consolidated accounts blur the applicable tax rate because of the summation of countries 
with different tax rates. Additionally, the consolidated accounts may not be available for all MNEs, 
so allowing this indicator to be missing reduces our sample attrition. 
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The target entity is the part of the MNE, which loses tax base as the result of the ATP 
structure. The indicators for the identification of the target entity have in common that 
the indicator identifying a lower tax entity [5b] must be zero. Together with the general 
requirement that at least one entity in the MNE group is identified as a lower tax entity, 
this reflects that the tax rate in this entity is at least 5 percentage points higher than in 
the lowest tax entity in the MNE. Therefore, there is an incentive to relocate tax base 
out of this entity. 
The defining feature of the target entity is the reduction of the corporate tax base. 
Therefore, we have a number of indicators which reflect this directly. First, there is the 
lower pre-tax profitability compared to the rest of the MNE [7a] and to domestic 
subsidiaries [7b].44  
For the standard classification into roles, we require that at least one of the two 
profitability indicators is met, i.e. that either the comparison to the rest of the group or 
to the domestic comparison group reveals a lower pre-tax profitability. For the strict use 
of the indicators we require that both pre-tax profitability indicators are unity. The same 
applies for the indicators based on the financial profits compared to the rest of the MNE 
[9a] and to domestic subsidiaries [9b]. One indicator of the two showing a lower 
financial profitability suffices for the standard use of the indicators, while both need to 
be in line for the strict classification.  
The indicators based on higher interest payments [10] and a higher debt share [11], 
both in comparison to the rest of the group and to the domestic subsidiaries are looking 
more directly at traces of the financial transaction. Since the ATP structure is based on 
internal debt and the resulting interest payments, the mirror of these transactions 
should be visible in the other parts of the MNE, notably in the lower tax country. 
Therefore, the differences between the subsidiaries of the same MNE should be more 
pronounced. To consider this, we tend to give more importance to the comparisons 
within the MNE. However, if we lack important parts of the MNE in our dataset, the 
comparison within the MNE might be misleading. To reduce this problem, we take one 
of the measures as sufficient for the standard classification. In contrast, for the strict 
interpretation of the indicators we require that all indicators are met.  
The counterpart to the target entity is the lower tax entity. The basic economic 
mechanism of the ATP channel using an internal financial transaction lies in the fact that 
corporate tax base is shifted to an entity in a country where it faces a lower corporate 
tax burden. Therefore, the common defining indicator is [5b], indicating a statutory 
corporate tax burden which is at least 5 percentage points lower than in the highest tax 
entity in the MNE group. The other indicators are also used inverted but analogous to 
the target entity. In its purest form, the ATP structure using internal financial 
transactions relocates tax base from the target entity to the lower tax entity. In 
consequence, indicators should exactly reflect this and take the opposite values. 
Precisely, this requires the pre-tax profitability to be higher than in the other parts of 
the MNE [7a] and compared to domestic firms [7b]. In line with the use for the target 
entity we also require one indicator to be zero for the standard classification and both 
                                          
44 Note that all profitability indicators and the interest indicator are calculated both as ratios of 
total assets and number of employees. Throughout the analysis, we only require that one of the 
two ratios is in line with definition for the indicators to take the value 1. This is also reflected in 
the fact that we drop the superscripts EMP and ASSET. 
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for the strict classification. This logic is also applied for the financial profitability in 
comparison to the rest of the MNE [9a] and to the domestic firms [9b]. Finally, we 
require the interest payments and debt share to be lower than in the domestic 
companies and also lower than in the rest of the MNE. These indicators are only defined 
indirectly since the high interest payments and debt share in the target entity are 
reflected in relatively low values in the lower tax entities. This is again reflected in the 
moderate importance we put on these indicators in the standard classification.  
There are a number of variations of the ATP channel using interest payments, which we 
do not present in detail here, but rather describe in the appendix. The offshore loan ATP 
structure as described in the ATP study deviates from the described ATP structure 
insofar, as there is no lower tax country but rather a zero/no corporate tax country 
involved. The hybrid loan ATP structure as described by the ZEW study looks much like 
the described financial transaction ATP structure for the target country. The key 
difference lies in the fact that no lower tax entity is involved, but rather the interest 
payments are not included as income in the remainder of the MNE group. In the absence 
of more detailed legal indicators the economic indicators are also in line with the interest 
free loan ATP structure.  
Finally, it is worth noting that basic ATP channel via interest payments does not require 
conduit entities. To acknowledge the presence and relevance of conduit entities, we 
nevertheless include this role. In particular, we allocate the attribute of a conduit entity 
to those parts of a MNE group, which are neither target nor lower tax entities, if the ATP 
channel is detected within the MNE group, i.e. if there are target or lower tax entities in 
the MNE group. In case of the strict use of indicators we additionally require that the 
conduit entity is in a country which is attractive for treaty shopping.  
Roles in ATP structures: Tax planning via royalty payments 
The combination of indicators for the ATP via royalty payments follows a similar logic.45. 
The starting point is again the ownership structure, which needs to involve at least one 
subsidiary in a lower tax country. The indicator for the relative tax situation of the 
entities and the indicators measuring the pre-tax profitability are used in the exact same 
way to distinguish the target entity and the lower tax entity. The differences to the 
previous ATP channel start with the second profitability measures, which are now based 
on operating profitability, again both in comparison [8a] to the rest of the MNE group 
and [8b] to domestic firms. This implies that for the target entity both the pre-tax and 
operating profitability indicator need to take the value 1 reflecting the lower profitability 
there. Again, in line with the previous ATP structure one of the indicators is sufficient 
for the standard classification, while both need to be consistent in the case of the strict 
classification. Furthermore, we also use the [12] intangible assets ratio indicators to 
identify whether the target entity has less intangible assets. For the strict classification, 
we demand that both indicators - the comparison to the domestic companies and within 
the MNE group – take the value 1, while for the standard classification one indicator 
with the value 1 is sufficient. 
To identify the lower tax entity, we follow the exact same procedure as before and 
use the inverse of the indicators. This includes the indicators showing a higher pre-tax 
and operating profitability as well as the higher intangible assets ratio. All of these 
                                          
45 For the detailed description see Table 39 in the appendix. 
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indicators need to coincide with the ownership based indicator identifying the lower tax 
status of the entity. Finally, we also combine the firm specific indicators with the country 
pair specific indicator of royalty flows. Specifically, we demand that the indicator takes 
the value one, which reflects that the net royalty payments flow from the country of the 
target entity to the country of the lower tax entity. However, since this is a less precise 
measure we place less weight on it, i.e. we only use it in the strict classification.  
A variant of the intellectual property and royalty payment ATP structure is the ATP 
structure using patent boxes. In this case the general indicator regarding the lower tax 
entity is replaced through the indicator [5d] which identifies the presence of the MNE in 
a country with a patent box. The lower tax entity is now defined through having a low 
rate because of the patent box, rather than having a generally lower statutory tax rate. 
Additionally, we rely on the indicators [13a] and [13b] which measure the number of 
patents held by the entities. Using the number of patents held rather than the balance 
sheet item intangible assets has both advantages and disadvantages. The balance sheet 
item intangible assets is less suitable to measure royalty bearing intellectual property 
since it may amongst others include acquired goodwill. On the other hand, patent 
ownership is not well covered in the Bureau van Dijk databases since they i) include 
patent applications rather than patent ownership and ii.) are incomplete. We aim to 
overcome these weaknesses by merging information from PATSTAT to our firm-level 
data. However, this merge is only feasible for a small number of firms, which reduces 
the coverage dramatically.  
Roles ATP structures: Strategic transfer pricing 
The basic combination of indicators is mostly overlapping with the ATP structures using 
intellectual property and royalty payments.46 This includes the necessity of a lower tax 
entity within the MNE group and the pre-tax and operating profitability indicators.  
The main difference is that the intangibles assets and bilateral royalty flows indicators 
are replaced by one very important indicator generally necessary to identify this type of 
ATP. Namely, the [14] bilateral import price anomalies need to be consistent with the 
ownership structure of the MNE. We only consider MNEs, where the ownership structure 
is line with the bilateral price anomalies, which themselves are already depending on 
the relevant tax rate differential. Therefore, it follows that the MNE needs to have at 
least one subsidiary in a lower tax country. Regarding the target country, apart from 
being the country with the higher tax rate, the most relevant indicators are based on 
the pre-tax and operating profitability. The comparison within the MNE should clearly 
show a lower effective tax burden and a lower profitability in the higher tax target 
country. For the lower tax country, the opposite is expected. Therefore, we place a 
higher weight on this indicator than on the comparison to the domestic subsidiaries.  
  
                                          
46 The combination of indicators to identify the roles for strategic transfer pricing are summarised 
in the appendix in Table 40. 
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3.4 Methodological considerations 
3.4.1 Aggregation of indicators 
While some of the general indicators are defined at the country level, the ATP specific 
indicators are mostly at the firm level. To draw conclusions for the Member States we 
therefore need some form of aggregation. The goal of the aggregation is to have 
indicators at the Member State level that are easy to interpret and carry as much 
information as possible. To achieve this goal, we have two separate approaches. First, 
we aggregate the underlying ratios of the specific indicators to country level averages 
and medians to get an indication of the overall extent of ATP structures. In a second 
step, we identify the roles at the firm level and aggregate these number of firms in 
different roles up to Member State totals. This gives an indication about the relative 
importance of the roles by Member States.  
Type specific averages and medians 
The starting point for the specific indicators are the underlying firm specific ratios. 
Denote 𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚 as the underlying ratio, e.g. the pre-tax profitability of individual entity 𝑖𝑖. An 
entity in this context can be either a firm for the comparison group, i.e. a standalone 
company or a firm within a domestic group, or a subsidiary or headquarter company in 
a MNE group. Using the binary indicators for relative tax position of the entities within 
MNE groups we are able to group the firms into three categories: 
• Standalone companies, respectively firms within purely domestic groups.  
• Firms within MNE groups, which are considered a lower tax entity, i.e. 𝜏𝜏𝑔𝑔𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 −
𝜏𝜏𝑚𝑚 > 5 percentage points.  
• Firms within MNE groups, which are not considered a lower tax entity, i.e. 𝜏𝜏𝑔𝑔𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 −
𝜏𝜏𝑚𝑚 ≤ 5 percentage points.  
The second approach to aggregation is to construct a categorical variable for the three 
types of entities. Looking at the descriptive statistics of the underlying ratios by country 
and firm type allows to broadly quantify the average effect of (potential) ATP activities. 
By comparing the country averages and medians of domestic firms to averages and 
median of different types of entities within MNE groups we can judge the extent of ATP. 
And by additionally looking at higher moments of the distribution, i.e. identifying 
whether the distribution is symmetrical or dominated by low or high values, we can 
broadly quantify whether ATP is a mass-phenomenon or driven by a few MNE groups.  
Finally, turning to the computation of overall values for the EU values, we report the 
weighted and unweighted average. The weights are the GDP for the general country-
level indicators and the number of firms for the averages of firm-specific indicators.47 
One caveat is that using a GDP-weighted average brings Member States with a large 
share of EU GDP closer to the EU average.  
 
                                          
47 Most of the times the weights are implicit by calculating an overall mean over the complete 
dataset. In the case, where we have an explicit assumption about the weight, this will be 
mentioned specifically. 
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Identification of outliers, high and low value countries 
The identification of Member States with particularly high or low value is a difficult task. 
In some cases, we can identify clear outliers but in other cases, it is difficult to decide 
on a clear threshold value. To avoid subjectivity as much as possible, we use one or two 
standard deviations below or above the mean.48 Indeed, assuming that the distribution 
is normal, the percentage of values that are within one or two standard deviations of 
the mean are approximately 68 and 95% respectively. In other words, there is 'only' 32 
and 5% chances that the value is above the threshold. 
Roles of firms by Member States 
The categorisation of firms with MNE groups into lower tax entities and not lower tax 
entities already hints at heterogeneous ATP behaviour even within the Member States. 
Therefore, to appropriately capture the different ATP strategies we take an additional 
approach to aggregation. Specifically, we allocate each entity for each ATP strategy to 
a role as defined in Section 2.3, namely target entity, lower tax entity and conduit 
entity. Furthermore, since the allocation to a specific role will not always be 
unambiguous, or in many instances the data may not support the hypothesis of a 
specific ATP structure taking place, we also allow for a further category; either the data 
is inconsistent with the specific ATP structure or the data is insufficient or incomplete. 
Each entity which has been classified into one of these four categories can be further 
identified as a subsidiary or the headquarter. The combination of the classification of 
the role and the headquarter status leaves us with eight categories (𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅) any entity 
within a MNE can fall in. Then we define for each of the three main ATP structures (𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺) 
binary variables 𝜃𝜃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑚𝑚  taking unity if the entity takes the role and zero otherwise. We 
define for each of the Member States 𝑐𝑐 the total number of corporate entities 𝑖𝑖 which 
are part of a MNE group as 𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐 . Then summing up dichotomous variables 𝜃𝜃𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑚𝑚 within 
Member States will give the number of entities with perform a specific role in any of the 
ATP structures. Finally, relating this number to the total number of MNE entities in the 
Member States gives the share of MNE entities performing a specific role. This 
information can then be used to evaluate in which roles Member States are 
predominantly used in the ATP structures. 
3.4.2 Data sources and limitations 
Orbis (Bureau van Dijk) 
The study builds on commercially available firm-level data, which include financial 
accounts and ownership structures. This information is used to examine how many 
companies are characterised by a corporate ownership structure which is consistent with 
ATP structures. The choice of the Orbis database provided by Bureau van Dijk implies 
several (dis-)advantages. The key advantages are the public availability which ensures 
that the analysis is (in principle) replicable by everybody with a commercial access to 
the dataset. The second and most important advantage is the consistency across 
countries, which would be difficult to achieve using different national datasets. Another 
                                          
48 For this exercise, we use the unweighted mean over the country-level values and the 
corresponding standard deviation.  
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important strength of the Orbis dataset is the combination of balance sheet and 
ownership information in one comprehensive database.  
There are also several important limitations in the choice of the Orbis. First, the coverage 
in Orbis is incomplete since it is not an administrative dataset. While the coverage for 
European firms has improved over the last years, the coverage for low tax countries 
outside Europe is still poor. Secondly, the data included builds on the financial accounts 
which are different from the tax accounts. Thirdly, different accounting standards may 
not be adequately reflected in the standardised accounts provided by Bureau van Dijk.  
Ownership information: All Bureau van Dijk datasets include a unique identifier, 
which allows to link balance sheet information to the ownership information and to 
general information about the company (e.g. geographic location, industry etc.). 
Regarding the shareholder, the available information includes the direct and the global 
ultimate owner and their respective shareholdings. By repeatedly merging information 
about unique direct owners (i.e. direct owners with more than 50 percent direct 
ownership) one can construct ownership chains to depict the overall ownership structure 
of the group.49 The use of ownership chains, rather than simply the subsidiary - direct 
owner pair, allows us to identify more complex ownership structures of MNEs, which can 
include several conduit entities. However, there are also substantial limitations to the 
available data, some originating from the data source, some from the bottom-up 
approach. The potentially strongest limitation in the data is the cross-sectional nature 
of the ownership information. This implies that we only have a snapshot of the latest 
information available at the time of the download. For the purpose of this study, we 
build the ownership chains based on a comprehensive download from the online version 
of Orbis in 2013.50 The bottom-up approach also has the limitation that we can only 
include firms in the MNEs ownership structure which are themselves included in the 
ORBIS data. 
Foreign direct investment data 
Data about the stock of foreign direct investment in any given country and the 
geographical split by investing country is available from different sources, amongst 
others from the IMF world investment database and Eurostat. The different data sources 
differ with respect to the definition of FDI. Most importantly, the Eurostat data series 
for FDI stocks has been changed in 2013 to include FDI positions in special purpose 
entities (SPEs). Additionally, the FDI stock held through SPEs is reported separately. 
However, this information is not yet available for all bilateral country pairs. Furthermore, 
the old Eurostat data series of FDI stocks has been discontinued, therefore the exact 
impact of the new definition can not be quantified.  
In contrast, the FDI stock data provided by the IMF in the world investment database 
does report a data series which is consistent over time. The comparison to the Eurostat 
data can be seen as a crude approximation for the importance of SPEs. Comparing the 
values for 2015 shows sizeable differences for Cyprus (189 % of GDP for inward and 
217 % of GDP for outward FDI stock), Hungary (84 % inward, 92 % outward), Ireland 
                                          
49 The discussion in the technical appendix builds on Jungmann and Loretz (2016).  
50 This implies that the ownership information reflects the situation around the year 2013, because 
the ownership information typically has shorter lags to be included. See also Section 3.4.3 for the 
discussion of time consistency.  
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(128 % inward), Luxembourg (5410 % inward, 6454 % outward) and the Netherlands 
(439 % inward, 488 % outward).51 
3.4.3 Sample period and time consistency of different data sets 
The main sample period for this study is 2010 to 2015. This use of a six-year time span 
allows to reduce the impact of outliers in one particular year. Additionally, picking a 
broader time window allows to reduce the impact of the financial crisis which may be 
reflected in the earlier years of the sample period.  
There are two main exceptions for the sample period. The first one is the ownership 
information which is only available for the year 2013, which lies in the middle of the 
sample period. Correspondingly, we also have the treaty shopping indicators only for 
the year 2013.  
For all other country or country-pair level indicators we use the yearly data to derive 
the indicator. For presentational issues, we do not report yearly values in the result 
tables, but rather the latest available value, i.e. the value for the year 2015. In cases 
where the values of the indicators are following a clear time trend (e.g. the increasing 
importance of royalty payments) we report the averages over the whole sample period 
together with the latest value. In cases where yearly volatility is high, we either pool 
the information over the six years (firm level information) or aggregate over the full 
sample period (e.g. the result for the consolidated accounts).   
                                          
51 See Table 44 for the complete comparison. 
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4 Results for EU 28 Member States 
The results presented in this section follow broadly the logic of the discussion so far. 
The starting point is the presentation of the general indicators, which outline the tax 
rates situation and the potential exposure to ATP for each Member State. The country-
level descriptive statistics of the specific firm-level indicators give a first indication of 
the relative importance of the various ATP structures. Aggregating the number of 
entities, which have been identified to play roles in the main ATP channels we investigate 
to which extent Member States are affected by ATP structures.  
4.1 Distribution of indicators and data at country level 
4.1.1 Tax rates and revenues  
The first two columns of Table 10 list the values for the statutory corporate income tax 
rate and the EATR as measures for the statutory corporate tax burden.  
In 2015 (used as the cut-off date given that it is the latest year for which most of the 
indicators data is available), the statutory corporate tax rates within the European 
Union varied from 10 percent in Bulgaria, 12.5 percent in Ireland and Cyprus, 15 percent 
in Latvia and Lithuania to 30.2 percent in Germany, 31.2 in Italy, 34 percent in Belgium, 
35 percent in Malta and 38 percent in France. The unweighted EU average in comparison 
was at 22.8 percent.52 At a first glance, the significant tax rate differentials suggest 
there is potential for ATP given the empirical role played by statutory tax rates in driving 
ATP. At the same time, there is also the caveat that some of the high tax countries have 
special tax regimes for certain types of income, e.g. reduced tax rates in a patent box. 
This is not captured by statutory rates and measures of effective tax rates such as the 
EATR below only capture them to the extent that they are modelled. 
The EATR varies broadly in line with the top corporate statutory tax rate, with the lowest 
values being in Bulgaria (9.0%), Lithuania (13.6%) and Ireland (14.1%). The 
unweighted average is at 21.1 percent, which is only slightly lower than the statutory 
corporate tax rate.53 The highest values for the EATR are 38.3 percent in France, 32.9 
percent in Spain, 32.2 in Malta and 28.2 in Germany.  
The second part of Table 10 lists the corporate tax revenues measured in percent of 
GDP for the Member States. Additionally, broad components of corporate tax revenues 
are listed to show the main determinants of the corporate tax revenues. Figure 5 also 
depicts the pairwise combinations of the corporate income tax revenues indicators.  
  
                                          
52 The clearly higher value for the weighted average reflects the higher tax rates in larger Member 
States, which is in line with the standard predictions of the tax competition literature. 
53 Note that it is possible that the EATR is higher than the statutory tax rates if the tax base 
definition is very broad. Technically, this is due to the tax burden falling on income streams which 
pay for the economic depreciation of the invested goods.   
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Table 10: Tax rates and decomposition of corporate tax revenues (2015) 
Country Statutory tax rate 
Effective 
average 
tax rate 
Corporate 
tax 
revenues 
% of GDP 
Corporate tax 
revenues % of 
corporate gross 
operating 
surplus 
Corporate 
gross 
operating 
surplus % 
of corporate 
value added 
Corporate 
value 
added % 
of GDP 
Austria 25.0 23.0 2.3 9.8 40.3 58.0 
Belgium 34.0 27.8 3.4 13.4 42.3 60.9 
Bulgaria 10.0 9.0 2.1 7.4 48.8 60.3 
Croatia 20.0 16.5 1.9 9.9 34.1 51.5 
Cyprus 12.5 15.3 5.9 27.1 42.6 50.9 
Czech Republic 19.0 16.7 3.4 10.5 51.9 59.4 
Denmark 23.5 21.3 2.6 11.0 41.7 56.9 
Estonia 20.0 15.7 2.1 7.4 44.5 63.4 
Finland 20.0 18.6 2.2 11.1 41.3 54.5 
France 38.0 38.3 2.6 14.2 32.1 55.3 
Germany 30.2 28.2 2.4 9.4 41.1 60.8 
Greece 29.0 27.1 2.2 18.1 54.2 35.7 
Hungary 20.6 19.3 1.7 7.4 48.0 55.4 
Ireland 12.5 14.1 2.7 5.6 69.4 72.6 
Italy 31.4 23.8 2.0 10.1 41.9 49.1 
Latvia 15.0 14.3 1.6 5.2 46.5 63.9 
Lithuania 15.0 13.6 1.5 4.4 53.0 66.5 
Luxembourga 29.2 25.5 4.5 19.2 43.3 65.8 
Maltab 35.0 32.2 6.7 19.2 50.7 50.2 
Netherlands 25.0 22.5 2.7 8.8 42.9 66.2 
Poland 19.0 17.5 1.8 8.1 52.1 49.9 
Portugal 29.5 26.6 3.1 14.7 42.5 51.3 
Romania 16.0 14.8 2.3 9.4 57.3 55.5 
Slovakia 22.0 19.6 3.7 15.3 51.2 49.2 
Slovenia 17.0 15.5 1.5 7.6 36.0 55.3 
Spain 28.0 32.9 2.4 9.7 42.3 56.9 
Sweden 22.0 20.8 3.0 12.2 37.9 63.3 
United Kingdom 20.0 19.5 2.5 12.5 36.6 58.1 
EU 28 27.5 25.9 2.5 11.1 40.6 57.3 
Average 22.8 21.1 2.7 11.4 45.2 57.0 
Std. deviation 7.3 6.8 1.2 5.0 7.9 7.3 
High values FR, MT, BE, IT, DE 
FR, ES, 
MT, DE 
MT, CY, 
LU 
CY, LU,  
MT, EL IE, RO, GR 
IE, LT, NL, 
LU 
Low values BG, CY, IE, LV, LT BG, LT, IE LT, SI 
LT, LV, 
IE 
FR, HR, SI, 
UK GR, IT, SK 
Notes: a Values for revenue decomposition from 2012, b Values for revenue decomposition from 2010. EU 28 
denotes the GDP-weighted average and Average refers to the arithmetic mean. High values are those above 
the mean plus two standard deviations (in bold) and mean plus one standard deviation. Low values are those 
below the mean minus two standard deviations (in bold) and mean minus one standard deviation. 
Source: European Commission (2017), AMECO database, ZEW study   
Malta (6.7%), Cyprus (5.9%) and Luxembourg (4.5%) stand out with particularly high 
corporate tax revenues, expressed in percentage of GDP, while Slovenia and 
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Lithuania (1.5% each) are characterised with low corporate tax revenues (expressed in 
percentage of GDP). In comparison, the weighted average of corporate tax revenues 
lies around 2.5 percent for the EU. By and large, this aggregate data show that the 
extremes of the spectrum are made up of smaller Member States. While some of them 
are able to raise substantial corporate tax revenues it also appears that several small 
Eastern European Member States are limited in their ability or willingness to raise 
corporate tax revenues.54  
Further decomposition of the corporate tax revenues, as illustrated in Figure 5, 
highlights some additional patterns.  
Figure 5: Decomposition of corporate tax revenues 
 
Source: AMECO database, ZEW study, own illustration  
First, relating the corporate tax revenues to the gross operating surplus of the corporate 
sector gives some form of macro-level implicit tax rate. Except for Cyprus being a 
clear outlier with 27.1 percent, one can see a strong positive correlation with the 
statutory corporate tax rate. Lower tax countries such as Lithuania, Latvia and Ireland 
have values in the range of 4.4 to 5.6 percent. Along with Cyprus, Malta, Luxembourg 
(19.2% each) and Greece (18.1%) have the highest ratios of corporate tax revenues to 
gross operating surplus. Countries, which are typically considered higher tax countries 
such as Germany (9.4%), Spain (9.7%), Italy (10.1%) and France (14.2%) are only 
close to the arithmetic average of 11.4 percent in this measure. One potential reason 
                                          
54 The lower statutory corporate tax rates are partly contributing to the lower revenues, but as 
the next paragraph shows are insufficient to completely explain this pattern. Other possible 
explanations include substantial loss carry forward, more lenient enforcement or generous tax 
breaks for corporations.  
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for this could be that they are not fully able to tax the corporate profits at the desired 
rate due to the presence of ATP. 
Relating the gross operating surplus to the value added yields a macro measure of 
profitability of the corporate sector. The one country standing out with a particularly 
high value in this case is Ireland where the gross operating surplus of the corporate 
sector amounts to 69.4 percent of its value added.55 Other countries with relatively large 
values are Romania (57.3%) and Greece (54.2%). At the other end of the spectrum we 
find France (32.1%), Croatia (34.1%), Slovenia (36.0%) and the United Kingdom 
(36.6%), which are all clearly below the arithmetic EU average of 45.2 percent. The 
potential explanations for this pattern may be numerous, but in particular for France 
that displays high statutory and effective tax rates, this could reflect that some parts of 
the corporate profits are moved to lower tax countries.  
Finally, relating the value added of the corporate sector to the GDP yields a measure of 
the size of the corporate sector. Comparing this to the statutory tax rate one can 
interpret a negative relationship as an impact of taxation on real activities rather than 
pure profit shifting. Again, Ireland stands out with the highest value of 72.6 percent for 
the corporate sector, followed by Lithuania, the Netherlands and Luxembourg with 
values around 66 percent. On the lower side, Greece is a clear outlier with a share of 
the corporate sector of only 35.7 percent, followed by Italy (49.1%) and Slovakia 
(49.2%). In comparison, the EU wide arithmetic average is at 57.0 percent. 
Key findings 
The statutory corporate tax rate varies substantially between the Member States which 
implies scope for ATP structures. The corporate tax revenues expressed as a percentage 
of GDP only partly reflect the differences in the statutory rates and suggest that some 
small Member States like Cyprus, Malta and Luxembourg are able to raise more tax 
revenues. The decomposition of the corporate tax revenues reveals that Ireland stands 
out with a particular high profitability of the corporate sector, which may indicate that 
it is able to attract substantial tax base. Others like France, Croatia, Slovenia or the 
United Kingdom appear to have a profitability of their corporate tax base well below the 
EU average. This may reflect an erosion of the tax base owing to ATP (as could be 
envisaged for a high tax country like France) but also reflect the general economic 
situation.  
4.1.2 Foreign direct investment  
The first four columns of Table 11 report the values of total inward and outward FDI 
stocks for all Member States. To account for country-size effects the FDI stocks are 
reported both in millions of Euro and in percent of GDP. 
Several Member States stand out with particularly high values of both inward and 
outward FDI stocks. In Luxembourg both inward (5766%) and outward (6749%) FDI 
stocks are a multiple of the GDP. Similarly, in Malta, inward FDI amount to more than 
17 times of the GDP and the FDI outward stocks are also almost 7 times larger than the 
                                          
55 The value for 2015 is particularly high due to a number of big corporate inversions which are 
also reflected in a 26.3 % growth in GDP. Nevertheless, Ireland also had above average values 
for the share of the corporate sector and the profitability of the corporate sector in the years 2010 
to 2014. 
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GDP. For Cyprus (roughly 900 percent of GDP), the Netherlands (more than 500 percent 
of GDP) and Ireland (more than 3 times GDP), we can also observe extraordinarily large 
inward and outward FDI stocks.56 Very large parts of this FDI stocks appear to be held 
in SPEs since the comparison to the IMF data does show less extreme values. Ireland in 
particular has recently experienced a large increase in outward FDI resulting in a 
substantially larger outward FDI stock compared to the inward FDI stock.57 The very 
high level of both inward and outward FDI stocks are a clear indication of the 
attractiveness of Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta and the Netherlands for holding 
companies, which themselves are foreign owned.  
Greece is yet again an outlier with both very low inward and outward FDI stocks. The 
characteristic of very low outward FDI stocks is also observed for most of the Eastern 
European Member States. However, in this case the disparity of inward and outward FDI 
stocks is more likely due to still underdeveloped capital markets. 
The last two columns in Table 11 present hypothetical FDI stocks. Specifically, we 
predict bilateral FDI stocks using economic and geographical characteristics of the 
countries. We use a simple gravity framework to simulate the FDI patterns. In its 
simplest form, the gravity framework assumes that bilateral flows – in our case the 
bilateral FDI stocks – are directly proportional to the relative GDP and indirectly 
proportional to the distance between the country pair. In our case, we would expect 
larger countries to attract more FDI and also to hold larger FDI positions abroad. For 
any given country-sizes we expect that country pairs which are further apart are 
characterised by lower bilateral FDI stocks. Using the GDP data and bilateral distances 
for 166 countries we simulate the fraction of FDI stock which would be between each 
country pair, if the simple gravity model holds. Then the observed world FDI stock is 
apportioned to each country pair according to these theoretically predicted FDI shares 
and aggregated over the countries. For ease of interpretation the last column compares 
the predicted FDI stock with the observed one.58 We present the predicted value as 
percentage of the observed value, which implies that (by the simple gravity model) 
unexplained FDI results in a value different from unity; high (low) values implying that 
there should be more (less) FDI in this country. The fact that the predicted FDI stock 
only amounts to 76.9 percent for the EU overall is partly due to the fact, that we are 
relying on the world FDI stock without SPEs for our simulations. At the same time, since 
we are simulating the FDI stocks worldwide, there is no constraint that the predicted 
FDI stocks need to match the observed FDI stocks for a geographical region.   
  
                                          
56 We deviate from the standard approach of only naming those countries with higher (lower) 
values than unweighted average plus (minus) standard deviation because the very large outlier 
Luxembourg inflates both average and standard deviation.  
57 In the Eurostat data - which includes SPEs - there is a strong increase in both inward and 
outward FDI stock in Ireland in 2015. In the FDI data provided by the IMF there is only a strong 
increase in outward FDI stocks for Ireland in 2015. On possible reason is the different treatment 
of FDI through SPEs. The IMF aims to collect FDI flows and stocks for SPEs separately. However, 
up to date for Ireland no separate data about FDI flows/stock through SPEs are available. 
Therefore, it is difficult to fully account for the big differences between the two data sources.  
58 Note that the simple gravity framework yields balanced inward and outward shares. Therefore, 
we compare the simulated value to the average of the inward and outward FDI stock. 
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Table 11: Foreign direct investment positions (2015)  
  inward FDI stock outward FDI stock Gravity FDI stock (simulated) 
  in %  of GDP 
Mio. of 
Dollars 
in %  
of GDP 
Mio. of 
Dollars 
Mio. of 
Dollars 
in % 
of observed 
value 
Austria 70.6 240056 83.8 284737 235613 89.8 
Belgium 102.2 418266 100.1 409880 538002 129.9 
Bulgaria 86.0 37958 4.0 1762 23497 118.3 
Croatia 54.0 23721 11.5 5035 30010 208.7 
Cyprus 904.7 159557 906.5 159879 7239 4.5 
Czech Republic 61.5 102756 10.1 16897 122468 204.7 
Denmark 39.2 104234 63.0 167672 180815 133.0 
Estonia 86.2 17462 27.9 5657 11831 102.4 
Finland 35.5 74154 40.8 85352 104891 131.5 
France 27.8 606370 50.5 1101103 1832664 214.7 
Germany 23.8 722826 41.7 1264059 2471133 248.7 
Greece 12.1 21348 14.6 25666 80372 341.9 
Hungary 160.6 176125 124.1 136093 70387 45.1 
Ireland 311.0 795644 318.7 815202 140908 17.5 
Italy 18.9 309620 26.1 429228 842831 228.1 
Latvia 55.6 13545 4.9 1196 13572 184.1 
Lithuania 36.2 13497 6.4 2397 20784 261.5 
Luxembourg 5766.8 3005207 6749.3 3517234 63527 1.9 
Malta 1732.0 152216 700.4 61553 3414 3.2 
Netherlands 534.9 3618685 633.4 4285080 823059 20.8 
Poland 39.3 167917 5.2 22354 248081 260.8 
Portugal 58.7 105475 30.5 54699 82590 103.1 
Romania 40.2 64440 0.5 745 82087 251.9 
Slovakia 51.0 40129 2.8 2177 62379 294.9 
Slovenia 30.0 11565 14.2 5461 27438 322.3 
Spain 46.7 502663 41.9 450361 514290 107.9 
Sweden 62.2 277877 76.9 343786 239675 77.1 
United Kingdom 50.2 1294795 55.6 1433450 1960756 143.7 
EU 28 63.1 13078106 72.9 15088714 10834312 76.9 
Average 374.9   362.3     151.9 
Std. deviation 1115.7   1272.9     101.3 
High values LU, MT         LU   EL, SI,  SK, LT, PL 
Low values      LU, MT, CY, IE, NL, HU 
Notes: EU 28 refers to the weighted average (for the ratios in % of GDP). Average refers to the arithmetic 
mean of the ratios (in % of GDP). High values are those above the mean plus two standard deviations (in 
bold) and mean plus one standard deviation. Low values are those below the mean minus two standard 
deviations (in bold) and mean minus one standard deviation. 
 Source: Eurostat, World Bank, own calculations   
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In line with the observed very large actual FDI positions, Luxembourg, Malta, Cyprus, 
Ireland, the Netherlands but also Hungary exhibit a very low value, which indicates that 
the observed FDI stocks can only be very poorly explained by the economic 
fundamentals in the gravity model.  
Greece and some Eastern European Member States (Slovenia, Slovakia, Lithuania and 
Poland) have the highest values of this indicator, reflecting that their FDI positions are 
below what the simple theory would predict.  
In Table 12 we move beyond the simple FDI stock and use the information from the 
foreign affiliate statistics and the structural business survey to investigate the economic 
relevance of the FDI situation in the countries. The first column provides a simple 
measure of market concentration by calculating the share of turnover in each Member 
States which is made by large companies, i.e. companies with more than 250 
employees.  
The United Kingdom (55.3%) and Germany (52.9%) stand out as the two Member 
States with the highest values for this indicator. At the other end of the distribution 
there are Malta (18.1%), Cyprus (18.8%), Estonia (22.2%) and Latvia (22.4%) which 
have much less turnover in large companies. In comparison, on average in the EU, 
around 44 percent of the turnover is made in large companies. One caveat of this 
measure is that the same definition of being a large company applies to all Member 
States. This may understate the importance of larger companies in smaller Member 
States, since in these smaller countries firms below 250 employees are already relatively 
large. The unweighted average 36.6 percent lies below the overall average for the EU, 
which underlines that larger Member States have a higher value in this indicator. 
The rest of Table 12 presents the relative importance of foreign-controlled firms 
in the Member States. In terms of simple number of firms under foreign control 
Luxembourg (28.9%) and Estonia (24.7%) clearly stand out. Greece (0.2%), Italy 
(0.3%), Spain (0.5%), Portugal (0.6%), Slovakia (0.8%) and France (0.8%) show low 
values in line with their relatively small FDI stocks, while the low values for Belgium 
(0.2%), Malta (0.6%) and Cyprus (0.7%) do not reflect the large FDI stocks.59 An 
alternative explanation for low shares of foreign-controlled firms could be a high number 
of domestic firms, here again due to tax or non-tax reasons.  
The last three columns in Table 12 show the percentage of turnover, value added 
and gross surplus made in foreign-controlled firms. Here, Ireland, Luxembourg 
and some of the Eastern European Member States, most notably Hungary, Romania and 
the Czech Republic stand out with high values. Compared to the EU-wide average of 
28.3 percent of turnover made in foreign-controlled companies the share of turnover in 
firms under foreign control is above 45 percent – or about one standard deviation above 
the unweighted average of 32.7 percent – in all of these countries. This is also reflected 
in a corresponding larger share of value added and gross operating surplus by foreign-
controlled companies in these countries.  
                                          
59 The large outliers Luxembourg and Estonia imply that one standard deviation below the 
unweighted average results in a negative share. To still describe Member States with low values, 
we name all countries with a share below 1 percent.  
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Table 12: Foreign-controlled corporate activities (2014)  
Country 
Share of 
turnover in 
companies 
with more than 
250 employees 
Share of 
foreign 
controlled 
firms 
Foreign-controlled firms’ 
percentage of 
Turnover Value added 
Gross 
operating 
surplus 
Austria 33.7 3.1 34.0 24.8 21.9 
Belgium 36.3 0.2 36.5 27.9 26.2 
Bulgaria 30.5 3.8 33.8 31.2 34.2 
Croatiaa  41.0 2.7 27.2 24.0 29.3 
Cyprusb 18.8 0.7 12.5 11.0 14.0 
Czech Republic 42.3 1.3 45.4 42.1 41.5 
Denmark 40.8 1.8 24.0 22.9 22.0 
Estonia 22.2 24.7 44.9 41.1 41.7 
Finland 45.4 1.2 19.0 21.0 22.6 
Franceb 42.1 0.8 19.9 15.7 12.0 
Germany 52.9 1.2 23.6 23.6 27.0 
Greecea 28.0 0.2 12.3 11.4 8.4 
Hungary 42.4 3.5 53.1 52.2 58.4 
Ireland 44.0 2.3 56.2 57.1 73.6 
Italya 31.5 0.3 17.0 14.2 12.7 
Latvia 22.4 6.7 39.4 32.1 33.6 
Lithuania 33.4 2.2 35.6 27.6 29.2 
Luxembourg 31.7 28.9 49.1 44.8 50.4 
Malta 18.1 0.6 21.6 23.7 23.4 
Netherlands 37.4 1.2 36.2 27.7 29.4 
Poland 44.1 9.3 36.5 34.8 36.5 
Portugalb 29.1 0.6 22.0 20.7 21.1 
Romania 41.7 5.8 48.3 45.0 46.2 
Slovakia 45.2 0.8 46.5 35.4 32.7 
Slovenia 31.9 4.5 26.0 21.9 22.2 
Spain 38.5 0.5 26.5 20.9 21.4 
Sweden 43.2 1.8 31.0 26.6 25.1 
United Kingdom 55.3 1.2 38.1 29.4 30.9 
EU 28 44.2 1.2 28.3 24.2 26.2 
Average 36.6 4.0 32.7 29.0 30.3 
Std. deviation 9.5 6.8 12.2 11.7 14.4 
High values UK, DE LU, EE 
IE, HU, 
LU, RO, 
SK, CZ 
IE, HU, 
RO, LU, 
CZ 
IE, HU, 
LU, RO 
Low values MT, CY,  EE, LV  
EL, CY,  
IT, FI, 
FR 
CY, EL, 
IT, FR 
EL, FR,  
IT, CY 
Notes: EU 28 refers to the average for the EU overall and Average refers to the arithmetic mean of the 
country values. High/low values are one standard deviation above/below the mean, bold entries are 2 
standard deviations above/below. a Values for the year 2013. b Values for the year 2011. Values for the year 
2015 are not yet available.  
Source: Foreign affiliate statistics and Structural Business Survey (Eurostat), own 
calculations   
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The case of Ireland is particularly interesting, since it is the only country where the 
fraction of surplus made in foreign-controlled countries with a value of 73.6 percent is 
substantially larger than the fraction of turnover or value added. This hints at foreign-
controlled companies being more profitable than the domestic ones. Together with the 
relatively low corporate tax rate in Ireland, this points into the direction of Ireland being 
able to attract corporate tax base from ATP. The opposite can be observed in Austria 
(21.9% of surplus compared to 34.0% of turnover) and Belgium (26.2% of surplus 
compared to 36.5% of turnover), where the foreign-controlled companies are 
substantially less profitable than the domestic ones. However, the tax rate situation in 
these two countries is less obvious with relative high statutory tax rates in combination 
with potentially substantial reductions in the tax base because of tax rules such as the 
notional interest deduction in Belgium. 
Greece, Cyprus, France and Italy all have very low values for turnover, value added and 
profits in foreign-controlled firms. Except for Cyprus, this is consistent with the relatively 
small FDI stocks.  
Key findings 
The FDI stocks in percent of GDP give a broad impression whether a Member State is 
exposed to ATP. In some instances, extraordinarily high values might be an indication 
that substantial ATP takes place. Both inward and outward FDI stocks are several times 
higher than GDP in Luxembourg, Malta, Cyprus, the Netherlands and Ireland. These 
large numbers are to a large extent due to FDI through SPEs. Marked differences in 
market shares of large corporations suggest that some Member States like Germany or 
the United Kingdom are more exposed to ATP. The high share of foreign controlled firms 
in Luxembourg and Estonia is likely to reflect some tax driven behaviour. Equally, the 
very high share of surplus in foreign controlled firms in Ireland, Hungary, Luxembourg 
and Romania is also consistent with higher than average corporate tax bases, as 
measured by the ratio of gross operating surplus to value added in Table 10, and could 
indicate ATP.  
4.1.3 Geographical distribution of MNEs and relative tax situations  
The next step investigates the geographical distribution of the MNE groups and relates 
this information to the tax rate information per country. The starting point for our 
analysis at the firm level is the ownership structure of the corporations. To be relevant 
for our analysis, a corporate group must consist of at least two legal entities and have 
a legal entity in at least two countries.60 Additionally, since we are interested in the 
impact of ATP on MNEs located in Europe, we also impose the restriction that at least 
one of the entities needs to be located within the EU 28 countries. This leaves us with 
an overall number of 408,590 entities within 67,120 MNE groups.61  
  
                                          
60 We use the term legal entity here, since for most of our analysis it does not matter where in 
the ownership structure the firm is located, i.e. it is not relevant whether the tax liabilities are 
reduced in a subsidiary or at the headquarter. 
61 See Table 45 and Table 46 in the appendix for the geographical distribution.  
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Table 13: MNE entities by relative statutory tax rates (2015) 
  
Share of firms/MNE groups in Member States which 
are lower tax entities are the lowest tax entity 
have a zero/no tax 
entity in the MNE group 
  firms MNE groups firms 
MNE 
groups firms 
MNE 
groups 
Austria 70.2 59.2 18.7 25.3 1.5 1.3 
Belgium 31.8 29.4 0.0 0.0 3.9 1.7 
Bulgaria 81.5 82.2 93.1 94.3 5.3 4.5 
Croatia 49.6 49.1 25.8 32.8 2.1 2.1 
Cyprus 79.3 79.1 96.8 97.0 1.2 1.0 
Czech Republic 72.6 71.1 60.3 68.9 2.8 1.9 
Denmark 54.1 49.4 22.9 25.2 1.9 1.9 
Estonia 36.4 36.9 44.7 50.2 2.2 2.4 
Finland 59.6 58.4 50.8 60.1 1.2 1.5 
France 0.0 0.0 1.6 4.2 6.5 1.5 
Germany 52.8 35.4 0.0 0.0 2.2 1.5 
Greece 39.1 36.5 10.3 12.8 2.1 1.9 
Hungary 59.0 48.2 0.0 0.0 3.3 2.3 
Ireland 96.7 97.0 85.0 89.5 7.6 5.1 
Italy 47.5 33.7 0.0 0.0 4.3 1.6 
Latvia 53.6 52.0 74.0 74.6 3.3 4.0 
Lithuania 56.7 57.8 82.8 82.2 1.6 2.0 
Luxembourg 33.6 27.0 0.0 0.0 4.9 3.5 
Malta 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.2 5.3 3.5 
Netherlands 73.9 54.8 21.2 33.7 6.7 5.3 
Poland 79.5 78.6 51.1 67.4 2.8 1.7 
Portugal 47.6 44.3 11.1 14.4 1.5 1.9 
Romania 68.3 66.6 60.4 66.9 4.2 3.2 
Slovakia 51.2 47.4 13.5 15.5 2.7 1.9 
Slovenia 40.5 40.6 26.7 32.4 1.1 1.3 
Spain 60.0 49.9 28.2 36.7 3.2 2.2 
Sweden 50.8 45.8 27.5 36.9 1.1 1.3 
United Kingdom 83.6 73.0 37.6 64.1 7.3 5.6 
EU 28 52.2 48.9 21.6 32.4 4.7 3.6 
Average 54.6 50.1 33.7 38.8 3.3 2.5 
Std. deviation 22.5 22.2 31.2 32.4 2.0 1.3 
High values IE, UK, BG, PL, CY 
IE, BG, 
CY, PL, UK 
CY, BG, 
IE, LT, LV 
CY, BG, 
IE, LT, LV 
IE, UK, 
NL, FR, BG 
UK, NL, 
IE, BG, LV 
Low values FR, MT, BE 
FR, MT, 
LU 
BE, DE, 
HU, IT, 
LU, MT, FR 
BE, DE, 
HU, IT, 
LU, MT, FR 
SI, SE, 
CY, FI CY 
Notes: A lower tax entity is defined as having a statutory corporate tax at least 5 percentage points lower 
than the highest statutory tax rates within the MNE group. The lowest tax rate entity is defined as entity with 
the lowest statutory corporate tax rate within the MNE group. Averaged over the period 2010 to 2015. The 
ownership information is from 2013, while tax rate information is from 2010 to 2015. EU 28 refers to the 
average value for the EU overall and Average refers to the arithmetic mean of country values. High/low values 
are one standard deviation above/below the unweighted "Average", bold entries are 2 standard deviations 
above/below. 
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Source: Orbis data (Bureau van Dijk), ZEW study, own calculations  
We merge this ownership structure with information about the statutory corporate tax 
rates in the respective countries. This allows us to categorise each entity of the 
corporate groups as either a lower tax entity (at least 5 percentage point tax differential 
to the highest statutory tax rate in the MNE group) or as the lowest tax entity, if there 
is no entity within the group which has a lower statutory tax rate. Additionally, we can 
identify those groups, which have an entity in a zero/no tax country.62 
In Table 13 we present the share of firms in each Member State which are classified into 
these three relative tax rate categories. For each of the category we also present the 
share of MNE groups in each Member State.63 Additionally, Figure 6 illustrates this 
categorisation together with the headline statutory tax rates in the Member States. The 
upper part in Figure 6 starts with comparing the share of firms which are classified as a 
lower tax entity to the statutory corporate tax burden. Not very surprisingly, the higher 
the corporate tax rate is, the smaller the share of firms which still classify as a lower 
tax entity.  
Figure 6: Corporate tax rates (2015) and MNE entities by relative tax rates  
 
Source: Orbis data (Bureau van Dijk), ZEW study, own calculations 
                                          
62 See Table 49, Table 50 and Table 51 in the appendix for the assumptions about the corporate 
tax rates. 
63 This removes the implicit weighting by number of entities, since it counts each MNE group – 
regardless the actual number of entities - only once in each Member State. 
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This is most evident at the extreme bounds of the corporate tax rate distribution. France 
has a corporate tax rate of 38 percent, which – in combination with no corporate tax 
rate higher than the 40 percent in the United States, rules out the classification as a 
lower tax entity. Equally, firms in Malta are never classified as lower tax entity. In 
contrast 96.7 percent of the firms in Ireland are classified as a lower tax entity, i.e. are 
in a group with at least on entity in a country with tax rate higher than 17.5 percent.64 
Other Member States with a high share of firms classified as lower tax entities are the 
United Kingdom (83.6%), Bulgaria (81.5%), Poland (79.5%) and Cyprus (79.1%). 
Entities in Member States with relatively high statutory tax rates e.g. Germany, Italy or 
Spain, are nevertheless classified as lower tax entities to some extent, reflecting that 
they often belong to MNE groups with entities with an even higher tax burden, most 
notably Japan and the United States. This is also reflected in the overall average, where 
we find that 52.2 percent of the entities in the EU are classified as a lower tax entity. 
However, looking at the second indicator in Table 13, it becomes evident that a large 
fraction of the MNE groups in the EU have further subsidiaries in lower tax jurisdictions. 
All the entities in Belgium, Germany, Hungary, Italy and Luxembourg belong to MNE 
groups with at least one entity in a lower tax country and only a very small fraction of 
the entities in Malta (0.8%) and France (1.6%) are the lowest tax entity.65 In contrast, 
for the vast majority of the entities in Member States with lower corporate tax rates, 
i.e. Cyprus (96.8%), Bulgaria (93.1%), Ireland (85.0%), Lithuania (82.8%) and Latvia 
(74%), these entities are also the entities with the lowest corporate tax rate within the 
MNE group. The low overall average of only 21.6 percent of entities (32.4 percent of the 
MNE groups) being in the lowest tax country reflects two different characteristics. First, 
MNE groups typically have only few entities in lower tax countries and a larger number 
of entities in higher tax countries. Secondly, the lowest tax entities are outside the EU 
and therefore not captured in this average based only on the EU part of the MNEs.  
The latter claim is partly addressed in the third indicator in Table 13 which looks at the 
share of MNE groups which also have an entity in a zero/no tax country. Overall, we 
find that 4.7 percent of the entities in the EU are within MNE groups, which also have a 
presence in a zero/no tax country. In terms of MNE groups, we find that 3.7 percent 
also have a presence in a zero/no tax country. This lower number reflects that on 
average MNE groups with more subsidiaries also have a subsidiary in a zero/no tax 
country. Note, that this is a very conservative estimate of a presence in zero/no tax 
country, since we require to have a least the basic information about the zero/no tax 
country entity in the ORBIS data base. 
Regarding the difference between the Member States, Ireland (7.6%), the United 
Kingdom (7.3%), the Netherlands (6.7%), France (6.5%) and Bulgaria (5.3%) stand 
out with the highest values. The type of countries that have a share above the EU 
average is quite diverse, ranging from high to low tax countries. This might indicate that 
ATP is relevant for all these countries but in different ways. Of the traditionally higher 
tax countries MNE entities in France (6.5%) have a much stronger link to zero/no tax 
                                          
64 Throughout the sample period of 2010 to 2015 the statutory tax rate in Ireland was 12.5 
percent. Since to be classified as a lower tax entity, the tax rate in this entity must be at least 5 
percentage points lower than the maximum tax rate within the MNE group, this implies at least 
one other entity with a tax rate of 17.5 percent or higher.   
65 Note that is it is possible to be classified as a lowest tax entity, but not as a lower tax entity if 
the difference to the highest tax country is less than 5 percentage points.  
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countries, compared to 4.3 percent for MNE entities in Italy and only 2.2 percent in 
Germany. However, this difference cannot be observed when looking at the share of 
MNE groups with a presence in zero/no tax countries. The Member States with the 
smallest number of entities in groups with links to zero/no tax countries are Slovenia, 
Sweden (1.1% each), Cyprus and Finland (1.2% each). 
Key findings 
In several European countries (Belgium, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg and Italy), all 
MNE entities have at least one subsidiary in a country with a lower tax burden, which 
reflects that these Member States are potentially more exposed to ATP. Being exposed 
to ATP does however not necessarily mean that a country's tax base is eroded. It can 
also be an indication that the country's tax rules are being used to shift profits but with 
limited direct impact on the tax base. At the other end of the spectrum, the countries 
identified as having the lowest statutory tax rates (see section 4.1.1), i.e. Cyprus, 
Bulgaria, Ireland, Lithuania and Latvia, host the highest share of MNE entities classified 
as lowest tax entities. This may be an indication that these Member States are more 
likely to benefit from ATP structures, with tax base shifted into these entities. Finally, 
looking at the share of MNE entities which are in MNE groups with a presence in a 
zero/no corporate tax country, Ireland, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France 
and Bulgaria stand out with the strongest links which may be an indication that these 
countries are more exposed to ATP, but potentially in different ways.   
4.1.4 Consolidated profitability and effective tax burden in MNE groups  
One indication of the existence of ATP is to look at the effective tax burden of MNE 
groups compared to their domestic counterparts. Under the assumption that the ATP 
structure does primarily affect the tax liabilities but leaves the tax base unchanged, we 
should be able to see lower effective tax burdens for MNE groups. In contrast, if the ATP 
structure reduces the corporate tax base, we will not necessarily see a difference in the 
effective tax burden, but rather see a difference in the pre-tax profitability.  
Furthermore, ATP structures can reduce the pre-tax profits via a reduction in financial 
profits and losses (e.g. through an interest deduction) or through a reduction in the 
operating profits (e.g. through transfer pricing or a royalty payment). Consequently, we 
may see different patterns of the effective tax rate and profitability measures, 
depending on the definition of our indicators.  
Figure 7 compares the overall distribution of two effective tax rate measures of MNEs 
and domestic companies. The upper part of Figure 7 looks at the ratio of tax liabilities 
in the financial accounts to the profit and loss before taxation (PLBT). And the lower 
part displays the tax liabilities as percent of earnings before interest and taxation (EBIT).  
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Figure 7: Distribution of consolidated ETRs by MNE status (2010-2015) 
 
Source: Orbis data (Bureau van Dijk), own calculations 
In both measures we see that the MNE groups – depicted as the transparent bars in the 
histogram – appear to exhibit higher effective tax rates than the domestic groups.66 In 
Table 14 and Table 15, we compare some descriptive statistics, namely, means, 
medians and skewness, of both ETR measures at the Member State level. Additionally, 
we provide the share of firms with suitable data to calculate the effective tax burden.67 
Because of the asymmetric tax treatment of taxable losses, we can only derive a 
meaningful ETR measure if the profit measure is positive. Even by aggregating over the 
full sample period of 2010 to 2015 we are still far from being able to use all observations.  
  
                                          
66 A simple t-test confirms that the ratio EBIT-based ETR 3 percentage points higher for MNEs 
while the PLBT-based ETR is 7 percentage points higher. Both effects are statistically significant. 
67 The share of firms used relates to the number of consolidated accounts in the data, see Table 
56 in the appendix for the breakdown by Member States. 
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Table 14: Consolidated ETR (Tax/PLBT), by Member States (2010-2015)  
   Domestic groups Multinational groups 
Country 
% 
obs. 
used 
TAX/PLBT % 
obs. 
used 
TAX/PLBT 
Mean Median Skewness Mean Median Skewness 
Austria 56.2 22.9 24.7 0.9 62.3 28.7 28.8 0.3 
Belgium 56.6 36.0 34.7 0.4 63.9 35.2 33.2 0.5 
Bulgaria 41.2 14.2 10.3 3.7 57.1 9.8 8.7 0.4 
Croatia 30.4 13.9 10.9 2.1 43.5 20.5 18.7 0.5 
Cyprus 14.6 20.0 16.0 1.5 16.7 21.7 17.2 0.2 
Czech Republic 26.5 26.8 18.7 2.3 50.0 24.4 21.5 0.6 
Denmark 58.4 22.8 23.7 0.8 65.8 29.3 27.1 1.2 
Estonia 80.0 9.2 9.0 0.1 72.7 19.0 16.2 1.5 
Finland 71.0 22.2 21.8 1.8 64.8 28.1 24.6 1.2 
France 41.6 29.7 29.7 0.7 46.6 37.1 37.1 0.3 
Germany 49.5 31.7 30.9 0.7 61.5 40.0 38.1 0.5 
Greece 26.1 32.6 28.9 0.7 30.7 37.9 34.4 0.6 
Hungary 51.1 13.9 9.9 2.4 63.2 14.9 9.3 0.9 
Ireland 30.2 18.3 16.3 1.8 47.7 21.6 18.7 1.5 
Italy 40.3 47.6 44.7 0.3 55.1 45.6 43.0 0.2 
Latvia 65.3 19.7 17.4 1.0 73.1 14.4 16.0 0.3 
Lithuania 66.7 10.1 10.4 -0.2 25.0 9.0 9.0 n.a. 
Luxembourg 50.0 18.2 13.0 0.5 46.6 32.8 32.3 0.6 
Malta 55.1 21.7 23.7 -0.4 33.3 17.4 16.2 0.8 
Netherlands 55.0 24.3 24.1 1.5 60.7 28.9 26.0 1.1 
Poland 53.4 22.3 20.3 1.9 63.6 22.9 20.2 2.6 
Portugal 46.0 28.7 27.2 1.3 54.3 38.4 34.2 0.8 
Romania 52.7 19.5 17.8 1.1 100.0 21.2 21.2 0.0 
Slovakia 39.1 26.5 23.8 0.3 28.6 14.6 14.6 0.0 
Slovenia 45.5 11.7 14.1 -0.6 41.7 16.1 17.6 -0.2 
Spain 40.8 27.2 27.7 1.0 50.6 30.7 29.4 1.0 
Sweden 58.5 24.8 23.5 1.3 62.8 32.0 29.4 0.9 
United Kingdom 41.9 23.2 22.7 1.2 59.0 30.3 28.3 0.9 
EU 28 47.5 26.5 24.4 1.1 58.1 33.4 31.1 0.7 
Average   22.8 21.3 1.1   25.8 24.0 0.7 
Std. deviation   8.3 8.4 0.9   9.6 9.3 0.6 
High values  IT, BE, EL, DE 
IT, BE, 
DE, FR 
BG, HU, 
CZ, HR  
IT, DE,  
PT, EL,  
FR 
IT, DE, 
FR, EL, 
PT 
PL, EE, 
IE 
Low values 
  
EE, LT, 
SI, HU, 
HR, BG 
EE, HU, 
BG, LT, 
HR 
SI, MT,  
LT, EE  
LT, BG, LV, 
SK, HU 
BG, LT, 
HU, SK 
SI, SK, 
RO 
Notes: Based on the consolidated accounts from Orbis. "% obs. used" refers the fraction of accounts which 
have a positive pre-tax profit, a non-negative tax liability and an effective tax rate within the interval of 0 
to 1. Means and Medians are in %. n.a. represents a case, where the skewness is not defined because we 
have only one observation. EU 28 refers to the average value for the EU overall and Average refers to the 
arithmetic mean of the country values. High/low values are one standard deviation above/below the 
unweighted "Average", bold entries are 2 standard deviations above/below. 
Source: Orbis data (Bureau van Dijk), own calculations 
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Overall, we can use 47.5 percent of the accounts of domestic companies and 58.1 
percent of the MNEs. That said, since we only have consolidated accounts for a subset 
of 7,917 of the 48,318 EU-based global ultimate owners in our dataset of unconsolidated 
accounts, we have a meaningful measure of the ETR for approximately 10 percent of 
the MNE groups in our sample. 68 This limitation contributes to the only moderate 
importance attributed to this indicator when allocating entities to roles. One additional 
potential pitfall in the interpretation of the ETR indicator could be that MNE groups are 
more likely to report overall taxable losses, and hence we systematically drop more 
observations for the MNE groups. However, the higher percentage of usable 
observations for MNEs does not support this hypothesis.  
The effective tax burden measure based on the PLBT (in Table 14) is higher in the EU 
on average for MNEs (33.4%) than for domestic groups (26.5%). It is neither driven by 
a larger number of MNEs in higher tax countries, nor is it due to higher ETRs in selected 
countries. On the contrary, for all Member States with decent coverage, the ETRs for 
MNE groups are higher. The same holds for the median values which rules out the 
potential explanation that higher ETRs are driven by extreme outliers. Looking at the 
skewness of the distributions by Member States we see almost only positive values 
which is also reflected in positive skewness overall. The positive skewness implies that 
indeed the averages are somewhat inflated by a few firms with larger values. This can 
be the case for Bulgaria, Hungary, Czech Republic and Croatia for their domestic 
companies and in Portugal, Estonia and Ireland for MNEs. However, the absolute value 
of the skewness is only moderately positive which implies that the averages are not too 
strongly affected by outliers.69  
Italy stands out with the highest average and median ETRs for both domestic companies 
and MNEs (i.e. above 40%). It is clearly above the statutory tax rate. Several other 
countries are also exhibiting high average and median values of ETRs, e.g. Germany, 
France, Belgium, Greece and Portugal, while some of the Eastern European countries 
have quite low average ETRs, for example Hungary, Bulgaria, Lithuania. However, since 
several of these averages are based on very few observations the numbers have to be 
seen with caution.  
Turning to differences between the ratios for domestic and MNE groups, seven Member 
States have both their mean and median domestic ETRs above the corresponding MNE 
ones. Slovakia has the largest difference with 11.9 and 9.2 pp. difference respectively. 
Malta comes second with differences of 4.3 and 7.5 pp. The other Member States are 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Italy, Latvia and Lithuania. At the other end of the spectrum, 
Luxembourg displays an ETR for domestic companies, which is well below the 
corresponding one for MNE groups.  
                                          
68 The total number of global ultimate owner in our sample is 67,120. However, for this part of 
the analysis we are only considering the 48,318 EU-based owners.  
69 This is also due to the fact, that we discard all observations with an ETR outside the interval of 
-1 to 1.  
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Table 15: Consolidated ETR (Tax/EBIT), by Member States (2010-2015)  
   Domestic groups Multinational groups 
Country 
% 
obs. 
used 
TAX/EBIT % 
obs. 
used 
TAX/EBIT 
Mean Median Skewness Mean Median Skewness 
Austria 69.8 19.4 19.8 1.2 74.3 22.5 23.4 1.2 
Belgium 65.2 27.8 29.0 0.6 72.5 25.9 24.8 1.5 
Bulgaria 47.4 10.7 7.0 2.1 57.1 7.5 8.7 -1.0 
Croatia 53.9 7.4 6.9 1.3 56.5 11.7 10.6 0.7 
Cyprus 20.4 14.0 11.0 1.0 38.1 15.3 14.7 0.7 
Czech Republic 29.4 32.5 21.7 1.6 87.5 24.7 18.8 1.9 
Denmark 63.0 20.8 20.8 1.4 73.7 23.2 23.1 1.4 
Estonia 60.0 28.3 17.7 0.7 63.6 15.5 13.6 1.0 
Finland 72.5 19.9 19.8 1.7 72.8 23.6 22.2 1.6 
France 57.2 24.9 24.9 1.1 66.5 26.9 26.0 1.4 
Germany 67.1 24.0 23.4 1.3 76.1 27.8 27.4 1.5 
Greece 43.2 20.6 17.4 1.7 58.7 22.7 21.7 0.9 
Hungary 48.9 16.1 10.5 1.7 68.4 12.6 10.3 1.0 
Ireland 39.7 14.7 13.5 2.4 54.9 19.3 15.3 2.6 
Italy 59.7 37.3 35.3 0.9 73.3 33.5 32.7 0.8 
Latvia 71.3 18.9 15.4 3.0 73.1 13.3 15.1 0.7 
Lithuania 68.5 9.5 9.6 -0.3 50.0 11.3 11.3 0.0 
Luxembourg 43.8 19.3 19.2 0.0 56.9 27.2 25.2 1.3 
Malta 49.3 24.5 25.8 0.3 33.3 14.5 12.2 1.0 
Netherlands 58.1 21.2 21.4 1.5 68.0 24.4 22.5 1.9 
Poland 59.3 17.8 17.6 2.1 72.9 17.6 16.8 1.9 
Portugal 57.9 20.0 19.1 1.8 72.8 21.8 20.0 1.7 
Romania 51.6 15.8 13.9 1.9 100 12.8 12.8 0.0 
Slovakia 30.4 24.2 23.3 1.2 14.3 16.3 16.3 n. a. 
Slovenia 45.5 8.9 9.0 0.0 54.2 8.9 7.8 -0.1 
Spain 49.6 21.6 21.7 1.0 58.5 20.8 20.1 1.2 
Sweden 65.5 20.6 21.8 1.4 71.1 24.7 23.9 1.9 
United Kingdom 58.6 19.2 20.3 1.3 69.4 22.1 22.3 1.4 
EU 28 59.7 22.1 21.6 1.3 69.9 25.1 24.1 1.4 
Average  20.0 18.5 1.3  19.6 18.6 1.1 
Std. deviation  6.8 6.7 0.7  6.5 6.3 0.8 
High values  IT, CZ, 
EE, BE 
IT, BE,  
MT 
LV, IE,  
BG  
IT, DE,  
LU, FR 
IT, DE, 
FR, LU 
IE, PL, 
SE, NL 
Low values  HR, SI,  
LT, BG 
HR, BG, 
SI, LT,  
HU 
LT, LU,  
SI, MT, 
EE 
 
BG, SI,  
LT, HR, 
HU, RO 
SI, BG,  
HU, HR,  
LT, MT 
BG, SI, 
LT 
Notes: Based on the consolidated accounts from Orbis. "% obs. Used" refers the fraction of accounts which 
have a positive operating profit (EBIT), a non-negative tax liability and an effective tax rate within the 
interval of 0 to 1. Means and Medians are in %. n.a. represents a case, where the skewness is not defined 
because we have only one observation. EU 28 refers to the average value for the EU overall and Average 
refers to the arithmetic mean of country values. High/low values are one standard deviation above/below 
the unweighted "Average", bold entries are 2 standard deviation above/below. 
Source: Orbis data (Bureau van Dijk), own calculations 
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Table 15 presents the Member States specific descriptive statistics for the second ETR 
measure calculated as the ratio between tax liabilities and EBIT. Overall, we are now 
able to use a substantially larger share of observations, given that the aggregated EBIT 
over the period 2010 to 2015 is more often positive. In other words, a relevant share 
of firms reports pre-tax profits clearly lower than operating profits. The larger values 
for the profit measure are also directly reflected in a lower ETR measure in Table 15. 
The EU average for domestic companies is now only 22.1 percent compared to 25.1 
percent for MNEs. This implies a much lower differential between domestic companies 
and MNEs, due to lower financial profits and lower extraordinary income for MNEs.  
Regarding the distributions of the ETRs, we can still observe slightly lower medians 
compared to the averages, also reflected in a positive skewness. Despite the slightly 
higher value of the overall skewness, the averages are still not strongly affected by large 
positive outliers. 
The ranking of the Member States remains broadly unchanged, with Italy still displaying 
the highest ETRs for both domestic companies and MNEs. The Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Belgium and Malta follow with high ETRs for domestic companies, while the MNE groups 
in Germany, France, and Luxembourg have clearly above average ETRs. However, it is 
worth pointing out, that the ETRs based on EBIT are substantially lower in all these 
countries. This reflects that, especially in high tax countries, firms in general and MNEs 
in specific, are able to substantially reduce the pre-tax profits compared to the operating 
profits. This highlights the importance of investigating the profitability, rather than only 
concentrating on the ETR. 
In consequence, in the next step we look at the distribution of the two profit measures. 
The upper part of Figure 8 shows the distribution of the profitability measure PLBT 
divided by total assets, while the lower part displays the distribution of the profitability 
measure of EBIT over total assets. Analogous to Figure 7, the transparent bars display 
the distribution of the values for MNE groups in comparison to the domestic groups in 
the filled bars.  
Both distributions of the PLBT-based profitability measures are very similar and have 
most observations close to a zero pre-tax profitability. In contrast, for the EBIT-based 
profitability measure the distribution for the MNE groups is slightly further right, 
indicating a moderately higher profitability.70 This confirms the observation made 
before, that MNE groups overall tend to have higher financial losses bringing down the 
corporate tax base. 
                                          
70 This is also visible in the simple t-test which shows a 0.5 percent - statistically significant - 
higher EBIT/total assets ratio for the MNE group. The PLBT/total assets ratios are not statistically 
different between the groups. 
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Figure 8: Distribution of profitability by MNE status (2010-2015) 
Source: Orbis data (Bureau van Dijk), own calculations 
In Table 16 and Table 17 we compare the country level descriptive statistics of the two 
profitability measures to identify whether this effect is broadly based or due to individual 
Member States.  
In contrast to the ETR measures, we are now also able to use loss making corporate 
groups as well, which increases the number of useable observations to some extent. 
Overall, we are now able to use 83.4 percent of the consolidated accounts of the 
domestic companies and 94.5 percent of the MNE groups. The difference in this 
percentage reflects to some extent that domestic groups tend to be smaller. Defining 
the profitability as return on assets, smaller values for total assets tends to lead to more 
extreme values. Together with our approach of excluding extreme values with a 
profitability outside the interval of -50 percent and 50 percent therefore leaves a smaller 
percentage of domestic companies. The overall average is almost identical with 2.8 
percent for the domestic companies compared to the 2.9 for the MNEs, confirming the 
finding from the graphical comparison in Figure 8. However, the overall median is clearly 
lower for the domestic companies (1.6%) than for MNE groups (2.4%).  
Looking at the overall skewness, we also see that pre-tax profitability of the domestic 
companies is slightly positively skewed, while the distribution for MNE groups is slightly 
more negatively skewed. This reflects the relatively larger number of domestic 
companies with a pre-tax profitability close to zero. 
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Table 16: Consolidated profitability (PLBT/Assets), by Member States (2010-
2015)  
   Domestic groups Multinational groups 
Country 
% 
obs. 
used 
PLBT/ASSETS % 
obs. 
used 
PLBT/ASSETS 
Mean Median Skewness Mean Median Skewness 
Austria 94.5 1.9 1.0 -1.6 98.4 2.5 1.7 0.9 
Belgium 91.4 3.0 2.0 1.1 97.5 2.5 2.6 -0.6 
Bulgaria 91.8 -1.2 -0.1 -1.9 100.0 1.4 0.7 1.2 
Croatia 95.1 -0.7 0.0 -1.7 100.0 -2.6 -2.1 -0.7 
Cyprus 50.5 -5.3 -2.5 -1.8 76.2 -0.4 -1.0 3.1 
Czech Republic 32.4 4.2 3.1 0.2 87.5 4.4 4.1 1.2 
Denmark 87.7 3.9 2.6 0.2 98.1 4.2 3.5 0.5 
Estonia 80.0 5.8 4.8 0.6 100.0 4.5 2.9 0.8 
Finland 94.4 4.9 3.8 -0.2 97.3 2.8 3.0 -0.8 
France 80.1 2.0 1.1 -1.0 90.5 1.5 1.3 -2.8 
Germany 86.1 2.6 1.3 -0.4 92.5 3.9 3.4 -0.2 
Greece 82.1 -1.1 0.0 -1.0 93.3 0.0 0.0 0.7 
Hungary 95.7 -0.2 0.9 -1.5 89.5 3.6 2.9 -0.4 
Ireland 60.5 1.3 0.1 -1.3 81.7 2.8 2.6 -0.9 
Italy 83.4 1.3 0.7 -1.2 95.7 1.9 1.3 -1.0 
Latvia 94.1 4.8 3.7 1.3 100.0 6.6 5.4 0.0 
Lithuania 100 2.5 1.5 0.8 100.0 2.2 1.3 0.8 
Luxembourg 81.3 1.2 1.0 -0.4 94.8 2.2 2.4 0.3 
Malta 76.8 5.2 3.6 1.9 80.0 2.5 0.9 1.0 
Netherlands 87.1 3.6 2.6 0.1 93.9 3.9 2.9 0.5 
Poland 85.9 2.2 2.7 -1.0 96.3 5.2 3.9 1.5 
Portugal 83.7 1.5 1.1 -0.1 95.7 1.7 1.6 1.3 
Romania 100 -1.3 0.5 -0.8 100.0 5.2 5.2 0.0 
Slovakia 69.6 1.3 0.7 0.9 57.1 0.1 -0.9 0.7 
Slovenia 95.5 -1.3 -0.5 -2.1 95.8 -0.7 0.0 -1.1 
Spain 79.9 1.6 0.8 -0.4 92.7 1.4 1.3 -0.6 
Sweden 86.3 4.7 3.1 0.0 96.1 3.6 3.5 -0.3 
United Kingdom 80.6 2.7 1.1 -0.1 96.0 3.0 3.1 -0.7 
EU 28 83.4 2.8 1.6 0 94.5 2.9 2.4 -0.4 
Average  1.8 1.5 -0.4  2.5 2.1 0.1 
Std. deviation  2.5 1.6 1.1  2.0 1.8 1.1 
High values  EE, MT,  
FI, LV,  
SE 
EE, FI, 
LV, MT, 
SE, CZ 
MT, LV, 
BE, SK,  
LT 
 LV, PL, RO, EE 
LV, RO, 
CZ, PL 
CY, PL,  
PT 
Low values  CY, RO, 
 SI, BG, 
EL, HR 
CY, SI 
SI, BG, 
CY, HR, 
AT, HU 
 
HR, SI, 
CY, EL,  
SK 
HR, CY, 
SK, SI,  
EL 
FR, SI, 
IT 
Notes: Based on the consolidated accounts from Orbis. % obs. used refers the fraction of accounts with a 
profitability measure within the interval of -0.5 to 0.5. Means and medians are in %. EU 28 refers to the 
average value for the EU overall and Average refers to the arithmetic mean of country values. High/low 
values are one standard deviation above/below the unweighted "Average", bold entries are 2 standard 
deviations above/below. 
Source: Orbis data (Bureau van Dijk), own calculations 
  
European Commission 
 
Aggressive tax planning indicators 
 
October 2017 | 80 
The average pre-tax profitability for domestic groups ranges from -5.3 percent in Cyprus 
to 5.8 in Estonia. For MNE groups the range is similar from -2.6 percent in Croatia to 
6.6 percent in Latvia. However, most of these numbers are based on a few companies 
only and therefore affected by large outliers. This is also reflected in a smaller range of 
values for the medians, which are arguably the more reliable statistic for Member States 
with few observations. Member States with high medians for consolidated pre-tax 
profitability for domestic companies are Estonia (4.8%), Finland (3.8%), Latvia (3.7%), 
Malta (3.6%), Sweden and the Czech Republic (3.1% each), while in Cyprus (-2.5%) 
and Slovenia (-0.5%) even the median pre-tax profitability is negative. In comparison, 
MNE groups in Latvia (5.4%), Romania (5.2%), the Czech Republic (4.1%) and Poland 
(3.9%) have the highest median pre-tax profitability. In Croatia (-2.1%), Cyprus (-
1.0%), Slovakia (-0.9%), Slovenia and Greece (0.0% each) have the lowest median 
pre-tax profitability. Of the countries with a larger number of observations, MNE groups 
in France stand out with an average (1.5%) or median pre-tax profitability (1.3%) which 
is clearly below the EU level. MNE groups in Italy and Spain also show low pre-tax 
profitability, while in contrast German MNE groups have relatively high pre-tax 
profitability. It is also remarkable, that the pre-tax profitability of German MNE groups 
is clearly higher than for domestic firms in Germany. The distribution of the pre-tax 
profitability in MNE groups in France shows a strongly negatively skewed distribution, 
reflecting the relatively large number of firms with a pre-tax profitability close to zero. 
The pre-tax profitability in MNE groups in Cyprus in contrast shows a clearly positive 
skewness. 
Table 17 provides the descriptive statistics for the operating profitability. Overall 
domestic firms in the EU have an average profitability of 4.5 percent while the MNE 
groups are more profitable with 5.1 percent. The higher operating profitability for MNE 
groups (4.9% compared to 4.0% for domestic companies) is even more pronounced in 
the median profitability. Overall the distributions for both domestic firms and MNE 
groups are only slightly skewed to the left. This mirrors the generally more balanced 
distribution in the lower part of Figure 8. There is no evidence for relatively more firms 
at zero operating profitability, which seems plausible since there is no longer the direct 
impact of the asymmetric tax treatment of the pre-tax profitability. The percentage of 
usable observations is lowest in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Cyprus and Ireland. While 
this in principle also can highlight the location of extreme values for profitability, it 
primarily reflects reporting standards in these countries, i.e. insufficient information.  
Domestic firms have the highest average operating profitability in Sweden (5.9%), 
followed by Finland (5.5%), Malta (5.3%), Latvia (5.3%) and Germany (5.2%). This 
ranking is not driven by extreme outliers, which is confirmed by the corresponding 
median operating profitability which again sees Sweden (4.9%) ahead of Finland 
(4.8%). The operating profitability for domestic companies is found to be the lowest in 
Cyprus (-1.6% on average, 0.0% median), Romania (-0.3% average, 0.5% median), 
Greece (0.0% average, 0.8% median) and Slovakia (0.3% average, 0.3% median). For 
MNE groups the ranking is rather different with the highest value for Romania (10.6%), 
followed by the Czech Republic (8.7%), Poland (7.5%), Latvia (7.4%) and Germany 
(7.1%). While these values are based on very few observations, MNE groups in Germany 
are showing a high operating profitability on average (7.1%) and the median of 6.9 
percent shows that this is not only due to some outliers. The MNE groups in Croatia, 
Slovakia and Slovenia have the lowest operating profitability.  
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Table 17: Consolidated profitability (EBIT/Assets), by Member States (2010-
2015)  
   Domestic groups Multinational groups 
Country % obs. used 
EBIT/ASSETS % 
obs. 
used 
EBIT/ASSETS 
Mean Median Skewness Mean Median Skewness 
Austria 92.8 3.7 3.1 0.5 95.3 4.2 3.8 0.3 
Belgium 91.7 4.1 3.6 0.0 97.5 4.5 4.5 -1.0 
Bulgaria 91.8 1.5 0.4 0.7 100.0 3.6 3.4 0.5 
Croatia 95.1 1.5 1.8 0.8 100.0 0.7 1.3 -0.8 
Cyprus 52.4 -1.6 0.0 -2.6 76.2 2.8 1.4 0.9 
Czech Republic 32.4 4.5 2.1 0.7 87.5 8.7 8.0 0.7 
Denmark 87.8 4.7 4.3 -0.3 98.1 5.7 5.2 0.5 
Estonia 80.0 3.9 1.4 1.0 100.0 5.9 4.0 1.1 
Finland 94.7 5.5 4.8 -0.7 97.3 4.5 4.3 -0.5 
France 79.6 3.8 3.7 -0.8 90.5 4.2 4.6 -1.9 
Germany 86.0 5.2 4.6 -0.5 92.3 7.1 6.9 -0.3 
Greece 82.5 0.0 0.8 -1.7 92.0 3.4 2.2 1.2 
Hungary 95.7 1.3 0.4 -1.5 89.5 4.3 4.6 -0.6 
Ireland 60.8 2.2 3.1 -1.6 81.7 3.3 4.2 -1.2 
Italy 83.4 2.7 2.6 -1.2 95.7 3.7 3.7 -0.7 
Latvia 94.1 5.3 4.5 1.0 100.0 7.4 5.8 0.4 
Lithuania 100.0 3.3 2.8 0.8 100.0 3.2 3.1 0.1 
Luxembourg 81.3 2.8 0.8 1.3 94.8 4.7 4.9 -1.4 
Malta 76.8 5.3 3.5 1.8 80.0 3.8 1.8 1.0 
Netherlands 87.1 4.5 3.9 -0.1 93.6 5.5 4.9 0.1 
Poland 87.2 3.8 4.3 -1.2 96.3 7.5 5.6 1.1 
Portugal 83.7 3.6 3.4 0.9 95.7 3.9 3.4 0.9 
Romania 100.0 -0.3 0.5 -0.7 100.0 10.6 10.6 0.0 
Slovakia 73.9 0.3 0.3 0.8 57.1 1.6 -0.2 1.2 
Slovenia 95.5 3.4 0.0 1.3 95.8 2.2 1.7 0.2 
Spain 80.0 2.8 2.9 -0.6 92.9 3.1 3.6 -1.1 
Sweden 86.2 5.9 4.9 -0.2 96.2 5.3 5.3 -0.5 
United 
Kingdom 80.0 5.0 4.6 -0.3 95.1 5.7 5.8 -0.9 
EU 28 83.2 4.5 4.0 -0.3 94.2 5.1 4.9 -0.5 
Average   3.2 2.6 -0.1   4.7 4.2 0.0 
Std. deviation   1.9 1.7 1.1   2.1 2.2 0.9 
High values  
SE, FI,  
MT, LV, 
DE 
SE, FI,  
UK, DE, 
LV, PL, DK 
MT, LU,  
SI, LT, 
EE 
 
RO, CZ, 
PL, LV,  
DE 
RO, CZ, 
DE 
EL, SK, 
PL, EE,  
MT, PT, 
CY 
Low values 
  
CY, RO, 
EL, SK 
CY, SI, 
SK, HU, 
BG, RO, 
LU, EL 
CY, EL,  
IE, HU, 
IT, PL 
 HR, SK, SI 
SK, HR, 
CY, SI,  
MT 
FR, LU,  
IE, ES,  
BE 
Notes: Based on the consolidated accounts from Orbis. % obs. used refers the fraction of accounts with a 
profitability measure within the interval of -0.5 to 0.5. Means and medians are in %. EU 28 refers to the 
average value for the EU overall and Average refers to the arithmetic mean of country values. High/low 
values are one standard deviation above/below the unweighted "Average", bold entries are 2 standard 
deviations above/below. 
Source: Orbis data (Bureau van Dijk), own calculations  
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Key findings 
The comparison of the consolidated ETRs finds a clearly higher ETR for MNEs, which is 
at odds with the expectation of MNEs being able to reduce their tax burden through ATP. 
The main message from the analysis of the consolidated accounts is that MNE groups 
are more profitable, measured through their operating profits. But this positive 
profitability gap for MNE groups is no longer observable once we compare pre-tax 
profitability. This implies that MNE groups are showing higher financial losses, or other 
extraordinary deductions, which help them to reduce the corporate tax base. The 
analysis of consolidated account does at the same time not reveal clear patterns across 
Member States and is hampered by data limitations. 
4.1.5 ATP-specific indicators at entity level  
In this subsection, we focus on the entities making up an MNE. Using the unconsolidated 
accounts of the individual entities (headquarters, intermediate owners and subsidiaries) 
of a MNE group allows learning more about the intra-group transactions. As a starting 
point, we divide the entities within MNE groups into those who are lower tax entities 
and those who are not. It allows comparing relevant indicators in these two subgroups 
to the domestic counterparts. This highlights whether key indicators are varying 
depending on the relative tax position of the entity within the MNE group. However, this 
approach has one important drawback. As already discussed in Section 4.1.3, Member 
States with very high (low) statutory tax rates will have hardly any MNE entities which 
are classified as lower (higher) tax entity. Together with incomplete coverage for some 
balance sheet items this implies that several of the Member State averages will be based 
on few observations. To mitigate this problem, we i.) also report the median per Member 
States and ii.) include the number of observations on which the aggregate statistics are 
based.71  
In the following we present means and medians for (i) domestic companies, (ii) MNE 
entities with a local statutory tax rate at least 5 percentage points below the highest tax 
rate in the MNE group, and (iii) other MNE entities, broken down by Member State. We 
start with three different profitability measures. Table 18 reports profits and losses 
before taxation (PLBT) in percent of total assets, Table 19 earnings before interest and 
taxation (EBIT) over total assets and Table 20 the financial profits and losses (FIN_PL) 
over total assets.72 
Starting with a few general observations about the distribution of pre-tax profitability 
in Table 18 one can see that, for all three subgroups, the averages are clearly higher 
than the medians, which suggests that the pre-tax profitability distribution is skewed to 
the left. This pattern is consistent with a smaller number of relatively profitable firms, 
while the bulk of firms are less profitable.  
  
                                          
71 To put the numbers further into perspective, Table 57 in the appendix presents the overall 
number of observations in the dataset.  
72 We also show profitability ratios based on the number of employees in Table 58, Table 59, and 
Table 60 in the appendix. Given that the coverage for the number of employees is worse, we 
restrict the discussion to the profitability measures based on total assets.  
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Table 18: Profitability (PLBT/ASSETS), by Member States (2010-2015)  
  Domestic companies 
Entities within a MNE group in a 
higher tax country lower tax country 
  PLBT/ASSETS (%) 
No. obs. 
PLBT/ASSETS (%) No. 
obs. 
PLBT/ASSETS (%) No. 
obs. Country Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Austria 4.7 2.9 7610 4.2 3.0 2817 6.0 4.8 13406 
Belgium 4.3 2.8 85753 4.0 2.7 26656 4.6 3.4 15805 
Bulgaria 2.2 1.1 18653 0.5 0.4 1233 3.6 2.0 6226 
Croatia 1.9 0.8 130650 -0.7 0.4 3375 1.9 1.6 3942 
Cyprus 2.2 2.5 193 9.7 5.2 24 4.2 1.6 133 
Czech Republic 3.1 1.8 28004 3.2 2.0 6934 5.6 4.4 26190 
Denmark 5.2 3.7 175902 4.3 3.6 14120 4.9 4.0 19680 
Estonia 4.5 2.6 9212 4.1 3.4 4839 6.3 5.2 4208 
Finland 5.7 3.4 39035 4.9 3.3 9689 6.6 5.3 11110 
France 4.8 4.0 312231 3.2 2.7 156838 3.8 2.6 4961 
Germany 5.3 3.4 62709 5.5 4.3 22680 6.8 5.6 35379 
Greece -1.2 -0.1 6039 -0.9 0.2 3440 1.1 1.6 4791 
Hungary 3.0 1.9 1353 3.4 2.5 708 4.5 4.1 4854 
Ireland 1.9 1.0 4738 0.5 0.4 492 3.4 1.5 14674 
Italy 1.2 1.0 265754 1.1 1.0 67153 2.6 2.1 42827 
Latvia 1.4 0.2 8221 2.0 0.1 1706 3.3 2.1 5277 
Lithuania 4.5 3.0 1861 5.8 5.2 659 7.7 6.6 3044 
Luxembourg 2.2 0.9 2946 0.9 0.0 3532 3.5 1.0 4906 
Malta 3.1 0.0 4703 7.3 3.3 1403 3.6 2.9 47 
Netherlands 4.6 2.3 21171 3.7 1.2 4419 4.3 2.1 21348 
Poland 3.0 2.0 37641 3.9 3.2 5111 6.0 5.4 33812 
Portugal 1.3 1.2 47748 2.4 1.9 9618 4.1 3.4 9048 
Romania 0.7 0.3 10508 -1.5 -0.6 13810 1.4 0.3 31876 
Slovakia 2.9 1.5 3468 3.7 2.4 2762 5.8 4.8 5228 
Slovenia 0.6 0.6 1872 0.8 1.3 834 4.7 3.8 1510 
Spain 1.0 0.8 159196 1.2 1.1 33527 3.1 2.6 44829 
Sweden 7.6 5.1 102383 5.7 3.9 19764 5.5 3.7 26525 
United Kingdom 5.1 3.4 122538 3.8 2.2 28719 4.7 2.8 137927 
EU 28 3.6 2.2 1672091 2.9 2.0 446862 4.5 3.1 533563 
Average 3.1 1.9   3.1 2.1   4.4 3.3  
Std. deviation 2.0 1.4   2.5 1.6   1.6 1.6  
High values 
SE, FI, 
DE, DK, 
UK 
SE, FR, 
DK, UK,  
FI, DE 
 CY, MT, LT, SE 
LT, CY,  
DE, SE  
LT, DE,  
FI, EE 
LT, DE,  
PL, FI,  
EE 
 
Low values EL, SI, RO, ES 
EL, MT,  
LV, RO  
RO, EL, 
HR, BG,  
IE 
RO, LU, 
LV, EL,  
BG, HR, IE 
 EL, RO, HR, IT 
RO, LU,  
IE, EL,  
CY, HR 
 
Notes: Based on the unconsolidated accounts from Orbis. No. obs. refers to firms serving as base for the mean and 
medians, i.e. firms with accounts with a profitability measure within the interval of -0.5 to 0.5. Higher tax country is 
defined as not being a lower tax entity, hence includes also companies in MNE groups without a 5 percentage-points 
tax differential within the MNE group. EU 28 refers to the means and medians over all observations, respectively to 
the sum of the observations. Average refers to the arithmetic mean of country values. High/low values are one 
standard deviation above/below the unweighted average, bold entries are 2 standard deviations above/below. 
Source: Orbis data (Bureau van Dijk), own calculations  
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The key overall observation in Table 18 is that entities which were classified as lower 
tax entities are the subgroup with the highest average (4.5%) and median (3.1%) pre-
tax profitability. This is clearly above the domestic firms with an average of 3.6 percent 
(median of 2.2%) and the difference is even more pronounced if we compare it to the 
MNE entities which are not classified as lower tax entities. Here the average pre-tax 
profitability is only 2.9 percent and the median is at 2.0 percent. This observation is 
clearly consistent with some ATP taking place. The difference in pre-tax profitability 
between MNE entities in a lower tax country and in a higher tax country, is also reflected 
at the level of the Member States, except for Malta, Cyprus and to some extent Sweden, 
where we observe a different pattern. The number of observations available for Cyprus 
and Malta is however limited. 
The pre-tax-profitability in domestic companies is highest in Sweden (7.6% on average, 
median at 5.1%). Domestic companies in Finland (5.7% average, 3.4% median), 
Germany (5.3% average, 3.4% median), Denmark (5.2% average, 3.7% median), the 
United Kingdom (5.1% average, 3.4% median) and in France (4.8% average, 3.4% 
median) also have high pre-tax profitability. For MNE entities which are not classified as 
lower tax entities the pre-tax profitability is relatively high in Cyprus (9.7% average, 
5.2% median), Malta (7.3% average, 3.3% median), Lithuania (5.8% average, 5.2% 
median) and Sweden (5.7% average, 3.9%). In comparison, the pre-tax profitability in 
MNE entities which are classified as lower tax entities is clearly higher in most Member 
States. The highest values are found in Lithuania (7.7% average, 6.6% median), 
Germany (6.8% average, 5.6% median), Finland (6.6% average, 5.3 median) and 
Estonia (6.3% average, 5.2% median). 
In Table 19, the broad overall picture about the profitability distributions in the three 
subgroups is confirmed for the measure of EBIT over total assets. Again, MNE entities 
facing relatively lower tax rates are showing the highest average (4.7%) and median 
(3.2%) operating profitability. This is higher than for domestic companies (3.8% 
average and 2.6 % median) and substantially higher than for the entities not classified 
as lower entities (3.1 % average and 2.1% median). 
For domestic companies, the highest operating profitability is again found in Sweden 
(7.0% average, 4.6% median), followed by Germany (5.9% average, 4.4% median), 
United Kingdom (5.6% average, 4.2% median), Finland (5.5% average, 3.4% median) 
and Denmark (5.5% average, 3.9% median). For MNE entities not classified as lower 
tax entities the highest average operating profitability is in Cyprus (13.1% average, 
7.5% median), Malta (6.8% average, 2.4% median) and Germany (6.2% average, 
5.0% median). In MNE groups classified as lower tax entity we find the highest operating 
profitability in Lithuania (8.4% average, 7.2% median), Germany (7.0% average, 5.5% 
median), Poland (6.8% average, 6.2% median), Slovakia (6.6% average, 5.6% 
median), Finland (6.6% average, 5.1% median), Cyprus (6.6% average, 3.8% median) 
and the Czech Republic (6.5% average, 5.3% median). 
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Table 19: Profitability (EBIT/ASSETS), by Member States (2010-2015)  
  Domestic companies 
Entities within a MNE group in a 
higher tax country lower tax country 
  EBIT/ASSETS (%) 
No. obs. 
EBIT/ASSETS (%) No. 
obs. 
EBIT/ASSETS (%) No. 
obs. Country Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Austria 4.4 3.0 7689 3.6 2.3 2818 5.5 3.9 13327 
Belgium 4.9 3.6 86600 4.0 2.5 27203 4.6 3.2 15980 
Bulgaria 2.9 1.8 19334 1.4 0.4 1254 4.4 2.9 6160 
Croatia 2.2 1.2 130323 0.5 1.0 3335 2.9 2.7 3870 
Cyprus 4.4 4.8 188 13.1 7.5 22 6.6 3.8 116 
Czech Republic 3.7 2.6 28384 4.1 2.9 7131 6.5 5.3 27078 
Denmark 5.5 3.9 178911 3.3 1.1 14638 4.0 1.7 20254 
Estonia 4.4 2.3 9586 4.1 3.3 4933 6.3 5.3 4191 
Finland 5.5 3.4 39250 5.0 3.2 9759 6.6 5.1 11248 
France 3.9 2.8 319552 3.0 2.0 161245 3.3 1.8 4992 
Germany 5.9 4.4 61846 6.2 5.0 22977 7.0 5.5 35987 
Greece 0.4 1.0 6166 0.5 1.6 3475 1.9 2.2 4854 
Hungary 3.0 1.8 1365 3.1 2.0 698 5.1 4.6 4835 
Ireland 2.7 1.8 5222 2.7 1.7 533 4.3 2.4 14984 
Italy 1.8 1.7 269204 1.7 1.6 68029 3.0 2.5 42855 
Latvia 1.9 0.4 6492 2.6 0.5 1462 4.4 3.3 4530 
Lithuania 4.9 3.6 1877 5.7 4.4 669 8.4 7.2 3053 
Luxembourg 2.9 1.9 3002 1.3 0.0 3616 2.9 0.0 4940 
Malta 3.1 0.0 4776 6.8 2.4 1409 3.3 0.0 45 
Netherlands 4.5 2.5 21273 3.7 0.1 4602 3.6 0.5 22183 
Poland 3.4 2.5 37999 4.4 3.9 5152 6.8 6.2 34338 
Portugal 2.2 2.3 48150 3.2 2.9 9647 4.7 4.1 9235 
Romania 1.3 0.6 10755 0.3 -0.1 13989 2.9 1.0 32124 
Slovakia 3.3 2.0 3464 4.3 3.1 2750 6.6 5.6 5197 
Slovenia 1.7 1.5 1849 1.5 1.8 786 5.0 4.4 1488 
Spain 1.5 1.3 162865 1.9 1.6 34516 3.5 3.0 45808 
Sweden 7.0 4.6 105025 4.9 2.7 20460 5.1 2.6 27210 
United Kingdom 5.6 4.2 124618 4.1 2.8 28001 4.6 2.7 127597 
EU 28 3.8 2.6 1695765 3.1 2.1 455109 4.7 3.2 528479 
Average 3.5 2.4  3.6 2.3  4.8 3.3  
Std. deviation 1.6 1.3  2.5 1.7  1.6 1.9  
High values SE, DE, 
UK, DK,  
FI 
CY, SE,  
DE, UK, 
DK 
 CY, MT,  
DE 
CY, DE, 
LT 
 LT, DE,  
PL, FI, 
CY, SI, CZ 
LT, PL,  
SK, DE, 
 CZ, EE  
 
Low values EL, RO,  
ES, SI,  
IT, LV 
MT, LV, 
RO, EL 
 RO, HR,  
EL 
RO, LU, 
NL, BG,  
LV 
 EL, RO, 
LU, HR,  
IT 
LU, MT,  
NL, RO 
 
Notes: Based on the unconsolidated accounts from Orbis. No. obs. refers to firms serving as base for the mean and 
medians, i.e. firms with accounts with a profitability measure within the interval of -0.5 to 0.5. Higher tax country is 
defined as not being a lower tax entity, hence includes also companies in MNE groups without a 5 percentage-points 
tax differential within the MNE group. EU 28 refers to the means and medians over all observations, respectively to 
the sum of the observations. Average refers to the arithmetic mean of country values. High/low values are one 
standard deviation above the unweighted average, bold entries are 2 standard deviation above/below. 
Source: Orbis data (Bureau van Dijk), own calculations  
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The difference in the operating profitability between lower and not lower tax entities 
within MNEs in Table 19 is consistent with ATP structures affecting the operational 
profitability, e.g. using royalty payments or strategic transfer pricing. Again, the overall 
differences in the average profitability are also reflected in almost all Member States. 
The exceptions are once more Cyprus and Malta, which are based on very few 
observations, and the Netherlands. The absence of a clear difference in operating 
profitability for MNE entities in the Netherlands is interesting since this would imply that 
Dutch firms are primarily using ATP structures not affecting the operating profit.  
For the financial profitability measure in Table 20, the overall picture is different. 
First of all, we find that European firms report overall financial losses. The average 
financial losses are highest for domestic companies (-0.6% of total assets). The 
difference in the mean financial profitability between lower tax entities (-0.3%) and 
higher tax entities (-0.4%) is small but nevertheless consistent with ATP structures 
using financial instruments.  
The overall negative financial profitability is inconsistent with purely intra-firm financial 
transactions in the EU, because in this case the financial losses would show up at the 
other entity and result in financial profit there. However, there are several explanations 
to reconcile an overall negative financial profitability for the EU firms with ATP 
structures. 
First, in those cases where the financial profit shows up in a zero/no corporate country 
outside the EU, only the financial losses in the EU part of the MNE will be captured. 
Second, it is possible that the receiving entities are not included in the dataset due to 
either missing values or resulting extreme values.73 In fact, the coverage of financial 
profits is substantially less complete, which results in a drop of observations of about 
one third. Therefore, it is possible that we miss the MNE entities which receive the 
interest income in the ATP structures and therefore underestimate the extent of ATP. 
For domestic companies, Austria (0.3% average, 0.0% median), Sweden (0.1% 
average, -0.1% median), France (0.0% average, -0.1% median) and Malta (0.0% 
average and median) exhibit the highest average financial profitability. For MNE entities 
not classified as lower tax, we find the highest average financial profitability in Denmark 
(0.7% average, -0.1% median), Austria (0.6% average, 0.0% median), Sweden (0.3% 
average, -0.2% median) and Malta (0.2% average, 0.0% median). In the lower taxed 
MNE entities the highest financial profitability is observable in the Netherlands (0.7% 
average, 0.0% median), Denmark (0.7% average, -0.1% median), Austria (0.6% 
average, 0.0 median) and Luxembourg (0.3% average, 0.0% median).  
  
                                          
73 In order to avoid too much impact of outliers on the means, we exclude observations where 
the absolute value of financial profits or losses is larger than 50 percent of total assets. 
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Table 20: Profitability (FIN_PL/ASSETS), by Member States (2010-2015)  
Source: Orbis data (Bureau van Dijk), own calculations  
  Domestic companies 
Entities within a MNE group in a 
higher tax country lower tax country 
  FIN_PL/ASSETS (%) 
No. obs. 
FIN_PL/ASSETS (%) No. 
obs. 
FIN_PL/ASSETS (%) 
No. obs. 
Country Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Austria 0.3 0.0 5743 0.6 0.0 2063 0.6 0.0 9684 
Belgium -0.7 -0.5 58285 -0.1 -0.2 19134 -0.1 -0.1 10801 
Bulgaria -1.1 -0.3 12928 -1.5 -0.8 970 -0.9 -0.5 4680 
Croatia -0.8 0.0 93650 -2.0 -0.7 2288 -1.5 -0.5 2739 
Cyprus -2.6 -2.3 138 -2.6 -1.0 20 -1.9 -0.4 103 
Czech Republic -1.0 -0.5 17848 -1.4 -0.6 5174 -1.2 -0.7 18668 
Denmark -0.8 -0.6 123416 0.7 -0.1 10030 0.7 -0.1 13917 
Estonia -0.2 0.0 4996 0.0 0.0 3468 -0.1 0.0 2674 
Finland -0.3 -0.1 21237 -0.4 -0.1 5998 -0.3 0.0 8345 
France 0.0 -0.1 172379 0.0 0.0 113029 n.a. n.a. 0 
Germany -0.5 -0.6 42093 -0.5 -0.5 14027 0.0 -0.2 24767 
Greece -1.7 -1.0 3204 -1.5 -0.6 2459 -1.0 -0.2 2927 
Hungary -0.2 -0.1 717 -0.2 -0.3 501 -0.4 -0.2 3478 
Ireland -1.0 0.0 2740 -2.4 0.0 332 -1.1 0.0 9714 
Italy -1.0 -0.5 154148 -0.9 -0.4 41548 -0.5 -0.2 33440 
Latvia -0.8 0.0 5402 -1.2 -0.1 1323 -1.1 -0.1 3820 
Lithuania -0.4 -0.3 1099 0.0 -0.1 447 -0.5 -0.3 1913 
Luxembourg -1.5 -0.5 1675 -0.9 -0.1 2207 0.3 0.0 2979 
Malta 0.0 0.0 1616 0.2 0.0 1006 n.a. n.a. 0 
Netherlands -0.1 0.0 12717 0.1 0.0 3026 0.7 0.0 15930 
Poland -0.8 -0.2 22372 -0.9 -0.3 3876 -0.9 -0.4 23038 
Portugal -1.0 -0.3 28478 -1.0 -0.3 7126 -0.7 -0.1 6114 
Romania -0.7 0.0 6434 -2.3 -0.6 10179 -1.9 -0.7 23565 
Slovakia -0.8 -0.5 2367 -0.8 -0.5 2257 -0.7 -0.4 3848 
Slovenia -1.3 -0.5 1479 -1.4 -0.4 616 -0.6 -0.1 1200 
Spain -0.6 -0.3 88855 -0.9 -0.3 21091 -0.6 -0.2 33479 
Sweden 0.1 -0.2 91246 0.3 -0.2 14918 0.2 0.0 21418 
United Kingdom -0.5 0.0 83584 -0.3 0.0 16198 0.3 0.0 99070 
EU 28 -0.6 -0.2 1060846 -0.4 -0.1 305311 -0.3 -0.1 382311 
Average -0.7 -0.3  -0.8 -0.3  -0.5 -0.2  
Std. deviation 0.6 0.5  0.9 0.3  0.7 0.2  
High values AT, SE, FR, MT   
DK, AT, 
SE, MT 
IE, UK, 
MT, AT,  
NL, EE 
 
NL, DK, 
AT, LU,  
UK 
  
Low values CY, EL,  LU CY, EL   
CY, IE,  
RO, HR 
CY, BG, 
HR, CZ, EL  
RO, CY,  
HR  
RO, CZ 
BG, HR   
Notes: Based on the unconsolidated accounts from Orbis. No. obs. refers to firms serving as base for the mean and 
medians, i.e. firms with accounts with a profitability measure within the interval of -0.5 to 0.5. Higher tax country is 
defined as not being a lower tax entity, hence includes also companies in MNE groups without a 5 percentage-points 
tax differential within the MNE group. EU 28 refers to the means and medians over all observations, respectively to the 
sum of the observations. Average refers to the arithmetic mean of country values. n.a. refers to cases where mean and 
median are not defined due to a lack of observations. High/low values are one standard deviation above the unweighted 
average, bold entries are 2 standard deviations above/below. 
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For several Member States, there is no clear differential between the MNE entities which 
are classified as lower tax or not, while for some other Member States the patterns are 
consistent with the ATP channel using interest payments.  For example, in the 
Netherlands, we see clearly higher average financial profits in those entities which are 
classified as lower tax entities (0.7% compared to 0.1%). In Luxembourg and the United 
Kingdom, the average financial profitability (0.3% each) is positive only for those MNE 
entities which are classified as lower tax entities. Also, in Ireland, the average financial 
profitability is much lower (-2.4%) for MNE entities that are classified as the higher tax 
entities, while for the lower tax entities the average financial profitability is -1.1%. In 
sum, the country level statistics suggest that in some Member States at least, some 
MNEs entities play the role of a lower tax entity in the ATP channel using interest 
payments. For Ireland, together with Croatia and Romania, the higher average financial 
losses in relatively higher tax entities also suggests that some MNE use these entities 
in the role of a target entity.74  
To look further into the ATP channels using (internal) financial transactions Table 21 
and Table 22 report the debt share, respectively the interest payments by Member 
States and firm classification. 
Overall, the crude measure of debt share, defined as the ratio between non-current 
and current liabilities to total assets, shows comparatively little variation between the 
different firm types. The average debt share for domestic companies in the EU is at 56.6 
percent, which is slightly lower than the value for MNE entities with relatively higher tax 
rates, which have on average a debt share of 56.9 percent. In contrast, those MNE 
entities which are classified as lower tax entities have a somewhat lower average debt 
share of only 50 percent. Further, it is noteworthy that the median debt share is clearly 
higher for all three subgroups. This can be explained with a smaller number of firms 
with much lower debt shares, reducing the overall average debt shares.  
Starting with the debt share of domestic companies one can see a positive correlation 
with the statutory tax burden in the Member States. Italy (67.5% average, 74.3% 
median) has the highest value, followed by Malta (60.6% average, 65.4% median), 
Sweden (60.2% average, 64.1% median) and Cyprus (60.1% average, 62.2% median). 
The lowest average debt shares in domestic companies are in Estonia (40.6% average, 
36.4% median), Bulgaria (43.7% average, 41.2% median), Romania (43.8% average, 
41.9% median), the Czech Republic (44.4% average, 43.0 median) and Poland (45.6% 
average, 44.7% median). The positive correlation between the debt share and the 
statutory tax rate is less pronounced for the MNE entities. The debt share in MNE entities 
not classified as lower tax entity is highest in Ireland (69.7% average, 87.7% median), 
followed by Italy (66.2% average, 72.6% median), Germany (63.8% average, 69.0% 
median) and Sweden (60.4% average, 65.9% median). The lowest values are found for 
the Netherlands (39.4% average, 33.8% median), Cyprus (43.4% average, 48.7% 
median) and Estonia (45.1% average, 43.4% median).  
  
                                          
74 For Cyprus, we also observe a high average financial loss, but this is only based on very few 
observations. Therefore, we do not draw strong conclusion on this aggregate number.  
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Table 21: Debt share (% of ASSETS), by Member States (2010-2015)  
 Domestic companies Entities within a MNE group in a 
higher tax country lower tax country 
 DEBT/ASSETS (%) 
No. obs. 
DEBT/ASSETS (%) No. 
obs. 
DEBT/ASSETS (%) No. 
obs. 
Country Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Austria 55.8 60.4 11927 53.4 58.2 3823 53.0 57.4 17127 
Belgium 55.9 60.2 55234 52.7 56.6 19835 51.9 55.1 12404 
Bulgaria 43.7 41.2 12014 48.5 49.2 809 48.3 48.7 4359 
Croatia 54.4 57.5 64133 56.8 59.0 1586 52.5 52.4 2183 
Cyprus 60.1 62.2 135 43.4 48.7 20 44.6 38.5 102 
Czech Republic 44.4 43.0 15347 50.4 52.2 4279 47.2 46.1 18097 
Denmark 56.0 60.7 95564 50.0 53.9 8740 47.8 50.6 13234 
Estonia 40.6 36.4 5317 45.1 43.4 3469 41.5 37.8 2920 
Finland 57.4 61.3 15074 56.9 60.3 4432 55.4 58.2 6379 
France 59.4 62.5 169421 57.8 62.0 111682 55.5 59.1 2119 
Germany 59.5 62.5 96780 63.8 69.0 32927 60.8 65.3 44079 
Greece 58.2 63.4 3090 58.5 63.2 2174 59.6 63.5 3087 
Hungary 52.5 55.8 710 54.9 59.5 485 55.1 58.3 3584 
Ireland 52.9 53.6 4611 69.7 87.7 353 54.6 57.4 11663 
Italy 67.5 74.3 145363 66.2 72.6 41700 62.9 68.0 34396 
Latvia 50.2 54.0 4038 55.4 60.7 865 51.4 54.2 3021 
Lithuania 49.5 49.5 1093 54.4 57.4 428 53.2 55.3 1980 
Luxembourg 57.2 62.0 1908 47.6 49.3 2497 47.7 50.0 3567 
Malta 60.6 65.4 1363 47.2 46.2 910 n. a. n. a. 0 
Netherlands 48.4 51.3 29360 39.4 33.8 7160 38.1 32.9 28934 
Poland 45.6 44.7 20076 47.8 47.4 3302 50.0 49.8 22501 
Portugal 56.5 60.8 24425 54.7 58.2 6703 55.6 58.8 6604 
Romania 43.8 41.9 5258 49.9 52.0 5077 50.6 52.1 16390 
Slovakia 54.2 58.0 2004 53.1 54.9 1987 52.7 54.1 3723 
Slovenia 51.0 54.2 1371 52.3 54.8 584 51.1 51.5 1160 
Spain 48.2 49.3 87739 52.3 54.5 21397 54.2 56.6 35539 
Sweden 60.2 64.1 89266 60.4 65.9 17326 58.7 63.5 24654 
United Kingdom 50.8 54.2 122872 48.1 50.8 24784 41.9 40.3 135624 
Total 56.6 60.7 1085493 56.9 61.5 329334 50.0 52.3 459430 
Average 53.4 55.9  53.2 56.5  51.8 51.3  
Std. deviation 6.3 8.7  6.7 10.1  5.9 8.5  
High values IT, MT, SE, CY IT, MT,  
IE, IT, 
DE, SE 
IE, IT, 
DE  IT IT, DE  
Low values 
EE, BG, 
RO, CZ,  
PL  
EE, BG, 
RO, CZ,  
PL  
 NL, CY,  EE 
NL, EE, 
MT  
NL, EE,  
UK, CY 
NL, EE, 
CY, UK  
Notes: Based on the unconsolidated accounts from Orbis. No. obs. refers to firms serving as base for the mean 
and medians, i.e. firms with a ratio of (non-current liabilities + current liabilities)/total assets in interval of 0 to 1. 
Higher tax country is defined as not being a lower tax entity, hence includes also companies in MNE groups without 
a 5 percentage-points tax differential within the MNE group. n. a. refers to cases where mean and median are not 
defined due to a lack of observations. EU 28 refers to the means and medians over all observations, respectively 
to the sum of the observations. Average refers to the arithmetic mean of country values. High/low values are one 
standard deviation above/below the unweighted average, bold entries are 2 standard deviations above/below. 
Source: Orbis data (Bureau van Dijk), own calculations  
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In contrast, for the MNE entities which are classified as lower tax entities, only Italy has 
a very high average debt share of 62.9 percent, and an even higher median debt share 
of 68.0 percent. Lower tax MNE entities in the Netherlands (38.1% average, 32.9%) 
have the lowest debt share, followed by those in Estonia (41.5% average, 37.8% 
median), the United Kingdom (41.9% average, 40.3% median) and Cyprus (44.6% 
average, 38.5% median). 
Table 22 reports the descriptive statistics for the interest payments, expressed in 
percentage of assets. The overall average of interest payments amounts to 1.4 percent 
for domestic companies, which is very similar to the 1.5 percent for MNE entities in 
relatively higher tax countries and 1.6 percent for MNE entities in lower tax countries. 
Overall, the coverage for interest payments is incomplete and for firms in Denmark, 
Estonia, Malta and the Netherlands no interest payments are reported. For those 
countries where interest payments are reported, the distribution is clearly skewed to 
the left with medians always lying below the averages. This implies that some larger 
values for the interest payments are driving up the averages. Secondly, in most Member 
States, the interest payments, measured as a percentage of total assets are higher in 
the MNE entities which are not classified as relatively lower tax entities.  
The highest values for domestic companies are in Luxembourg (3.0% average, 1.5% 
median), Ireland (2.4% average, 1.1% median), the United Kingdom (2.3% average, 
0.9% median), Latvia (2.3% average, 0.8% median), Greece (2.2% average, 1.4% 
median) and Bulgaria (2.2% average, 0.9% median). In MNE entities classified as not 
being the lower tax entities we find higher values for interest payments, starting with 
4.9 percent average (3.8% median) for Ireland, 4.1 percent average (1.3% median) for 
Croatia, 4.0 percent average (1.7% median) for Luxembourg and 3.2 percent average 
(1.3% median) in Romania. Slovenia stands out as the Member State where the MNE 
entities have the lowest interest payments (0.5% average, 0.1% median). The MNE 
entities which are classified as lower tax entities have generally lower interest payments 
ranging from 3.2 percent average (1.2% median) in Ireland, 2.9 percent average (0.9% 
median) in Luxembourg, 2.4 percent average (0.9% media) in Latvia, 2.3 percent 
average (0.8% median) in the United Kingdom to 0.5 percent average in Slovenia (0.1% 
median). 
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Table 22: Interest payments (% of ASSETS), by Member States (2010-2015)  
  Domestic companies 
Entities within a MNE group in a 
higher tax country lower tax country 
  INT/ASSETS (%) No. 
obs. 
INT/ASSETS (%) No. 
obs. 
INT/ASSETS (%) No. 
obs. Country Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Austria 0.8 0.4 5257 1.2 0.6 1865 0.9 0.4 8473 
Belgium 1.3 0.8 18042 1.2 0.6 14906 0.9 0.3 8489 
Bulgaria 2.2 0.9 10734 2.8 1.6 884 2.0 1.0 4180 
Croatia 0.7 0.5 18 4.1 1.3 16 1.7 1.6 5 
Cyprus 1.3 1.3 2 n. a. n. a. 0 0.0 0.0 1 
Czech Republic 1.4 0.7 10089 1.7 0.7 3302 1.3 0.6 12102 
Denmark n. a. n. a. 0 n. a. n. a. 0 n. a. n. a. 0 
Estonia n. a. n. a. 0 n. a. n. a. 0 n. a. n. a. 0 
Finland 1.7 0.9 15511 1.9 0.8 4467 1.6 0.5 6271 
France 1.0 0.5 149982 1.3 0.4 91395 n. a. n. a. 0 
Germany 1.4 1.1 39988 1.7 1.2 13376 1.3 0.8 23257 
Greece 2.2 1.4 2846 2.1 1.2 2054 1.4 0.5 2559 
Hungary 1.5 0.8 470 1.4 0.9 347 1.5 0.7 2220 
Ireland 2.4 1.1 1578 4.9 3.8 167 3.2 1.2 5051 
Italy 1.3 0.8 144053 1.3 0.7 38214 1.0 0.4 30211 
Latvia 2.3 0.8 3247 2.6 1.0 864 2.4 0.9 2698 
Lithuania 0.4 0.4 2 n. a. n. a. 0 0.7 0.7 1 
Luxembourg 3.0 1.5 1600 4.0 1.7 2095 2.9 0.9 2798 
Malta n. a. n. a. 0 n. a. n. a. 0 n. a. n. a. 0 
Netherlands n. a. n. a. 0 n. a. n. a. 0 n. a. n. a. 0 
Poland 1.7 0.7 16729 1.8 0.7 2720 1.7 0.7 17291 
Portugal 1.7 0.9 18949 1.8 1.0 4983 1.5 0.6 3964 
Romania 1.5 0.8 2982 3.2 1.3 4635 2.2 0.9 12712 
Slovakia 1.1 0.5 1596 1.1 0.6 1497 1.1 0.4 2777 
Slovenia 0.4 0.1 1189 0.5 0.1 535 0.5 0.1 1019 
Spain 1.4 0.8 76898 1.7 0.8 17797 1.4 0.6 27908 
Sweden 1.3 0.7 80339 1.5 0.8 13507 1.2 0.6 19213 
United Kingdom 2.3 0.9 49878 2.7 1.2 8963 2.3 0.8 57372 
EU 28 1.4 0.7 651979 1.5 0.6 228589 1.6 0.6 250572 
Average 1.5 0.8  2.1 1.0  1.5 0.7  
Std. deviation 0.6 0.3  1.1 0.7  0.7 0.4  
High values 
LU, IE,  
LV, UK, 
BG, EL 
LU, EL,  
CY  
IE, HR,  
LU, RO IE  
IE, LU,  
LV, UK HR, IE  
Low values SI, LT,  HR, AT 
SI, LT,  
AT, HR  SI SI  
CY, SI,  
LT 
CY, SI,  
BE  
Notes: Based on the unconsolidated accounts from Orbis. No. obs. refers to firms serving as base for the mean and 
medians, i.e. firms with accounts with a ratio of interest payments/total assets within the interval of -0.5 to 0.5. 
Higher tax country is defined as not being a lower tax entity, hence includes also companies in MNE groups without 
a 5 percentage-points tax differential within the MNE group. n. a. refers to cases where mean and median are not 
defined due to a lack of observations. EU 28 refers to the means and medians over all observations, respectively to 
the sum of the observations. Average refers to the arithmetic mean of country values. High/low values are one 
standard deviation above/below the unweighted average, bold entries are 2 standard deviation above/below. 
Source: Orbis data (Bureau van Dijk), own calculations 
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Table 23 and Table 24 look at the descriptive statistics of two underlying ratios for 
indicators for ATP channels using intangible assets and royalty payments. Specifically, 
Table 23 looks at the ratio of intangible assets to total assets, which is a broadly 
available but imprecise measure of intellectual property based on the balance sheet item 
intangible assets. Since intangible assets may also include non-royalty bearing assets, 
e.g. acquired goodwill, Table 24 also looks directly at patent ownership by firms. 
Starting with the intangible assets ratio in Table 23 we see that for all three subgroups 
less than 50 percent of the firms are reporting intangible assets. This is reflected in the 
median level of intangibles assets being zero. At the same time, there are some 
companies which report substantial intangible assets, which brings the overall ratio to 
an average of 2.9 percent for domestic companies. This is broadly in line with the 
average of 3.3 percent for entities within MNE groups not classified as lower tax entities 
and 2.2 percent for entities which face a relatively lower tax rate. This is against the 
expectation from the description of the ATP structures, which predicts more intangible 
assets in lower tax entities. In domestic companies, we find the highest share of 
intangible assets in France (6.3% average, 0.4% median), Italy (4.6% average, 0.4% 
median), Finland (3.4% average, 0.1% median) and Greece (3.3% average, 0.1% 
median), while the lowest shares are in Slovakia (0.6% average, 0.0% median) and the 
Czech Republic (0.8% average, 0.0% median). Within MNE entities in relatively higher 
tax countries France has the highest share of intangible assets (4.6% average, 0.0% 
median), followed by Italy (4.5% average, 0.3% median) and Portugal (3.7% average, 
0.0% median). Low share of intangible assets in this subgroup of firms are found in 
Romania (0.8% average), Slovakia (0.9% average), Latvia (1.0% average), Czech 
Republic (1.0% average), Bulgaria (1.1% average) and the Netherlands (1.2% 
average).75 In the MNE entities which are classified as lower tax entities we find again 
the highest share of intangible assets in France (4.4% average, 0.2% median), Italy 
(3.8% average, 0.3% median), Spain (3.8% average, 0.0% median) and Finland (3.2% 
average, 0.2% median). 
Overall, the differences between the different types of firms are much less pronounced 
than the differences between Member States. Hence, apart from the observation of less 
intangible assets in Eastern European countries, one cannot draw strong conclusions 
from the country-level descriptive statistics. 
  
                                          
75 In all these Member States, the median share of intangible assets is zero. 
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Table 23: Intangible assets (% of ASSETS), by Member States (2010-2015)  
  Domestic companies 
Entities within a MNE group in a 
higher tax country lower tax country 
  INT_A/ASSETS (%) 
No. obs. 
INT_A/ASSETS (%) No. 
obs. 
INT_A/ASSETS (%) No. 
obs. Country Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Austria 1.6 0.1 12598 1.4 0.0 4101 1.5 0.0 17853 
Belgium 1.6 0.0 57245 1.7 0.0 20506 1.9 0.0 12326 
Bulgaria 1.4 0.0 14466 1.1 0.0 1035 1.6 0.0 5145 
Croatia 1.6 0.0 91860 2.0 0.0 2303 2.1 0.1 2757 
Cyprus 1.2 0.0 137 3.2 0.0 20 1.3 0.0 110 
Czech Republic 0.8 0.0 17867 1.0 0.0 5240 0.8 0.0 20305 
Denmark 2.2 0.0 114839 2.4 0.0 9783 2.3 0.0 14614 
Estonia 2.3 0.0 4193 1.9 0.0 3003 1.9 0.0 2551 
Finland 3.4 0.1 19870 3.6 0.3 6089 3.2 0.2 8628 
France 6.3 0.4 187228 4.6 0.0 131209 4.4 0.2 2333 
Germany 1.4 0.1 93200 1.8 0.1 31966 1.9 0.1 42427 
Greece 3.3 0.1 3597 3.3 0.1 2645 1.7 0.0 3602 
Hungary 3.0 0.1 720 2.6 0.1 512 2.1 0.1 3641 
Ireland 1.2 0.0 4526 2.3 0.0 225 2.5 0.0 10824 
Italy 4.6 0.4 161314 4.5 0.3 45968 3.8 0.3 36699 
Latvia 1.2 0.0 5464 1.0 0.0 1334 1.0 0.0 4006 
Lithuania 1.5 0.0 1146 2.5 0.0 470 2.1 0.1 2096 
Luxembourg 1.1 0.0 2366 1.3 0.0 3077 1.4 0.0 4135 
Malta 2.1 0.0 1652 3.0 0.0 1037 n. a. n. a. 0 
Netherlands 1.4 0.0 29686 1.2 0.0 7806 1.6 0.0 29428 
Poland 2.0 0.0 21337 2.9 0.1 3627 1.4 0.0 23864 
Portugal 2.1 0.0 26925 3.7 0.0 7200 2.3 0.0 6584 
Romania 0.8 0.0 6835 0.8 0.0 10206 1.2 0.0 24478 
Slovakia 0.6 0.0 2318 0.9 0.0 2246 1.3 0.0 3950 
Slovenia 2.2 0.1 1473 2.5 0.3 616 2.8 0.3 1204 
Spain 2.5 0.0 92363 3.3 0.0 23762 3.8 0.0 38858 
Sweden 1.2 0.0 89730 1.7 0.0 17297 2.1 0.0 24857 
United Kingdom 1.8 0.0 110596 2.1 0.0 22330 2.1 0.0 116067 
EU 28 2.9 0.0 1175551 3.3 0.0 365613 2.2 0.0 463342 
Average 2.0 0.0  2.3 0.1  2.1 0.0  
Std. deviation 1.2 0.1  1.1 0.1  0.9 0.1  
High values FR, IT,  FI, EL 
FR, IT, 
SI  
FR, IT,  
PT 
SI, IT,  
FI  
FR, IT,  
ES, FI 
IT, SI,  
FI, FR  
Low values SK, CZ   
RO, SK, 
CZ, LV, 
BG, NL 
  CZ, LV,  RO   
Notes: Based on the unconsolidated accounts from Orbis. No. obs. refers to firms serving as base for the mean and 
medians, i.e. firms with accounts with a ratio of intangible assets/total assets within the interval of 0 to 1. Higher 
tax country is defined as not being a lower tax entity, hence includes also companies in MNE groups without a 5 
percentage-points tax differential within the MNE group. n. a. refers to cases where mean and median are not 
defined due to a lack of observations. EU 28 refers to the means and medians over all observations, respectively to 
the sum of the observations. Average refers to the arithmetic mean of country values. High/low values are one 
standard deviation above/below the unweighted average, bold entries are 2 standard deviations above/below. 
Source: Orbis data (Bureau van Dijk), own calculations  
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Table 24 looks directly at patent ownership by firms. To avoid double counting, we 
include only the granted patents in our dataset. The match between the data from the 
European patent office and Orbis is at least until now not so good, which leaves us with 
a significantly reduced dataset. Overall, we are left only with 8,877 observations for 
domestic companies, 7,945 for MNE entities which are not a lower tax entity and 15,581 
for lower tax entities in MNE groups. This is a remarkable shift between domestic 
companies and MNEs which reflects that patent applications tend to be concentrated in 
MNE groups. This point is further reinforced by the higher averages and medians in MNE 
groups. The average domestic company in the EU only hold 0.7 patents, while in lower 
tax entities in MNE groups an average of 2.6 patents is found. In comparison, in those 
MNE entities which are classified not as lower tax entities we find on average 2.0 patent 
applications. Furthermore, the patent applications are concentrated in a few companies 
which is visible through the clearly higher averages than medians. Overall, the relatively 
few observations for which we are able to match the patent information on the firm level 
data are consistent with the predictions of the ATP structures. This is also evident when 
we look at the level of the Member States.   
In domestic companies, the few firms in Malta stand out with an average of 5.2 patent 
applications. In contrast, looking at the median number of patent application in domestic 
companies, France, Greece, Hungary and Lithuania have a relatively high value of 1. 
However, only in the case of France this is based on a meaningful number of 
observations.  
For firms within MNEs not classified as lower tax entities, we observe the highest number 
of patent granted in France (3.1 average, 1.0 median) and Germany (1.6 average, 1.0 
median). This pattern is also reflected in the MNE entities classified as lower tax entities 
where the highest number of patent granted is found for France (4.3 average, 1.0 
median), Belgium (4.2 average, 1.0 median), Netherlands (3.6 average, 1.0 median) 
and Germany (3.5 average, 1.0 median). Among the top 4 countries in terms of number 
of patents, three have a patent box.76 While there may be also an economic and 
industrial underpinning behind this number of patents, this seems to indicate that patent 
boxes play a role in attracting patents.  
  
                                          
76 In 2015 a patent box was in place in Belgium, Cyprus, France, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, United Kingdom. See Table 52 for more information. 
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Table 24: Patents granted, by Member States (2010-2015)  
  Domestic companies 
Entities within a MNE group in a 
higher tax country lower tax country 
  No. Patent granted No. 
obs. 
No. Patent granted No. 
obs. 
No. Patent granted No. 
obs. Country Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Austria 0.9 0.0 385 0.7 0.0 204 1.9 1.0 1091 
Belgium 0.7 0.0 242 0.8 0.0 345 4.2 1.0 475 
Bulgaria 0.0 0.0 2 n. a. n. a. 0 n. a. n. a. 0 
Croatia n. a. n. a. 0 n. a. n. a. 0 n. a. n. a. 0 
Cyprus n. a. n. a. 0 n. a. n. a. 0 n. a. n. a. 0 
Czech Republic 0.7 0.0 30 0.4 0.0 20 0.8 0.0 118 
Denmark 0.5 0.0 553 1.2 0.0 183 1.7 1.0 566 
Estonia 0.2 0.0 10 0.1 0.0 8 1.0 1.0 1 
Finland 0.3 0.0 337 0.4 0.0 174 2.1 1.0 684 
France 1.0 1.0 1100 3.1 1.0 3250 4.3 1.0 213 
Germany 1.0 0.0 2712 1.6 1.0 2656 3.5 1.0 6081 
Greece 1.1 1.0 10 0.4 0.0 10 1.5 1.0 14 
Hungary 1.0 1.0 1 n. a. n. a. 0 0.8 1.0 26 
Ireland 0.3 0.0 32 n. a. n. a. 0 1.2 1.0 203 
Italy n. a. n. a. 0 n. a. n. a. 0 n. a. n. a. 0 
Latvia 0.5 0.5 2 n. a. n. a. 0 n. a. n. a. 0 
Lithuania 1.2 1.0 6 0.3 0.0 3 0.0 0.0 2 
Luxembourg 0.7 0.0 19 0.6 0.0 20 2.1 1.0 97 
Malta 5.2 0.0 13 0.8 1.0 8 0.5 0.5 2 
Netherlands 0.5 0.0 550 1.3 1.0 125 3.6 1.0 782 
Poland 0.4 0.0 170 0.4 0.0 47 0.9 0.0 91 
Portugal 0.5 0.0 58 0.2 0.0 43 0.3 0.0 35 
Romania 0.3 0.0 4 0.2 0.0 6 n. a. n. a. 0 
Slovakia 0.1 0.0 12 0.7 1.0 6 0.3 0.0 6 
Slovenia 0.4 0.0 16 0.6 0.5 16 0.8 1.0 29 
Spain 0.4 0.0 585 0.7 0.0 309 0.8 0.0 827 
Sweden 0.4 0.0 717 1.3 0.0 252 2.3 1.0 1208 
United Kingdom 0.6 0.0 1311 0.6 0.0 260 1.6 1.0 3030 
EU 28 0.7 0.0 8877 2.0 1.0 7945 2.6 1.0 15581 
Average 0.8 0.2  0.8 0.3  1.6 0.7  
Std. deviation 1.0 0.2  0.7 0.4  1.3 0.5  
High values MT FR, LT,  EL, HU  FR, DE 
FR, DE, 
MT, NL, 
SK 
 FR, BE, NL, DE    
Low values       LT, SK, RO 
CZ, LT, 
PT, SK, 
ES  
 
Notes: Based on the unconsolidated accounts from Orbis. No. obs. refers to firms serving as base for the mean 
and medians, i.e. firms which are matched with information of the European patent office. Higher tax country is 
defined as not being a lower tax entity, hence includes also companies in MNE groups without a 5 percentage-
points tax differential within the MNE group. n. a. refers to cases where mean and median are not defined due 
to a lack of observations. EU 28 refers to the means and medians over all observations, respectively to the sum 
of the observations. Average refers to the arithmetic mean of country values. High/low values are one standard 
deviation above/below the unweighted average, bold entries are 2 standard deviation above/below. 
Source: Orbis data (Bureau van Dijk), European patent office, own calculations  
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Key findings 
The descriptive statistics of specific indicators are generally consistent with at least some 
ATP taking place. For 25 out of 28 Member States, we see a higher pre-tax profitability 
in MNE entities with a relatively low statutory tax burden. The fact, that we see a similar 
picture for operating profitability points into the direction that ATP structures using 
royalty payments or strategic transfer pricing are also playing a role. The MNE entities 
in the Netherlands fall somewhat outside this picture which is also reflected in their 
financial profits and losses. While, for most Member States, we can observe financial 
losses on average, we see on average financial profits for the MNE entities some Member 
States, including Denmark, Sweden, Austria and the Netherlands. This suggests that at 
least some MNE groups relocate corporate tax base to their entities in these Member 
States via ATP structures using interest payments. The results for debt shares are 
broadly in line with the predictions of the ATP structures while the interest payments 
reported in the profit and loss accounts are too incomplete to show any convincing 
evidence for the ATP channel via interest payments. Equally, looking at the aggregate 
distribution of the intangible assets does not show patterns which are consistent which 
the ATP channel using royalty payments while, for the relatively few companies where 
we can match patent ownership information, some pattern emerges. The patent 
holdings tend to be concentrated in countries with patent boxes, most notable France, 
Belgium and the Netherlands (albeit also in Germany). Overall, once we go beyond the 
profitability measures, the country level evidence for the specific indicators is less 
compelling. This may be due to several reasons; the most obvious one being poor data 
quality, due to insufficient coverage of the relevant balance sheet item or data points 
overall. Another reason is that the calculation of Member State wide means and medians 
masks compositional difference between the subgroups. If MNE entities are operating 
in systematically different industries, which also have different economic fundamentals, 
the averaging over the different groups can cover the traces of ATP structures. To 
overcome this issue, we will use industry-country cells for comparison in the analysis of 
the next section. 
4.1.6 Royalty flows, bilateral import price anomalies and treaty shopping 
indicators  
The royalty payments are not available at firm level, but rather only at the bilateral 
country-pair and country level. Furthermore, the bilateral data is in a number of 
instances incomplete, therefore Table 25 reports the total sums, i.e. royalty payments 
and receipts with all countries of the world. In order to relate the total royalty payments 
and receipts to the economic size of the Member States we report the values in percent 
of GDP. Additionally, to highlight imbalances we also report the difference between 
payments and receipts, i.e. the net payments. Positive values for the difference indicate 
that entities in the Member States pay more royalties than they are receiving from other 
entities abroad. Since royalty flows can be volatile and display large values for a 
particular year, the table reports both the averages of the sample period 2010 to 2015 
and the value for 2015.  
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Table 25: Royalty flows, by Member States (2010-2015)  
  
Royalty receipts Royalty payments Net payments 
(% of GDP) (% of GDP) (% of GDP) 
Country Average 2010-2015 2015 
Average 
2010-2015 2015 
Average 
2010-2015 2015 
Austria 0.32 0.26 0.55 0.43 0.22 0.17 
Belgium 0.75 0.78 0.75 0.81 0.00 0.03 
Bulgaria 0.06 0.11 0.42 0.42 0.36 0.31 
Croatia 0.07 0.10 0.61 0.61 0.55 0.51 
Cyprus a 0.01 0.01 0.43 0.84 0.42 0.83 
Czech Republic 0.23 0.28 0.71 0.72 0.48 0.44 
Denmark 0.78 0.78 0.48 0.46 -0.30 -0.32 
Estonia 0.09 0.06 0.33 0.21 0.24 0.16 
Finland b 1.46 1.15 0.70 0.40 -0.76 -0.75 
France 0.67 0.69 0.53 0.64 -0.14 -0.05 
Germany 0.43 0.48 0.28 0.29 -0.14 -0.19 
Greece 0.04 0.03 0.22 0.17 0.18 0.13 
Hungary 1.95 1.37 1.73 1.27 -0.22 -0.11 
Ireland 2.77 2.91 26.39 29.36 23.62 26.45 
Italy 0.22 0.19 0.35 0.26 0.12 0.08 
Latvia 0.04 0.03 0.20 0.14 0.15 0.11 
Lithuania 0.04 0.06 0.13 0.13 0.09 0.07 
Luxembourg 2.51 3.09 5.80 6.00 3.29 2.91 
Malta 6.34 3.20 9.45 4.88 3.11 1.67 
Netherlands 4.80 5.78 6.06 6.96 1.26 1.18 
Poland 0.08 0.10 0.64 0.57 0.56 0.47 
Portugal 0.04 0.05 0.34 0.39 0.31 0.34 
Romania 0.17 0.06 0.46 0.50 0.28 0.45 
Slovakia 0.03 0.03 0.51 0.66 0.48 0.63 
Slovenia 0.14 0.15 0.82 0.57 0.67 0.42 
Spain b 0.13 0.15 0.43 0.42 0.30 0.27 
Sweden 1.81 1.98 0.65 0.93 -1.16 -1.04 
United Kingdom 0.83 0.68 0.50 0.48 -0.33 -0.20 
EU 28 0.80 0.82 1.14 1.29 0.34 0.47 
Average 0.96 0.88 2.16 2.13 1.20 1.25 
Std. deviation 0.96 1.36 5.22 5.62 4.49 4.99 
High values MT, NL,  IE, LU 
NL, MT,  
LU, IE IE IE IE IE 
Low values       
Notes: a Average over 2011-2015. b Average over 2012-2015. We use the item “Charges for the use of 
intellectual property, n.e.c” as proxy for royalty flows. EU 28 refers to the average value for the EU overall. 
Average refers to the arithmetic mean of country values. High/low values are one standard deviation 
above/below the unweighted "Average", bold entries are 2 standard deviations above/below. 
Source: Eurostat, OECD EBOPS 2010, World Development indicators 
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Overall, we see that all Member States together have an inflow of royalty payments of 
0.80 percent of combined GDP, while they have an average outflow of royalty receipts 
of 1.14 percent. This implies an overall net payment of 0.34 percent of combined GDP. 
While the outflows in 2015 are similar to the average of the period 2010 to 2015 the 
inflows saw a marked increase in 2015. A broad comparison between the overall values 
to the unweighted average of the country values reveals that the receipts are much 
higher in a number of smaller Member States, resulting in a clearly higher unweighted 
average for receipts and net receipts. 
The country level patterns in Table 25 are very clear. Malta (6.34%), the Netherlands 
(4.80%), Ireland (2.77%) and Luxembourg (2.51%) have the highest royalty receipts 
in percent of the GDP. With the exception of Malta, all the values are driven by an even 
higher value in 2015 suggesting that the importance of royalty receipts is increasing 
over time. Regarding royalty payments Ireland is the Member State which stands out 
with a very large amount of royalty payments. The royalty payments of 26.39 percent 
of GDP (29.36% for 2015) also result in extraordinarily high net payments of 23.62 
percent (26.45% for 2015). Other countries which are reporting substantial royalty 
outflows are Luxembourg, Malta and the Netherlands.77 At the same time, these three 
countries are also characterised by large inflows of royalty payments, which reduces the 
net payments. The majority of Member States has moderately positive net royalty flows, 
while a few Member States experience a clear net inflow of royalty payments. This is 
most pronounced for the Scandinavian countries, Finland, Sweden, Denmark and the 
United Kingdom. Due to their size, France and Germany have a high total inflow of 
royalty payments in absolute value, but only a moderate net royalty inflow in relation 
to the GDP. Overall, the country level aggregates are consistent with the hypothesis of 
substantial ATP via royalty payments taking place. 
Bilateral import price anomalies: We use bilateral trade data from the Eurostat 
Comext database to identify anomalies in bilateral import prices. We use the monthly 
import data from 2010 to 2015 for all EU 28 countries with each other and ten potential 
no/zero tax countries and aggregate them to bilateral yearly values at the 8-digit 
product classification. After data cleaning, we are left with 644,944 observations.78 We 
then calculate median unit values for each product-importer country-year combination. 
Then we relate each of the bilateral unit values to this benchmark. If we observe a 
bilateral unit value which is either five times higher or lower than a fifth of the median 
value of this product we treat this bilateral unit price as suspicious. This leads to 3,067 
cases where import prices are too high and to 4,038 cases where import prices are too 
low.79 The flip-side of the coin are 2,892 cases where export prices are too high and 
4,006 cases where the export prices are too low. The remaining 207 cases involve non-
EU countries and are therefore not visible in the exporting country perspective in Table 
26.  
                                          
77 We depart from the rule of discussing Member States which fall outside one standard deviation 
of the unweighted average of the country values. This is because Ireland is such an extraordinary 
outlier, that it masks other patterns.  
78 We use only those cells which have at least 100 tons and a total value of at least 100,000 
Euros. Further we restrict the dataset to goods for which we have at least 10 transactions per 
year and a minimum of 5 importing and 5 exporting countries. 
79 The choice of the threshold hardly affects the country ranking. We alternatively used thresholds 
between two times higher and half as high and the country ranking is still correlated with 0.97. 
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Table 26: Bilateral import price anomalies, by Member States (2010-2015)  
  By exporting country: Prices are too  
By import country: 
Prices are too  
Country high low high Low 
Austria 141 226 129 130 
Belgium 237 304 178 165 
Bulgaria 7 32 21 51 
Croatia 17 14 12 11 
Cyprus 1 0 1 0 
Czech Republic 104 259 148 337 
Denmark 63 113 84 81 
Estonia 2 12 3 8 
Finland 39 49 21 22 
France 313 363 315 265 
Germany 295 373 244 200 
Greece 13 60 25 44 
Hungary 62 146 129 98 
Ireland 163 26 34 57 
Italy 198 301 308 337 
Latvia 4 20 17 16 
Lithuania 8 49 17 31 
Luxembourg 25 18 7 4 
Malta 0 0 6 4 
Netherlands 247 300 256 447 
Poland 141 371 143 227 
Portugal 14 57 28 28 
Romania 26 68 63 117 
Slovakia 41 143 131 312 
Slovenia 14 99 42 21 
Spain 124 212 314 542 
Sweden 114 141 129 132 
United Kingdom 479 250 262 351 
EU 28 total 2892 4006 3067 4038 
Average 103.3 143.1 109,5 144,2 
Std. deviation 120.3 127.3 106.9 151.9 
High values UK, FR, DE, NL, BE 
DE, PL, FR,  
BE, IT, NL  
FR, ES, IT,  
UK, NL, DE  
ES, NL, UK,  
IT, CZ, SK 
Low values  MT, CY, EE, HR CY  
Notes: Export prices too high (low) refers to the number of bilateral unit prices which are more than 5 
times higher (lower) than the median price of the good in this year in the importing country, counted by 
the exporter country. The same applies for the import prices, but counted by the importer country. EU 28 
total refers to the sum of the observations. Average refers to the arithmetic mean. High/low values are 
one standard deviation above/below the unweighted average, bold entries are 2 standard deviations 
above/below. 
Source: Comext database, Eurostat, own calculations 
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Table 26 sums up the bilateral cases of too high or too low import prices by exporter 
and importer country. While the number of bilateral trade price anomalies is not showing 
a very clear picture, there are still some characteristics which indicate that the price 
anomalies might be driven by transfer pricing.  
Starting with the view on the exporting countries, we see that, except for the United 
Kingdom (479), countries with the highest number of cases of abnormally high prices 
are relatively higher tax rates such as France (313), Germany (295), the Netherlands 
(247) and Belgium (247) have. The number of cases with abnormally low prices is 
highest in Germany (373), followed by Poland (371), France (363), Belgium (304), Italy 
(301) and the Netherlands (301). This suggests, that strategic transfer pricing is used 
for shifting profits into and out of these countries. The higher number of cases of 
abnormally high prices in the United Kingdom points into the direction of more tax base 
being moved to the United Kingdom. The other countries with high values, all have more 
cases of abnormally low prices. This is also reflected in the view on the importing 
countries. Here we find the highest number of abnormally high prices in France (315), 
followed by Spain (314), Italy (308), the United Kingdom (262), the Netherlands (256) 
and Germany (244). The prevalence of abnormally low import prices is highest in Spain 
(542), the Netherlands (447), the United Kingdom (351), Italy (337), the Czech 
Republic (337) and Slovakia (312). For France and Germany, the results are comparable 
to the trend observed discussed above, i.e. an erosion of the tax base through transfer 
pricing. For the United Kingdom, similar to what was mentioned above, there is an 
indication that tax base would be increased through transfer pricing. For Spain and the 
Netherlands, the higher number of low import prices would indicate that tax base is 
moved to these countries, which is not consistent with what is observed from the 
"exporting side". That said, the aggregation up to the Member States level does not 
allow for a more detailed analysis of the bilateral patterns. Additionally, one has to bear 
in mind that the overall number of abnormal prices amounts to only about one percent 
of the cases. 
Treaty shopping indicators: There is little quantitative information on treaty 
shopping, no readily available measure exists for its magnitude, nor on the size of the 
subsequent reduction of the effective tax burden for MNE’s. Van‘t Riet and Lejour (2014 
and 2017) consider dividend repatriation for a set of 108 countries, including all Member 
States, covering almost 95 percent of world GDP in 2013. Moreover, many zero/no tax 
countries and financial centres are included. For this set of countries treaty shopping 
indicators are generated. 
For each pair of countries, the combined tax rate on repatriation of dividends can be 
determined. We denote the headquarter country as the home country of an investment, 
and the host country where the investment takes place. Further we abstract from the 
corporate income tax at in the host country, and fully concentrate on the additional tax 
burden upon repatriation to the headquarter. This tax burden may include a withholding 
tax levied by the host country. Countries have standard rates for their withholding taxes 
but also engage in bilateral tax treaties, in which, often reciprocally, reduced withholding 
tax rates have been agreed upon with their treaty partners. Next, the home country 
may subject the foreign dividend income to its own corporate income tax; this depends 
on the method of double tax relief they apply. With the dividend participation exemption 
there will be no further taxation in the home country. With a credit system or deduction 
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as tax relief method, there may still be taxation in the home country. The combined 
host and home taxation is the repatriation tax.  
As a starting point, we calculate the bilateral repatriation tax rates for each country pair. 
This bilateral tax burden primarily depends on the interplay of unilateral rules by each 
country and the bilateral tax treaties between the country pairs.80 From the set of 
bilateral tax rates, country average repatriation tax rates are computed, for direct 
outward and inward dividend flows. For each host country, the bilateral repatriation tax 
rates of all the possible home countries are weighted with the GDP of the home country, 
as a proxy for the relative size of the outward dividend flows. Similarly, the inward 
average tax rates are weighted. These average tax burdens measure the repatriation 
tax in the absence of treaty shopping and are a useful reference point for the potential 
relevance of treaty shopping. The first columns in Table 27 reports these average 
dividend repatriation taxes together with the number of bilateral tax treaties in force. 
Regarding the number of tax treaties, France (80), the Netherlands (74), Germany (71), 
Spain (71) and Belgium (70) rank highest. Cyprus (35), Estonia (36), Malta (38), Greece 
and Slovakia (42 each) in contrast have signed the least number of tax treaties of all 
Member States.  
Among the Member States Luxembourg is found to have the lowest average repatriation 
tax rate for outward dividends, thus in its capacity as a host country. This average rate 
is 6.8 percent, and Luxembourg ranks fourth lowest in the full set of 108 countries. The 
three countries with a lower average outward rate than Luxembourg have no 
withholding tax on dividends whereas Luxembourg has a standard rate of 15 percent. 
Other Member States with low average repatriation rates for outward dividends are 
France (8.0%), Slovakia (8.7%), the United Kingdom (8.8%) and Belgium (9.0%). At 
the other end of the spectrum are Cyprus (19.8%), Bulgaria (17.4%), Malta (16.8%), 
Ireland (16.1%) and Lithuania (16.0%). This partly reflects the lower number of tax 
treaties, which may result in substantial double taxation for subsidiaries in non-EU 
destinations. 
For headquarter countries the average inward repatriation tax rates matter. The 
Netherlands (3.4%) has the lowest rate among the Member States and worldwide. Other 
Member States with low average inward repatriation rates are Finland (3.7%), the 
United Kingdom (3.8%), Sweden (3.8%) and Luxembourg (4%). Most other EU 
countries also have relatively low average inward rates, resulting in an EU average of 
6.5 percent. This can be compared to the average rate of the USA which is 16.7 percent. 
This difference is one reason for the attractiveness of European countries for corporate 
inversions of US MNE’s. In comparison, the highest direct inward repatriation tax rates 
in EU Member States are 13.1 percent for Slovakia, 11.9 percent for Croatia, 11.8 
percent for Greece and 9.7 percent in Portugal. 
  
                                          
80 This calculation is based on the national, bilateral (tax treaties) and multilateral (e.g. parent 
subsidiary directive) tax law information for the year 2013. For more detailed information see 
van’t Riet and Lejour (2017). 
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Table 27: Treaty shopping indicators (2013)  
    Repatriation tax direct flows 
Repatriation tax 
optimised flows 
Attractiveness for 
treaty shopping 
Country No. Tax treaties outward inward outward inward Centrality 
Austria 66 11.2 4.8 5.3 1.6 1.9 
Belgium 70 9.0 4.3 3.4 1.6 3.0 
Bulgaria 50 17.4 6.7 5.3 1.6 1.9 
Croatia 44 14.0 11.9 5.3 1.6 0.4 
Cyprus 35 19.8 7.5 5.3 1.6 4.3 
Czech Republic 66 14.3 6.7 5.3 1.6 1.2 
Denmark 61 12.6 4.6 5.3 1.6 3.2 
Estonia 36 10.0 6.7 5.3 1.6 6.7 
Finland 59 11.6 3.7 5.3 1.6 3.9 
France 80 8.0 6.9 3.3 1.7 3.8 
Germany 71 11.1 5.2 4.7 1.7 2.4 
Greece 42 9.8 11.8 5.3 1.6 1.5 
Hungary 47 11.2 5.8 5.3 1.6 6.1 
Ireland 53 16.1 5.6 5.3 1.6 5.5 
Italy 69 10.5 6.9 4.2 1.7 1.1 
Latvia 45 15.3 6.3 5.3 1.6 1.8 
Lithuania 44 16.0 6.3 5.3 1.6 2.1 
Luxembourg 57 6.8 4.0 4.8 1.6 7.7 
Malta 38 16.8 6.6 4.8 1.6 4.2 
Netherlands 74 9.9 3.4 5.3 1.7 6.6 
Poland 64 13.7 6.3 5.3 1.7 1.3 
Portugal 53 11.9 9.7 4.1 1.6 0.9 
Romania 66 14.7 7.5 5.3 1.6 1.6 
Slovakia 42 8.7 13.1 5.3 1.6 5.3 
Slovenia 46 14.9 6.5 5.3 1.6 1.9 
Spain 71 9.8 6.8 4.6 1.7 3.4 
Sweden 67 12.4 3.8 5.3 1.6 3.6 
United Kingdom 51 8.8 3.8 5.4 1.7 12.2 
EU 28 56.0 12.4 6.5 5.0 1.7 3.6 
Average 56.0 12.4 6.5 5.0 1.7 3.6 
Std. deviation 12.9 3.2 2.5 0.6 0.0 2.6 
High values FR, NL,  DE, ES, BE 
CY, BG, 
MT, IE, LT 
SK, HR, 
EL, PT   
DE, UK,  
FR, IT 
UK, LU,  
EE, NL 
Low values CY, EE, MT, EL, SK 
LU, FR, 
SK, UK, 
BE 
NL, FI, UK, 
SE, LU 
FR, BE,  
PT, IT,   HR, PT 
Notes: Repatriation tax rate refers to the GDP weighted average for 108 countries. Centrality refers to the 
GDP-weighted percentage of tax optimal repatriation routes which include the respective country. EU 28 and 
average refers to the unweighted average of country values. High/low values are one standard deviation 
above/below the unweighted average, bold entries are 2 standard deviations above/below. 
Source: van’t Riet and Lejour (2017), own calculations  
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The columns four and five in Table 27 report the corresponding average outbound and 
inbound dividend repatriation tax, if the repatriation path is optimised, i.e. treaty 
shopping is taking place. Treaty shopping is the practice where MNEs, rather than 
investing directly in a host country, funnel the investment through a third country (or 
more) to take advantage of treaty provisions not found between the host and the home 
country of the investment (Davies, 2004). This practice is implemented by letting the 
MNE’s determine their optimal dividend repatriation strategy. They consider the 
international corporate tax infrastructure as a network and choose their tax minimizing 
routes.  
For each country pair, the tax minimizing repatriation routes are computed. These may 
still be the direct routes. However, for two-thirds of all country pairs there is an indirect 
route that is ‘cheaper’ than the direct route. Note, that an indirect route may involve 
more than one intermediate station (conduit country). For all country-pairs also the 
lowest possible repatriation tax rates are recorded. Again, GDP-weighted average 
repatriation tax rates are computed for the countries in their home and host capacities, 
for optimal repatriation strategies.  
Two things are striking in the tax-optimised repatriation rates. First, they are clearly 
much lower than the direct repatriation rates. For outbound repatriation taxes the 
overall average drops from 12.4 percent to 5.0 percent, for inward repatriation rates 
from 6.5 percent to 1.7 percent. This confirms the relevance of treaty shopping 
strategies. Second, the variation between the Member States is much smaller, which 
represents a relatively even levelled playing field including treaty shopping. France 
(3.3%), Belgium (3.4%), Portugal (4.1%) and Italy (4.2%) are the Member States 
which still have relatively low outbound repatriation rates. The inward repatriation rates 
are close around 1.6 percent for all Member States, with values of 1.7 percent for 
Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Italy.  
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that, with optimal repatriation strategies, no EU country 
will be able to impose residence taxation. Repatriated dividends will enter the EU 
through a country with the dividend participation exemption. With the Parent-Subsidiary 
directive, any other Member State can be reached without taxation. Additionally, most 
source taxation will disappear given optimal tax routes. Within the EU dividends can be 
moved without taxation to a Member State that levies no withholding tax. However, in 
some cases it may be preferable for MNE’s to pay some withholding tax in a Member 
State with a tax treaty with the non-EU residence country when this treaty stipulates a 
more favourable tax relief in the residence country. 
The last column of Table 27 presents the centrality measure as a direct measure of the 
attractiveness of the Member States as a treaty shopping location. The value of the 
centrality measure can also be interpreted as a weighted fraction: the United Kingdom 
would be on 12.2 percent of the cheapest tax routes of all country pairs. It is followed 
by Luxembourg (7.7%), Estonia (6.7%) and The Netherlands (6.6%). At the bottom of 
the league, we find Croatia (0.4%) and Portugal (0.9%). The United Kingdom ranks 
high because it is an EU member and it levies no non-resident withholding tax on 
dividends. It shares these characteristics with Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Malta and 
Slovakia, all in the top 10. But the UK has signed more bilateral tax treaties, and 
multinationals face on average a lower withholding tax on incoming dividends. The 
impact on this ranking of a zero rate on the withholding tax is evident. Luxembourg is 
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the first country without a general rate of zero to appear on the list, the Netherlands 
and Ireland are second and third, but all three countries have signed many bilateral tax 
treaties. Finally, it is worth noting that each of the Member States features in some tax 
optimal repatriation strategies. Given, that almost a third of the 108 countries 
considered in the treaty shopping analysis are not used at all in treaty shopping 
strategies, this is a remarkable characteristic of EU Member States.  
Key findings 
The country-level information of royalty payments and receipts draws a very clear 
picture. Ireland stands out as the Member States with the highest net royalty payments, 
which is consistent with the ATP channel using royalty payments. Other Member States 
with significant royalty inflows and outflows are Luxembourg, Malta and the 
Netherlands. Sweden, Finland, Denmark and the United Kingdom have the highest net 
receipts. The analysis of bilateral import price shows that higher tax countries such as 
Germany or France tend to have more anomalies in terms of high import prices, pointing 
to an erosion of tax base through transfer pricing. Spain, the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands and Italy also have a relatively high number of price anomalies, which 
suggests that strategic transfer pricing strategies could affect the base in these 
countries. Overall, however, the bilateral trade price anomalies can only give a first 
indication and further research would be necessary. The treaty shopping indicators 
identify some countries like the United Kingdom, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and 
Estonia as central on dividend repatriation routes. Treaty shopping is of relevance for 
repatriations from outside the EU.  
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4.2 Roles in ATP structures, by Member States 
In this subsection, we present the roles of the entities within MNE groups and how the 
roles are distributed across Member States. We use the combination of indicators 
described in subsection 3.3 and allocate each entity within a MNE group to a unique role 
in the respective ATP structures. After excluding those observations where we have 
information for none of the indicators, we are left with a total of 1,432,034 observations 
for the period 2010 to 2015. Overall, we have at least some information about 251,744 
European entities in 55,373 groups.81 We concentrate the presentation in the main text 
on the standard classification, because the strict classification into roles results in very 
low numbers of entities which can unambiguously attributed to roles within ATP 
structures.82  
4.2.1 Roles within ATP via interest payments 
The results for the ATP structure using interest payments are presented in Table 28. For 
each Member State, we present the share of companies which are classified as target 
entities (i.e. those entities where the tax base is reduced because of an interest 
deduction), lower tax entities (i.e. those entities where tax base is taxed at a lower 
rate), conduit entities (i.e. entities with an MNE group with ATP, but not a target or 
lower tax entity) and the share of companies for which the data is either not consistent 
with the ATP channel using interest payments or insufficient to draw any conclusion. 
The results in Table 28 present only the share of companies and do not distinguish 
between subsidiaries and headquarter companies. This information can be found in the 
detailed results in the appendix in Table 62.  
As discussed in Section 2, target entities are characterised by lower pre-tax profitability, 
lower financial profitability together with either a higher debt share or higher interest 
payments in these entities. Additionally, they must be located in a country with a 
statutory tax rate relatively higher than in other parts of the MNE group.83 Overall, these 
requirements result in 5.0 percent of the firms being classified as target entities. France 
(20.5%) and Belgium (12.4%) stand out as the Member States with the largest share 
of the companies classified as target entities. In contrast, no firms are classified as 
target entities in Bulgaria, Cyprus, Ireland and Lithuania.  
The second category is the lower tax entities, which are attracting corporate tax base 
through a potentially lower tax burden. These are the mirror image of the target entities 
and the requirements for an entity being classified as a lower tax entity are higher pre-
tax profitability, higher financial profitability together with either a lower debt share or 
lower interest payments. Additionally, they need to be located in countries with a 
statutory tax rate being relatively lower than in other parts of the MNE group.   
                                          
81 See Table 61 in the appendix for a break-down of observations by Member States.  
82 See appendix for a summary of the different assumptions underlying the strict and weak 
classifications. For the detailed results see also Table 62, Table 63, Table 64, Table 65 and Table 
66 in the appendix. 
83 See Table 38 in the appendix for a complete description of the combination of indicators. 
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Table 28: Roles ATP structures using interest payments, by Member States 
  % of entities classified as 
Country target entity lower tax entity  conduit entity not consistent/ insufficient data  
Austria 1.1 9.2 42.5 47.1 
Belgium 12.4 4.4 33.9 49.4 
Bulgaria 0.0 17.4 26.7 55.9 
Croatia 1.5 3.1 30.5 64.9 
Cyprus 0.0 1.3 29.9 68.7 
Czech Republic 0.2 9.1 27.3 63.3 
Denmark 1.1 5.1 34.2 59.6 
Estonia 1.9 1.7 24.4 72.0 
Finland 2.5 5.5 33.5 58.5 
France 20.5 0.0 31.5 48.0 
Germany 2.4 4.3 37.5 55.8 
Greece 2.2 7.6 30.6 59.6 
Hungary 0.9 9.9 49.0 40.1 
Ireland 0.0 8.4 44.5 47.1 
Italy 5.5 7.8 29.3 57.4 
Latvia 0.0 10.3 23.9 65.8 
Lithuania 0.0 4.5 28.3 67.2 
Luxembourg 1.6 5.2 30.8 62.3 
Malta 5.8 0.0 31.1 63.1 
Netherlands 0.2 3.7 45.3 50.8 
Poland 0.2 12.5 33.4 54.0 
Portugal 5.2 6.0 30.2 58.7 
Romania 0.1 8.7 17.3 73.8 
Slovakia 1.4 7.8 29.0 61.8 
Slovenia 4.2 13.0 38.0 44.8 
Spain 3.3 6.9 33.9 56.0 
Sweden 3.7 7.6 37.3 51.3 
United Kingdom 0.7 7.7 42.5 49.1 
EU 28 5.0 6.3 39.1 49.5 
Average 2.8 6.7 33.1 57.4 
Std. deviation 4.4 4.0 7.1 8.5 
High values FR, BE BG, SI, PL 
HU, NL, 
IE, AT, 
UK 
RO, EE, 
CY, LT 
Low values  FR, MT, CY, EE 
RO, LV, 
EE 
HU, SI, 
AT, IE,  
FR 
Notes: Based on the unconsolidated accounts in Orbis, pooled over the years 2010-2015. Entries refer to 
percentage of entities, i.e. the sum of subsidiaries and owners. EU 28 refers to the average over all 
observations, while Average reports the arithmetic average of the country values. High/low values are one 
standard deviation above/below the unweighted average, bold entries are 2 standard deviations 
above/below. 
Source: Orbis data (Bureau van Dijk), own calculations 
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For all Member States, we find on average 6.3 percent of the firms showing the 
characteristics of lower tax entities. The highest shares of lower tax entities are found 
in Bulgaria (17.4%), Slovenia (13.0%) and Poland (12.5%). In France and Malta none 
of the firms play the role of a lower tax entity and only very few firms in Cyprus (1.3%) 
and Estonia (1.7%) are classified as lower tax entities. It should be noted that this is 
based on the statutory tax rates (and does therefore not reflect specific tax regimes).    
The third category is conduit entities. This category covers all firms for which we have 
at least one target entity within the MNE group, but are unable to allocate the entity 
itself to either target or lower tax entity. Overall, 39.1 percent fall in to this category. 
The conduit entity role is most common in Hungary (49.0%), the Netherlands (45.3%), 
Ireland (44.5%), United Kingdom (42.5%) and Austria (42.5%). In contrast, some 
Eastern European countries have the lowest share of conduit entities, namely in 
Romania (17.3%), Latvia (23.9%) and Estonia (24.4%) less than a quarter of the firms 
fall into this category.  
The final category collects all firms, where data is insufficient or indicators inconsistent 
with the ATP structure. On average, this applies to 49.5 percent of firms. The highest 
shares of firms in this category is found in Romania (73.8%), Estonia (72.0%), Cyprus 
(68.7%) and Lithuania (67.2%). The lowest shares in this category are found in Hungary 
(40.1%), Slovenia (44.8%), Ireland (47.1%), Austria (47.1%) and France (48.0%).  
Figure 9 visualises the findings by presenting the share of target entities as dark grey 
bars, the share of lower tax entities as light grey bars and the share of conduit entities 
as black squares. 
Figure 9: Roles by Member States within ATP channel via interest payments 
 
Source: Own calculations as described in the study  
A variant of the ATP structure using financial transactions is the use of a hybrid loan. 
The key difference is that there is no lower tax country involved, where the interest 
receipts are facing a lower tax burden. In contrast, the interest income is not included 
in the tax base in the receiving country. However, since the analysis is based only on 
economic data, it struggles to adequately take into account the legal details involved in 
any ATP structure using mismatches. Therefore, the analysis of the ATP structure using 
a hybrid loan is essentially a one-sided analysis of the ATP structure using financial 
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assets. For the interested reader, we include the description and the results in the 
Appendix.84  
Key findings 
The analysis of roles within the ATP channel using interest payments finds that MNE 
entities in France and Belgium are most often found to be target entities. The countries 
with the largest share of lower tax entities are Bulgaria, Slovenia, and Poland. 
Additionally, we find a large share of entities in Hungary, the Netherlands, Ireland, the 
United Kingdom and Austria that belong to MNE groups that engage in ATP. One needs 
to be relatively cautious in the interpretation of these results given the data limitations. 
Especially, for the latter group of Member States, this may partly reflect incomplete 
information about these entities or lower tax entities outside the EU. Further the 
statutory tax rates play an important role in classifying the entities in the various 
Member States as either lower tax or target entities. 
4.2.2 Roles within ATP via royalty payments 
Table 29 summarises the results for the roles within ATP channels using royalty 
payments. The description again concentrates on the standard classifications and 
combines the results for subsidiaries and headquarter entities. A broad comparison to 
the results for the ATP via interest payments show that we are able to classify more 
firms into roles in ATP via royalty payments. This partly reflects that we have more 
information about intangible assets – compared to interest payments - and partly shows 
that the distribution of intangibles assets is also more in line with the predictions derived 
from the ATP structures.   
Overall, we are able to classify 6.7 percent of the firms into the role of a target entity. 
This reflects that these entities have a lower pre-tax profitability, a lower operating 
profitability and less intangible assets while being a in a country with a relatively high 
statutory tax rate. The highest share of target companies is found in France (27.1%), 
Belgium (15.7%) and Malta (12.6%). In Bulgaria, Cyprus and Ireland no firms are 
classified as target entities. 
The overall share of lower tax entities is 7.7 percent on average, with the highest share 
found in Slovenia (22.5%), Hungary (20.6%), Lithuania (20.2%), Bulgaria (20.2%) and 
Poland (19.6%). In comparison, in Malta (0%), France (0.4%), the Netherlands (2.6%), 
and Luxembourg (3.4%) only a small share of the firms are identified to be a low tax 
entity.  
The share of firms classified as conduit entities amounts to 46.1 percent for the EU 
overall. In Hungary (61.2%), Ireland (60.6%), the United Kingdom (58.6%), the 
Netherlands (56.8%) and Austria (54.2%) more than half of the companies are 
classified to be in a group where some ATP takes place. In contrast in Romania (19.8%), 
Latvia (27.8%) and Estonia (29.6%) less than 30 percent of the firms are attributed the 
role of a conduit entity.    
                                          
84 See Table 41 for a description of the strict use of the indicators, Table 42 for a description of 
the standard use and Table 47 for the results.  
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Table 29: Roles ATP structures using royalty payments, by Member States 
  % of entities classified as 
Country target entity lower tax entity  conduit entity not consistent/ insufficient data  
Austria 1.4 14.2 54.2 30.2 
Belgium 15.7 5.6 46.6 32.2 
Bulgaria 0.0 20.2 31.1 48.8 
Croatia 4.2 11.4 34.0 50.4 
Cyprus 0.0 3.9 38.9 57.2 
Czech Republic 0.2 13.9 31.5 54.4 
Denmark 3.1 5.2 43.5 48.3 
Estonia 3.9 6.1 29.6 60.4 
Finland 3.6 11.9 42.8 41.8 
France 27.1 0.4 44.8 27.7 
Germany 2.7 7.7 49.7 39.8 
Greece 4.4 11.6 42.4 41.6 
Hungary 1.4 20.6 61.2 16.8 
Ireland 0.0 4.6 60.6 34.8 
Italy 7.8 11.9 37.9 42.4 
Latvia 0.1 11.6 27.8 60.4 
Lithuania 0.1 20.2 35.6 44.1 
Luxembourg 2.1 3.4 40.9 53.6 
Malta 12.6 0.0 34.5 52.9 
Netherlands 0.5 2.6 56.8 40.2 
Poland 0.3 19.6 40.2 39.8 
Portugal 6.9 7.9 40.9 44.3 
Romania 0.3 15.3 19.8 64.6 
Slovakia 1.6 13.2 36.7 48.6 
Slovenia 5.7 22.5 36.9 34.8 
Spain 4.4 12.4 42.9 40.2 
Sweden 4.4 5.8 49.2 40.5 
United Kingdom 1.0 4.3 58.6 36.1 
EU 28 6.7 7.7 46.1 39.5 
Average 4.1 10.3 41.8 43.8 
Std. deviation 5.9 6.5 10.2 10.8 
High values FR, BE,  
MT 
SI, HU, 
LT, BG,  
PL 
HU, IE, 
UK, NL,  
AT 
RO, LV, 
EE, CY 
Low values  MT, FR,  NL, LU 
RO, LV,  
EE 
HU, FR,  
AT, BE  
Notes: Based on the unconsolidated accounts in Orbis, pooled over the years 2010-2015. Entries refer to 
percentage of entities, i.e. the sum of subsidiaries and owners. EU 28 refers to the average over all 
observations, while average reports the arithmetic mean of the country values. High/low values are one 
standard deviation above/below the unweighted average, bold entries are 2 standard deviations 
above/below. 
Source: Orbis data (Bureau van Dijk), own calculations 
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For 39.5 percent of the firms we have either insufficient data to classify them into a role 
within ATP using royalty payments, or the data is inconsistent with this ATP channel. 
The shares by Member States vary from 64.6 percent in Romania, 60.4 percent in Latvia, 
60.4 percent in Estonia, 57.2 percent in Cyprus to 16.8 percent in Hungary, 27.7 percent 
in France, 30.2 percent in Austria and 32.2 percent in Belgium. Figure 10 once more 
illustrates the main results.  
Figure 10: Roles by Member States within ATP channel via royalty payments 
Source: Own calculations as described in the study  
The variant of the intellectual property ATP structure which uses patent box rather than 
a lower tax country leads in our case to hardly any firms being classified into roles in 
this ATP structure. This is due to the fact that we are only able to match a small number 
of firms with patent data. Therefore, we only present the results in the Appendix in 
Table 66. The standard classification allows attributing some observations in almost all 
countries with patent boxes (Belgium, Spain, France, the United Kingdom, Hungary, 
Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands and Portugal) to the role of lower tax entities. The 
counterpart is the allocation of some entities in Germany, Austria, Finland, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom (prior to the introduction of the patent box) to the role of a target 
entity. Additionally, there are is a moderate share of the firms which are classified into 
the role of a conduit entity. This reflects that the few firms for which we have patent 
information tend to be larger MNE groups.  
Key findings 
For the ATP channel through royalty payments, we find that MNE entities in France, 
Belgium and Malta are most often classified as target entities. The countries with the 
largest share of lower tax entities are Slovenia, Hungary, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Poland. 
The countries with a large share of conduit entities are again Hungary, the Netherlands, 
Ireland, the United Kingdom and Austria. Overall, for around 60% of the MNE entities, 
we are able to classify them as target, lower tax or conduits entities, which is much 
higher than was possible for the ATP channel using interest payments (around 50% of 
MNE entities were not allocated). It reflects that the distribution of intangible assets at 
the firm level is broadly consistent with the ATP structure using royalty payments. One 
still needs to be relatively cautious in the interpretation of these results given the data 
limitations. Further the statutory tax rate plays an important role in classifying the 
entities in the various Member States. 
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4.2.3 Roles within ATP via strategic transfer pricing 
The third ATP structure we look at is the use of strategic transfer pricing. In the scenario 
with the standard assumption this is primarily looking at differences in pre-tax and 
operating profitability coinciding with the relative tax situation in the respective part of 
the MNE. Table 30 summarises the results and Figure 11 graphically presents the key 
findings for this ATP channel. 
Figure 11: Roles by Member States within ATP channel via transfer pricing 
 
Source: Own calculations as described in the study  
Overall, we are now able to classify three quarters of the firms into roles within ATP 
using strategic transfer pricing. For the remaining 25.0 percent of the observations, 
there is either insufficient information about the relative profitability or the geographical 
distribution of the entities does not result in a tax rates differences within the MNE 
groups.   
The share of firms which are classified as target entities amounts to 12.0 percent overall. 
France (42.1%), Belgium (27.9%) and Malta (24.4%) have the largest share of firms 
classified as target entities. In contrast Cyprus, Ireland, and Bulgaria have no entities 
falling into this category.  
Overall, we classify 21.3 percent of the firms as lower tax entities. The Member States 
with the highest share of lower tax entities are Bulgaria (45.7%), Poland (44.9%), 
Romania (42.5%), the Czech Republic (40.5%), and Lithuania (40.0%). In comparison, 
in France and Malta (1.1% each), Cyprus (11.7%) and Germany (12.2%) only few 
companies are classified as lower tax entities. This is not surprising for countries with 
higher statutory tax rates like France or Malta, but needs some explanation for Cyprus. 
The relatively low tax rate itself is not sufficient for the classification as a lower tax 
entity. The relatively low share of lower tax entities for Cyprus implies that either the 
relative profitability measures speak against a classification as a lower tax entity or data 
is insufficient for such a classification. Since our data requirements are less strong for 
the ATP via strategic transfer pricing, we would therefore expect some of the potential 
target or lower tax entities showing up as conduit entities. 
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Table 30: Roles ATP structures using strategic transfer pricing, by Member 
States  
  % of entities classified as 
Country target entity lower tax entity  conduit entity not consistent/ insufficient data  
Austria 3.3 24.0 55.9 16.8 
Belgium 27.9 16.2 35.1 20.8 
Bulgaria 0.0 45.7 29.5 24.8 
Croatia 10.0 27.8 30.2 32.0 
Cyprus 0.0 11.7 52.4 35.9 
Czech Republic 0.5 40.5 28.1 30.8 
Denmark 7.4 27.0 34.7 30.9 
Estonia 10.3 25.0 23.3 41.4 
Finland 9.4 25.3 32.9 32.4 
France 42.1 1.1 36.3 20.5 
Germany 6.6 12.2 55.0 26.2 
Greece 6.7 25.5 35.3 32.5 
Hungary 3.1 39.3 48.6 9.0 
Ireland 0.0 34.6 54.6 10.8 
Italy 17.1 18.9 30.7 33.4 
Latvia 0.1 39.1 26.1 34.7 
Lithuania 0.2 40.0 32.9 26.9 
Luxembourg 4.3 15.0 43.3 37.4 
Malta 24.4 1.1 43.9 30.6 
Netherlands 1.5 14.8 60.4 23.4 
Poland 0.5 44.9 35.3 19.3 
Portugal 10.5 24.4 28.4 36.7 
Romania 0.6 42.5 19.9 37.0 
Slovakia 2.7 34.3 28.3 34.7 
Slovenia 11.6 35.0 34.5 18.9 
Spain 8.9 25.4 35.6 30.1 
Sweden 8.1 21.3 39.9 30.7 
United Kingdom 2.9 25.5 55.1 16.5 
EU 28 12.0 21.3 41.8 25.0 
Average 7.9 26.4 38.1 27.7 
Std. deviation 9.8 12.3 11.1 8.4 
High values FR, BE,  
MT 
BG, PL, 
RO, CZ,  
LT, HU, LV 
NL, AT, 
UK, DE, 
IE, CY  
EE, LU,  
RO, PT 
Low values  MT, FR  CY, DE 
RO, EE, 
LV 
HU, IE,  
UK, AT, 
SI 
Notes: Based on the unconsolidated accounts in Orbis, pooled over the years 2010-2015. Entries refer to 
percentage of entities, i.e. the sum of subsidiaries and owners. EU 28 refers to the average over all 
observations, while average reports the arithmetic mean of the country values. High/low values are one 
standard deviation above/below the unweighted average, bold entries are 2 standard deviations 
above/below. 
Source: Orbis data (Bureau van Dijk), own calculations 
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The conduit entities are the largest group of companies in the ATP channel of strategic 
transfer pricing, with an overall average of 41.8 percent. Looking at the share of conduit 
entities by Member States, we see the Netherlands (60.4%), Austria (55.9%), the 
United Kingdom (55.1%), Germany (55.0%), Ireland (54.6%) and Cyprus (52.4%) with 
the largest shares. At the other end of the spectrum we find 19.9 percent of conduit 
entities in Romania, 23.3 percent in Estonia and 26.1 percent in Latvia. With our 
definition of conduit entities, a large share of companies classified as conduit entities 
can be due to a misclassification, because the data is not clear enough to classify them 
also as a target or lower tax country. Alternatively, it could truly reflect that the ATP 
structure shifts the profits between other entities and that these entities are only helpful 
for enabling tax free repatriation. Irrespective of the potential misclassification, the 
substantial share of conduit entities confirms that in a large proportion of the MNE 
groups at least some ATP takes place. 
Looking at the share of companies, for which we have inconsistent or insufficient data 
to allocate them to a role in the transfer pricing ATP structure we find the highest shares 
in Estonia (41.4%), Luxembourg (37.4%), Romania (37.0%) and Portugal (36.7%). At 
the other end, we only have insufficient or inconsistent information for 9.0 percent of 
the firms in Hungary, 10.8 percent in Ireland and 16.5 percent in the United Kingdom, 
16.8 percent in Austria and 18.9 percent in Slovenia. 
Key findings 
In line with the previous results we also find for the ATP channel using strategic transfer 
pricing that MNE entities in France, Belgium and Malta are most often classified as target 
entities. Some of the Eastern European Member States have the largest share of lower 
tax entities, namely Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, the Czech Republic Latvia, Lithuania 
and Hungary. The countries with a large share of conduit entities are again the 
Netherlands, Austria, Ireland and the United Kingdom but also Germany and Cyprus. 
Reflecting the lower data requirements, we are now able to classify a three quarter of 
the MNE entities to roles within the ATP structure using strategic transfer pricing. This 
confirms the finding of Section 4.1.5. where the operating profitability is lower in 
relatively higher tax MNE entities. One needs to be relatively cautious in the 
interpretation of these results given the data limitations. In particular, the statutory tax 
rate plays an important role in classifying the entities in the various Member States. 
4.3 Overall assessment of exposure and tax base impact of ATP on 
Member States 
This section combines the findings from the previous two subsections with the aim to 
draw a broad picture, which Member States are exposed, benefitting or losing from ATP 
structures. An overview of availability, clarity of the message and limitations of the 
various indicators concludes the section. 
The country-level distribution of the indicators and the classification of entities into roles 
within ATP structures provide partial insights of the impact of ATP on the Member States. 
In this subsection, we collect these elements in order to see whether a broader picture 
emerges. Specifically, Table 31 summarises the results of the country-level indicators, 
Table 32 the results for the consolidated MNE group indicators, Table 33 the results for 
the ATP specific indicator by firm type, Table 34 the results for bilateral indicator and 
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Table 35 the results from the combination of the indicators and the classification of 
entities into roles within ATP structures.  
Table 31: Summary of results: Country-level indicators 
  Member States with 
Indicator high values low values 
[1a] Statutory tax rate FR, MT, BE, IT, DE BG, CY, IE, LV, LT 
[1c] Effective average tax rate FR, ES, MT, DE BG, LT, IE 
[2a] Corporate tax revenues (% of GDP) MT, CY, LU LT, SI, LV* 
[2b] Corporate tax revenues  
(% of Corporate gross operating surplus) 
CY, LU, MT, EL LT, LV, IE 
[2b] Corporate gross operating surplus  
(% of Corporate value added) 
IE, RO, EL FR, HR, SI, UK 
[2b] Corporate value added (% of GDP) IE, LT, NL, LU EL, IT, SK 
[3a] inward FDI stock (% of GDP) LU, MT, CY* EL*, IT*, DE* 
[3a] outward FDI stock (% of GDP) LU, CY*, MT* RO*, SK*, BG* 
[3b] unexplained FDI stock (% observed FDI) EL, SI, SK, LT, PL LU, MT, CY, IE, NL, HU 
[3c] Share of foreign-controlled firms LU, EE, PL* EL*, BE*, IT* 
[3c] Turnover by foreign-controlled firms  
(% of total) 
IE, HU, LU, RO, SK, CZ EL, CY, IT, FI, FR 
[3c] Value added by foreign-controlled firms  
(% of total) 
IE, HU, RO, LU, CZ CY, EL, IT, FR 
[3c] Surplus by foreign-controlled firms  
(% of total) 
IE, HU, LU, RO EL, FR, IT, CY 
[3d] Market concentration UK, DE, FI* MT, CY, EE, LV 
[4a] No. bilateral tax treaties FR, NL, DE, ES, BE CY, EE, MT, EL, SK 
[4b] Outward repatriation taxes: direct flows CY, BG, MT, IE, LT LU, FR, SK, UK, BE 
[4b] Inward repatriation taxes: direct flows SK, HR, EL, PT  NL, FI, UK, SE, LU 
[4c] Outward repatriation taxes: treaty shopping UK*, PL*, NL* FR, BE, PT, IT,  
[4c] Inward repatriation taxes: treaty shopping DE, UK, FR, IT MT*, CY*, EE* 
[4d] Attractiveness for treaty shopping UK, LU, EE, NL HR, PT, IT* 
[5b] Share of firms are lower tax entities IE, UK, BG, PL, CY FR, MT, BE 
[5b] Share of MNE groups are lower tax entities IE, BG, CY, PL, UK FR, MT, LU 
[5b] Share of firms are the lowest tax entities CY, BG, IE, LT, LV BE, DE, HU, IT, LU, MT, FR 
[5b] Share of MNE groups are the lowest tax 
entities 
CY, BG, IE, LT, LV BE, DE, HU, IT, LU, MT, FR 
[5c] Share of firms have a zero/no tax entity in 
group 
IE, UK, NL, FR, BG SI, SE, CY, FI 
[5c] Share of MNE groups have a zero/no tax 
entity in group 
UK, NL, IE, BG, LV CY, AT*, SI* 
Notes: High/low values are one standard deviation above the unweighted average, bold entries are 2 
standard deviations above/below. In cases where less than three countries are identified with high or low 
values, we have reported three countries with the highest/lowest values. These Member States are in italics 
and marked with an asterisk. Based on the results in Table 10, Table 11, Table 12, Table 27 and Table 13. 
 Source: Own calculations 
All the results contain those Member States with particularly high or low values for the 
indicators. The identification of high or low values follows the same logic as the previous 
section, namely the Member States which lie more than one standard deviation above 
or below the unweighted average of the country values. In this way, we are able identify 
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those Member States, which appear to be exposed to ATP and benefit or lose tax base 
because of ATP. It is worth noting that each of the indicators may be driven by non-tax 
factors and therefore is not strictly measuring ATP. But if several indicators point into 
the same direction, one can arguably treat the sum of them as indications of ATP. 
We start with the statutory corporate tax burden and treat those Member States with 
higher statutory corporate tax rates as most exposed to ATP.85 France, Malta and 
Germany are the Member States with highest values both for statutory and effective 
average tax rates, while Bulgaria, Lithuania and Ireland have low values for both 
statutory tax measures. The overall situation of corporate tax revenues shows high 
values for Malta, Cyprus and Luxembourg and very low values for Lithuania and 
Slovenia. The decomposition of the corporate tax revenues into main macroeconomic 
aggregates, provides us with the share of corporate tax revenues in the gross operating 
surplus, which can be seen as an implicit tax rate. Cyprus stands out here with a very 
high value while in Lithuania, Latvia and Ireland the implicit tax rate is low in line with 
the low statutory tax rates. We interpret the share of the corporate value added in GDP 
as a measure of the size of the corporate sector. We treat a larger corporate sector as 
more exposure to ATP. Alternatively, it can be seen as an indication of the size of the 
corporate sector as the result of tax planning activities. In this case a larger value for 
this indicator, as observed in Ireland, would signal that a Member State is gaining from 
ATP. 
The third group of indicators are based on the aggregate FDI statistics. The high value 
for Luxembourg dominates these indicators, but also for other Member States both 
inward and outward FDI stocks are inexplicably high. The indicator unexplained FDI 
stock shows that the values for Luxembourg, Malta, Cyprus, Ireland, the Netherlands 
and Hungary are much higher than what we would expect from economic and 
geographical determinants. The activities in foreign-controlled firms, which can be used 
as a measure of the exposure to ATP, show high values amongst others for Luxembourg, 
Romania, Hungary, and Ireland. In particular, the high profitability in foreign controlled 
firms in Ireland is in line with the predictions of the ATP. Again, a higher value implies 
a larger exposure to ATP. The same interpretation applies for the concentration 
measure, where higher concentration also indicates more vulnerability to ATP strategies. 
The United Kingdom appears to be the country which is most likely to be used in a treaty 
shopping strategy, which is reflected in its attractiveness for treaty shopping. Finally, 
we also interpret a higher share of MNE groups with an affiliate in a zero/no corporate 
income tax country as more exposure to ATP. Member States which seems to be most 
exposed according to this indicator are the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Ireland, 
Bulgaria and Latvia.  
  
                                          
85 The Member States with the lowest statutory tax rates are also likely to be exposed to ATP, 
albeit for different reasons. However, since there are zero/no corporate income tax countries 
outside the EU which can serve as lower tax countries, we still attribute a “least exposed” to them.  
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Table 32: Summary of results: Consolidated MNE indicators 
   Member States with 
Indicator high values low values 
[6a1] Consolidated effective tax burden 
TAX/PLBT: Domestic companies 
IT, BE, DE, FR  EE, HU, BG, LT, HR  
[6a1] Consolidated effective tax burden 
TAX/PLBT: MNE groups 
IT, DE, FR, EL, PT  BG, LT, HU, SK, 
[6a2] Consolidated effective tax burden 
TAX/EBIT: Domestic companies 
IT, BE, MT  HR, BG, SI, LT, HU  
[6a2] Consolidated effective tax burden 
TAX/EBIT: MNE groups 
IT, DE, FR, LU  SI, BG, HU, HR, LT, MT  
[6b1] Consolidated profitability 
PLBT/ASSET: Domestic companies 
EE, FI, LV, MT, SE, CZ CY, SI 
[6b1] Consolidated profitability 
PLBT/ASSET: MNE groups 
LV, RO, CZ, PL HR, CY, SK, SI, EL 
[6b2] Consolidated profitability 
EBIT/ASSETS: Domestic companies 
SE, FI, UK, DE, LV, PL, 
DK 
CY, SI, SK, HU, BG, RO, 
LU, EL 
[6b2] Consolidated profitability 
EBIT/ASSETS: MNE groups 
RO, CZ, DE SK, HR, CY, SI, MT 
Notes: All entries refer to the results based on the medians. High/low values are one standard deviation 
above/below the unweighted average, bold entries are 2 standard deviations above/below. In cases where 
less than three countries are identified with high or low values we have reported three countries with the 
highest/lowest values. These Member States are in italics and marked with an asterisk. Based on the results 
in Table 14, Table 15, Table 16 and Table 17. 
Source: Own calculations 
In Table 32, we summarise the results for the consolidated effective tax burden and the 
consolidated profitability for both domestic companies and MNE groups. The higher ETR 
for the MNEs does allow drawing conclusions about ATP. The highest values for the 
consolidated profitability are largely driven by countries with a small number of firms in 
our samples and therefore do not allow strong conclusions.  
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Table 33: Summary of results: Specific indicators by firm types  
  Domestic companies MNE higher tax MNE lower tax 
Indicator high values low values 
high 
values low values 
high 
values low values 
[7] Pre-tax 
profitability 
SE, FR, DK, 
UK, FI, DE 
EL, MT, LV, 
RO 
LT, CY, DE, 
SE 
RO, LU, LV, 
EL, BG, HR, 
IE 
LT, DE, PL, 
FI, EE 
RO, LU, IE, 
EL, CY, HR 
[8] Operating 
profitability 
CY, SE, DE, 
UK, DK 
MT, LV, RO, 
EL CY, DE, LT 
RO, LU, NL, 
BG, LV 
LT, PL, SK, 
DE, CZ, EE  
LU, MT, NL, 
RO 
[9] Financial 
profitability 
LV*, MT*, 
RO*, UK* CY, EL, DK*  
IE, UK, MT, 
AT, NL, EE 
CY, BG, HR, 
CZ, EL 
AT*, EE*, 
LU*, NL*, 
IE*, UK* 
RO, CZ, BG, 
HR  
[10] Interest 
payments LU, EL, CY 
SI, LT, AT, 
HR IE, LU*, BG* SI, FR*, BE* HR, IE, BG* CY, SI, BE 
[11] Debt 
share IT, MT, SE* 
EE, BG, RO, 
CZ, PL  IE, IT, DE NL, EE, MT IT, DE, EL* 
NL, EE, CY, 
UK 
[12] Intangible 
assets FR, IT, SI 
 SI, IT, FI  IT, SI, FI, FR 
 
[13] Patent 
applications 
FR, LT, EL, 
HU 
 FR, DE, MT, 
NL, SK 
  CZ, LT, PT, 
SK, ES  
Notes: All entries refer to the results based on the medians. High/low values are one standard deviation 
above/below the unweighted average, bold entries are 2 standard deviations above/below. In cases where less 
than three countries are identified with high or low values we have reported three countries with the 
highest/lowest values. These Member States are in italics and marked with an asterisk. For the indicators, 
intangible assets and patent applications large number of zeros/missings result in many countries having the 
same median value, (i.e. zeros), these countries are not reported here. Based on the results in Table 18, Table 
19, Table 20, Table 21, Table 22, Table 23, and Table 24. 
Source: Own calculations 
Table 34: Summary of results: Bilateral indicators  
  Member States with 
Indicator high values low values 
14a. Bilateral import prices are too high: 
exporting country UK, FR, DE, NL, BE MT*, CY*, EE* 
14b. Bilateral import prices are too low: 
exporting country DE, PL, FR, BE, IT, NL  MT, CY, EE, HR 
14c. Bilateral import price are too high: 
importing country FR, ES, IT, UK, NL, DE  CY, EE*, MT* 
14d. Bilateral import price are too low: 
importing country ES, NL, UK, IT, CZ, SK CY*, MT*, LU* 
15a Royalty payments IE, MT*, NL* LV*, EL*, EE* 
15b Royalty receipts MT, NL, IE, LU CY*, EL*, PT* 
15c Net royalty payments IE, LU*, MT* SE*, FI*, UK* 
Notes: High/low values are one standard deviation above/below the unweighted average, bold entries are 2 
standard deviations above/below. In cases where less than three countries are identified with high or low 
values we have reported three countries with the highest/lowest values. These Member States are in italics 
and marked with an asterisk. Based on the results in Table 26 and Table 25. 
Source: Own calculations  
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Table 33 summarises the results for the analysis of the specific indicators by firm type. 
The key result here lies in the differences between the different types of firms. Not 
directly visible in Table 33 but a clear indication for the importance of ATP is the fact 
that for almost all Member States the profitability is highest in those MNE entities which 
are identified as facing a relatively lower tax rate. The mirror image of this is the lower 
profitability – even in comparison to the domestic companies - in those parts of the MNE 
groups which are facing a relatively higher tax rate. Regarding the Member States with 
higher values this is partly visible in Table 33. For example, Denmark is only showing a 
high pre-tax profitability for its domestic companies, but not for MNE groups. In 
contrast, in Lithuania only the MNE entities but not the domestic companies are 
exhibiting very high pre-tax profitability. Financial profits appear to be very unevenly 
distributed between Member States with only a few Member States having MNE entities 
with positive financial profits in the majority of firms and on average. Among those are 
Austria, the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden. Similarly, the intangible assets and 
patent holdings are concentrated in few firms. Additionally, the data quality rules out 
strong conclusions based on the distribution across Member States. 
Table 34 summarises the results for the bilateral indicators on import price anomalies 
and royalty payments. The country-level analysis of bilateral import price anomalies 
primarily reveals that larger and relatively higher tax Member States tend to have more 
anomalies in the import prices. Without the context of the firm structure this only 
confirms the potential importance of strategic transfer pricing. The bilateral royalty 
flows, in contrast, paint a stark picture. Ireland stands out as the Member States with 
by far the largest net royalty payments. Malta, the Netherlands and Luxembourg show 
some relevant royalty payments and receipts. Overall, Sweden, Finland and the United 
Kingdom have the highest net royalty receipts. These indicators highlight the 
importance of the royalty payments ATP channel. 
Table 35 looks at the classification into roles for the three main ATP structures. Here, 
we treat those countries as gaining from an ATP structure, if the number of lower tax 
entities is higher than the number of target entities. Correspondingly we treat those 
countries are losing from an ATP structure if the number of target entities surpasses the 
number of lower tax entities. The share of entities that are classified as conduit entities 
gives further indication of the exposure to ATP.86  
France, Malta and Belgium show up as the Member States with the highest share of 
target entities, while Cyprus, Bulgaria and Ireland are consistently the Member States 
with the smallest share of target companies. This reflects that the statutory tax rate 
plays an important role in our classification. Among the Member States with the highest 
share of firms classified as lower tax entities Bulgaria, Slovenia and Poland play a major 
role. The lowest shares are found for France, Malta and to a lesser extent also for 
Cyprus, Germany and the Netherlands. The connection to the tax rate is therefore much 
weaker in the classification into lower tax entity. The share of conduit entities is typically 
highest in Hungary, Austria, the Netherlands, Ireland and the United Kingdom. The 
lowest shares of conduit entities are found in Romania, Estonia and Latvia.    
                                          
86 Note that we classify entities as conduit entities if they are in a MNE group with at least on 
target entity and are not allocated to another role themselves. 
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Table 35: Summary of results: Combination of indicators – roles within ATP 
channels 
ATP via interest payments: Share of firms classified as  
  target entity lower tax entity conduit entity inconsistent/no data 
High values FR, BE, MT* BG, SI, PL HU, NL, IE, AT, UK RO, EE, CY, LT 
Low values BG*, CY*, LV*, IE*, LT*  FR, MT, CY, EE RO, LV, EE HU, SI, AT, IE, FR 
ATP via royalty payments: Share of firms classified as  
  target entity lower tax entity conduit entity inconsistent/no data 
High values FR, BE, MT SI, HU, LT, BG, PL 
HU, IE, UK, NL, 
AT RO, LV, EE, CY 
Low values BG*, CY*, IE* MT, FR, NL, LU RO, LV, EE HU, FR, AT, BE  
ATP via strategic transfer pricing: Share of firms classified as  
  target entity lower tax entity conduit entity inconsistent/no data 
High values FR, BE, MT BG, PL, RO, CZ, LT, LV, HU 
NL, AT, UK, DE, 
IE, CY  EE, LU, RO, PT 
Low values BG*, CY*, IE* MT, FR, CY, DE RO, EE, LV HU, IE, UK, AT, SI 
Notes: High/low values are one standard deviation above/below the unweighted average, bold entries are 
2 standard deviations above/below. In cases where less than three countries are identified with high or 
low values we have reported three countries with the highest/lowest values. These Member States are in 
italics and marked with an asterisk. Based on the results in Table 28, Table 29 and Table 30 
 Source: Own calculations 
The share of conduit entities is strongly negatively correlated with the share of firms for 
which we have either insufficient data or evidence which is inconsistent with the ATP 
structures. Romania, and the Baltic countries have the highest share of firms for which 
we have no information consistent with ATP structures while for Hungary we find the 
clearly lowest share.  
The broad picture emerging from the summary of the indicators is that several Member 
States appear to be exposed to ATP structures. This includes smaller Member States 
such as Ireland, Luxembourg, Cyprus, Malta or the Netherlands where the country-level 
indicators as summarised in Table 31 strongly suggest that ATP plays an important role. 
The summary of the results based on firm-level data in Table 35 also points into the 
direction of other countries being exposed to ATP. France, Belgium and Malta show up 
as Member States which tend to be losing tax base. Bulgaria, Poland, Slovenia, Hungary 
and Latvia  are often qualified as having high numbers of lower tax entities. This pattern 
is in line with these countries gaining tax base, but the classification may also be 
strongly driven by the level of the statutory tax rates. In several other Member States, 
we find traces of ATP, which is reflected in a sizeable share of the firms classified as 
conduit entities. This includes Austria, Hungary, the Netherlands, Ireland and the United 
Kingdom. In some of these cases this might reflect profit shifting to zero/no tax 
countries outside the EU, since several of these countries are also characterised through 
a relatively large share of MNE groups with links to such countries.  
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More generally, for almost all Member States the profitability measures in the MNE 
entities indicate some patterns consistent with ATP. In this context, the relative 
approach in Table 33 underemphasises the overall impact.87 Overall, the qualitative 
nature of the overall assessment implies this allocation is based on subjective 
judgement. Additionally, this does not take into account the underlying data quality at 
Member States level. For example, the small countries Cyprus and Malta both fall into 
the category, where the indicators show some impact of ATP but are not painting a clear 
picture whether the Member States are primarily benefitting or losing. These ambiguous 
results may also be partly driven by incomplete data and a small sample of firms to 
base the analysis on. 
Table 36 therefore concludes the overall assessment by collecting the indicators derived 
in this study and assesses them with regard to their availability, clarity of message and 
limitations.  
The indicators range from readily available and easy-to-interpret information, like the 
corporate tax revenues, to complex combination of indicators for the identification of 
the roles in the ATP channels. Very often there is a trade-off between data availability 
and the limitations of the indicator. For example, reliable data about bilateral royalty 
flows to zero/no corporate income tax countries outside the EU would clearly help to 
identify ATP channels. The trade-off between data availability and limitations is most 
extreme in the identification of the roles. The results for the strict use of the indicators 
would in principle produce reliable evidence for ATP structures. However, until now 
incomplete and imprecise data rules out meaningful results under the strict use of the 
indicators. As such, the discussion of the limitations of the indicators in Table 36 should 
be see a roadmap for future research.  
  
                                          
87 The approach simply ranks the Member States by strength of evidence. If 25 out 28 countries 
show evidence consistent with ATP this implies that the four Member States with the weakest 
evidence for ATP are classified as least affected.  
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Table 36: Overview of indicators and broad assessment 
Indicator Availability Ease of interpretation Limitations 
Corporate tax revenues 
in % of GDP Very good Very Easy 
Not possible to separate ATP from other 
economic factors, no information about channel 
of ATP 
Decomposition of 
corporate tax revenues Good Easy 
Not possible to separate ATP from other 
economic factors 
(unexplained) FDI stock Good Easy (Moderate) 
Not possible to (cleanly) separate the effect of 
ATP from other factors 
Market structure Good Difficult No clear message about ATP, only qualitative statements possible 
Presence in zero/no tax 
haven countries Mixed Very Easy 
Clear message about ATP, but difficult to 
quantify impact of ATP. Results partly driven by 
data availability 
Consolidated effective 
tax burden Limited Very Easy 
Often not available. Difficult to separate ATP 
from confounding factors. Based on financial 
account rather than tax accounts. 
Consolidated 
profitability  Limited Easy 
Often not available. Difficult to separate ATP 
from confounding factors. Based on financial 
account rather than tax accounts. 
Distribution of pre-tax 
profitability Mixed Easy Validity is limited if coverage is incomplete 
Distribution of operating 
profitability Mixed Easy Validity is limited if coverage is incomplete 
Distribution of financial 
profitability Mixed Easy Validity is limited if coverage is incomplete 
Distribution of debt 
share Mixed Easy 
Validity is limited if coverage is incomplete, 
imprecise measure because distinction between 
internal and external debt is not possible 
Distribution of interest 
payments Limited Easy 
Validity is limited if coverage is incomplete, 
imprecise measure because distinction between 
internal and external debt is not possible 
Distribution of intangible 
assets Mixed Easy 
Validity is limited if coverage is incomplete, 
imprecise measure because of lack of 
information about the nature of the intangibles 
Distribution of patent 
holding Very limited Easy 
Validity is limited if coverage is incomplete, 
difficulty to identify ownership rights correctly 
Bilateral import price 
anomalies Good Moderate 
Not very precise measure because of lack of 
intra-firm transactions 
Bilateral royalty flows Mixed Easy 
Imprecise measure because of lack of firm-level 
information, bilateral information is also often 
missing 
Treaty shopping 
indicators Good Difficult 
Indirect measure which is difficult to interpret, 
limited information about impact on tax 
revenues 
Roles in ATP via interest 
payments Very limited Moderate 
Trade-off between reducing the impact of 
confounding factors and data requirements 
Roles in ATP via royalty 
payments Very limited Moderate 
Trade-off between reducing the impact of 
confounding factors and data requirements 
Roles in ATP via 
strategic transfer pricing Very limited Moderate 
Trade-off between reducing the impact of 
confounding factors and data requirements, 
difficulty to separate from other tax planning 
behaviour 
Source: Own considerations based on the results in the study  
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5 Conclusions 
The aim of this study is to complement existing analysis of ATP by MNEs by providing 
country-level indicators. We build on the existing analysis of tax rules that facilitate ATP 
(ATP study), and the analysis of the effects of tax planning on forward looking effective 
tax burdens by the ZEW study. We group the discussed ATP structures into three main 
channels: i) ATP via interest payments, ii) ATP via royalty payments and iii) ATP via 
strategic transfer pricing. For each of these three main channels we extract the basic 
economic substance and match these characteristics to available data. General 
indicators are presented which give an overall impression about the extent and exposure 
to ATP. Further specific indicators provide some insight into certain aspects of the ATP 
structures. The use of the indicators in this study is twofold. First, we look at the 
country-level distribution of the indicators to identify the potential overall exposure to 
ATP of the Member States. Second, we combine the indicators to identify the three main 
"types" of entities within MNE groups, namely the  
 target entity where the tax base is reduced because of a deduction from the 
profits,  
 the lower tax entity where the tax base is increased but taxed at a lower rate, 
and  
 the conduit entities which are in a group with ATP activities but no clear effect 
on the tax base is observable. The label "conduit entity" may have a broader 
meaning than is generally understood in tax literature as it does not only 
encompass entities through which income flows transit. 
Counting the relative occurrence of the three types of entities within the Member States 
sheds some light on the possible use of the legal systems in each of the three main ATP 
channels.  
The derivation of economic indicators is partly driven by data constraints. The most 
important data shortcomings include: a general lack of firm-level information about the 
entities in non EU countries, especially zero/no tax countries, no possibility to distinguish 
between intra-firm and external financial flows, no information about hybrid 
instruments, no reliable information on permanent establishments, incomplete data 
about intellectual property and patent ownership, no detailed bilateral information about 
royalty flows and poor quality of bilateral foreign direct investment flows. The data 
quality also prevents us from drawing strong conclusions, but considered together, the 
indicators show a relatively consistent pattern. Some indicators are clearly influenced 
by other factors (e.g. general economic conditions) than ATP and none of the indicators 
provides therefore per se an irrefutable causality towards aggressive tax planning. 
Rather, considered together, the set of indicators shall be seen as a "body of evidence" 
that are consistent with the possible existence of an ATP structure. Being an outlier 
country for one (or several) indicators does therefore not suggest that the country is 
without any doubt used by MNEs in ATP structures. Instead, it indicates that such 
structure potentially exists. 
Nevertheless, we are able to derive some indicators, which shed some light on ATP 
structures within the Member States. For several indicators, the observed outcome could 
be due to either ATP or other economic circumstances. To reduce the problem of falsely 
attributing observed anomalies to ATP, we combine the indicators and classify each 
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entity within an MNE to a role. The requirement for several indicators to be line with the 
predictions from the ATP structures reduces the likelihood of alternative explanations. 
However, the stricter we apply the criteria the more likely we exclude some firms 
engaging ATP behaviour and underestimate the overall extent.  
From the overall situation of corporate tax revenues and their decomposition into main 
macroeconomic aggregates, we start with the first observations that some smaller 
Member States, like Cyprus, Malta and Luxembourg seem to be able to raise more 
corporate tax revenues in percent of GDP than others. Ireland in contrast seems able to 
attract a sizable amount of corporate tax base. For Cyprus, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, 
the Netherlands and Hungary we observe FDI stocks that are unexplained by economic 
fundamentals in a gravity model.  
Equally based on aggregated data, we find a more concentrated market structure in 
Germany and the United Kingdom, which could translate into a larger tax revenue risk 
resulting from ATP because larger firms are major tax payers. The high share of foreign 
controlled firms in Luxembourg and Estonia could reflect some tax driven behaviour. 
The high share of surplus in foreign controlled firms in Ireland, Hungary, Luxembourg 
and Romania is also consistent with higher than average corporate tax bases, which in 
turn are possibly the result of ATP activities. These results shall of course be taken with 
caution given the level of aggregation of the indicators. 
The analysis of the consolidated effective tax burdens for the MNE groups as a whole 
produces little insight into potential ATP activities, which is most likely due to the limited 
validity of this indicator if ATP activities also affect the tax base and therefore are not 
reflected in the ETR measure. The analysis of the consolidated profitability of MNE group 
suggests that this is the case. MNEs groups tend to have a higher operating profitability 
which vanishes when comparing the pre-tax profitability. This finding is consistent with 
ATP activities affecting the tax base, in which case the effective tax burden is not 
necessarily affected.  
The comparison between the unconsolidated accounts of MNE entities to both domestic 
firms and other entities within MNE groups yields more interesting results. The latter 
comparison uses the incentives for ATP as the dividing line and compares MNE entities, 
which are facing a lower tax burden than the rest of the group to the other MNE entities 
that face a higher tax burden. We find a consistently higher profitability in MNE groups 
if they are located in a relative low tax country. This holds for the comparison to 
domestic firms and for the comparison to firms within MNE groups which are not facing 
a relative low tax burden. This is consistent with all ATP channels. The differences in 
operating profitability are consistent with ATP structures using royalty payments or 
strategic transfer pricing. At the same time differences between operating and pre-tax 
profitability are also suggesting the importance of the ATP channel via interest 
payments. Patterns in financial profitability measures further indicate that ATP 
structures using interest payments may be concentrated in a few Member States. 
Furthermore, the skewed distribution of the profitability measures suggests that ATP is 
likely to take place (and lucrative to do so) in only a concentrated number of companies. 
Aggregate statistics of royalty flows are consistent with the hypothesis of substantial 
ATP practices using intellectual property. Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta and the 
Netherlands appear to be affected by ATP structures using royalty payments, which is 
reflected in statistically large royalty inflows and outflows. Sweden, Finland, Denmark 
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and the United Kingdom are in contrast those Member States which experience the 
largest net royalty receipts. We also find evidence of distorted bilateral import prices. 
The abnormally high import prices in high tax countries compared to transactions of the 
same good with other countries are consistent with the ATP structure using transfer 
pricing to shift profits out of these countries.  
Regarding the importance of Member States on dividend repatriation routes in 
international treaty shopping practices, we find that treaty shopping is of importance 
for European firms enabling tax efficient repatriation of dividends to and from countries 
outside the EU. The United Kingdom, Luxembourg, Estonia and the Netherlands stand 
out here as being central to many tax optimal repatriation routes.  
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Technical appendix 
A Detailed description of ATP structures  
A.1. Offshore loan ATP structure 
Figure 12 describes the offshore loan ATP structure from the ATP study. While the ZEW 
study reduces the tax planning strategy to its bare minimum the ATP structure from the 
ATP study has additional features which highlight important legal aspects. In line with 
the financing via offshore ATP structure, an offshore (in the sense of being in a country 
with zero or no corporate taxation) subsidiary is set up and financed by the parent 
country. The money is lent on to a holding entity in Member State B, which pays interest 
in return. This holding company lends the money onward to a holding company in 
Member State C and receives interest for the loan. In sum the transactions largely cancel 
out in the holding company in Member States B. The holding company in Member State 
C can deduct the interest costs and achieves tax savings via group consolidation with 
the target company.  
Figure 12: Offshore loan ATP structure 
 
Source: Own illustration based on ZEW study (2016) and ATP study (2015)  
In the end, the interest payments are deductible from the profits in the target entity 
and thereby reduce the tax burden there. The interest income is taxable in the offshore 
subsidiary, but since the tax rate in this country is zero, the overall tax burden is 
reduced.  
A.2. Hybrid loan ATP structures 
Another channel of tax planning, which was described in the ATP study, is the case of 
mismatches in the tax treatment of transactions between the countries involved. The 
origin of the potential tax savings here typically stems from the fact that the costs of a 
transaction are legally seen as tax deductible in one country, while the income in the 
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other country is seen as not taxable. Figure 13 illustrates the hybrid loan ATP structure 
from the ZEW study.  
Figure 13: Hybrid loan ATP structure (ZEW study) 
  
Source: Own illustration based on ZEW study (2016) 
The key mechanism to reduce the overall tax burden is the transaction between the 
subsidiary in the non-Member State B and Member State C. Country B treats the income 
from the transaction as tax-exempt dividends, while country C allows the deduction of 
the interest costs.  
Figure 14: Hybrid loan ATP structure (ATP study) 
 
Source: Own illustration based on ATP study (2015) 
Figure 14 shows the hybrid loan structure from the ATP study, which has the additional 
feature that an additional holding company is involved. The key mechanism of the tax 
saving is identical to the hybrid loan structure from the ZEW study. The hybrid loan from 
the offshore entity is treated as a loan in the holding company in Member State C, which 
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therefore can deduct the interest costs. The receipts in the offshore entity in State B are 
treated as tax exempt dividends. The final reduction in the overall tax burden is then 
achieved via group taxation between the holding company and the target entity in 
Member State C.  
A.3. Hybrid entity ATP structure 
Figure 15 depicts the hybrid entity ATP structure where the mismatch stems from a 
different legal qualification on the legal nature of the entity in countries B and A. Treating 
the hybrid entity as part of a tax-transparent entity in country A will imply that the 
interest received cancels out with the costs of the loan. The tax saving originates from 
the fact that the hybrid entity in country B can consolidate the interest costs with 
another existing subsidiary through group taxation.  
Figure 15: Hybrid entity ATP structure 
  
Source: Own illustration based on the ATP study (2015) 
A.4. Interest free loan ATP structure 
Figure 16 shows the interest free loan ATP structure. While this ATP structure does not 
involve a hybrid instrument, the main mechanism still depends on a mismatch of 
treatment of interest payments. The mismatch in this structure lies in the fact that the 
subsidiary in country B gives an interest free loan to the subsidiary in country D which 
allows a deduction for deemed interest payments. Hence, there are no interest received 
to be taxed in country B, and the overall tax burden is reduced. Like the offshore loan 
ATP structure, the interest-free loan ATP structure involves solely internal debt 
financing. However, in contrast to the channel described above the tax saving originates 
from a mismatch between the two countries involved: one country deducts interest 
costs, which never occurred according to the tax treatment in the other country. 
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Figure 16: Interest free loan ATP structure 
  
Source: Own illustration based on the ATP study (2015) 
A.5. Patent box ATP structure 
Figure 17 shows the description of the patent box ATP structures presented in the ATP 
study. Like the patent box ATP structure described in Figure 3, the ATP structure from 
the ATP study builds on the existence of a patent box in Member State B, which lowers 
the tax rate on the royalties received. The tax deduction of the royalties paid from the 
subsidiary in country C lowers the tax burden in the target entity. The lower tax rate 
offered in the patent box results in a significantly lower tax burden. The only difference 
to the ATP structure in Figure 3 is that the ATP study includes the transfer of the royalty 
bearing intellectual property in the structure, while the ZEW study assumes that the 
intellectual property is already in the country with the patent box.  
Figure 17: Patent box ATP structures (ATP study) 
 
Source: Own illustration based on ATP study (2015)  
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A.6. Further ATP structures using intangible assets 
The ATP study includes two more ATP structures where the deduction of royalty costs 
lies at the heart of the tax savings. Figure 18 depicts the two-tiered IP ATP structure. 
The key channel of the two-tiered ATP structure is that the intellectual property is 
transferred to a subsidiary, which is incorporated in country E, but is tax-resident 
outside that country in a jurisdiction where it is tax-exempt. As a result, the royalty 
payments made by the target company in Member State D are deducted from the tax 
bases there but are not taxes in the entity in country E. The second tier of the structure 
sees subsidiaries in Member States B and C with sub-licenses and corresponding royalty 
flows.  
Figure 18: Two-tiered intellectual property ATP structure 
  
Source: Own illustration based on ATP study (2015) 
Figure 19 shows the IP and cost-contribution agreement structure from the ATP study. 
The tax reduction in this ATP structure originates from the allocation of the royalty 
payments to a tax free company in State B in combination with the deduction of R&D 
costs in Member State A and royalty costs in Member State C. Both Member States levy 
higher taxes which results in the overall tax reduction.  
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Figure 19: Cost contribution agreements ATP structure 
  
Source: Own illustration based on ATP study (2015) 
A.7. ATP structures and tax rules of Member States  
The ATP study identifies for each of the seven ATP structures which tax rules where 
needed for such structures to exist. In Table 37, we summarise the seven ATP structures 
and identify which Member States’ tax rules can be used in which role in the respective 
ATP structures. This is based on the information in Appendix 2 of the ATP study. This 
implies that we base this part of the analysis on the legal situation in each Member State 
at the time of the writing of the ATP study.88 Any subsequent law changes are not taken 
into account. Table 37 distinguishes between four possible roles. The role of the MNE 
group is shown as non-shaded cells and is always labelled State A in the ATP study. We 
interpret this as the headquarter country, which amongst others needs to have 
neither binding CFC rules nor tax obstacles to the repatriation of the profits. The second 
role, we label target countries, shown as lightly shaded cells, which are the 
subsidiaries where the tax base is eroded because of the ATP structure. Some of the 
ATP structures involve a non-EU Member State, typically zero or no corporate tax 
countries, which we show as black cells. Finally, some of the ATP structures have 
further conduit entities, shown as darkly shaded cells, which are enabling the ATP 
structure but not directly gaining significant tax base.  
In each cell, we list the EU Member States with all tax rules necessary to be used in a 
given role in a given ATP structure.89 However, one tax rule is disregarded. It is the 
“Lack of a general or specific anti avoidance rule” (indicator 32 in the ATP study) 90. 
                                          
88 The ATP study has been published in December 2015, which implies that cut-off date for the 
legal situation is approximately mid 2015.  
89 Note that indicators 14 and 15 respectively 20 and 21 in the ATP study are the exception to 
this rule, since the beneficial owner test of withholding taxes is obsolete if no withholding taxes 
are levied. Therefore, we use either one of these indicators as sufficient for the MS to play the 
respective role. 
90 If indicator 32 was taken into account, it quickly becomes evident that the legal indicators from 
the ATP structure may be too conservative since no EU country scores in all the necessary 
indicators to be a target country. 
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Since the ATP study (page 147) closes with the qualification that “[…] (t)his should not 
be taken as a complete overturning or discrediting of the model ATP structures […]”, we 
disregard this indicator. This results in some more Member States qualifying for the role 
of the target country as indicated in brackets in Table 37. Furthermore, it should be 
noted that the ATP study investigates the absence or existence of certain tax rules but 
does not necessarily look into their effectiveness91. Therefore, the table below provides 
a conservative view of which Member States' tax rules could be used in which structure. 
Table 37: Legal indicators and roles of countries in ATP structures 
ATP structure State A State B State C State D State E 
1  
(Offshore loan) 
BE, BG, CY, 
CZ, EE, LU, LV, 
MT, RO, SK 
no MS no MS no MS   
2 
(Hybrid loan) 
BE, BG, CY, 
CZ, EE, LU, LV, 
MT, RO, SK 
no MS 
 no MS     
3 
(Hybrid entity) 
No MS  
(AT, BE, DE, 
DK, EL, ES, FI, 
FR, HU, IE, LT, 
LU, LV, MT, NL, 
RO, SI, UK) 
no MS       
4 
(Interest-free 
loan) 
BE, BG, CY, 
CZ, EE, LU, LV, 
MT, RO, SK 
IE, MT Non MS  (CY, EE, IE) no MS   
5 
(Patent box) CZ, MT 
CY, HU,  
MT, UK 
PL, SI  
(BE, CY, HU, LU, 
LV, NL, RO) 
    
6 
(Two-tiered IP) CZ, MT CY 
PL, SI  
(BE, CY, HU, LU, 
LV, NL, RO) 
PL, SI  
(BE, CY, 
HU, LU, LV, 
NL, RO) 
no MS 
7 
(IP and cost 
contribution) 
CZ no MS No MS (BE, LU, NL) all MS 
 
Note: State A to State E refers to the labelling in the ATP study, empty cells imply that no such State is 
mentioned in the ATP structure. Entity D in the IP and cost contribution ATP structure is a manufacturing 
company, and therefore does not classify as a conduit entity in the spirit of the ATP study. However, it fits the 
definition of a conduit entity of this study. 
Source: Own consideration based on ATP study  
The results in Table 37 already suggest that the legal situation in some Member States 
is more conducive to ATP than in others. However, the legal possibility of a role in a ATP 
structure does not yet take into account to which extent the MNEs are using the 
opportunities. Therefore, it is necessary to link the legal information to information 
about the ownership structure of the MNEs.  
  
                                          
91 For example, the ATP study states that the absence of CFC rules "would constitute the absence 
of a critical anti-avoidance measure which could have prevented an ATP structure. This indicator 
examines the absence (or existence) of CFC rules, but does not examine their effectiveness". On 
that basis the results presented in Table 1 may be too restrictive. 
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B Overview combination of indicators 
This section summarises the combination of indicators to classify MNE entities into the 
types described in Section 2.3. The combinations are first shown for the main channels 
and subsequently for all ATP structures derived from the ATP study.  
B.1. Combination of indicators to identify roles in main ATP channels 
The three main channels presented in the main text are i) ATP via interest payments, 
ii) ATP via royalty payments and iii) ATP via strategic transfer pricing. The combinations 
for the classification for these three main channels are described in Table 38 for the 
interest payment channel, Table 39 for the royalty payment channel and Table 40 for 
the strategic transfer price channel.  
The exact description of the combination and how the different classifications differ from 
each other is found in the next subsection where all ATP structures are described.  
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Table 38: Combination of indicators: ATP via interest payments  
ATP channel 1: Tax planning via interest payments 
      usage for classification 
Role Indicator Description standard strict 
General 
[5b] 
The MNE group has at least one 
subsidiary in a country with a 
lower tax rate 
For at least 
one entity in 
MNE [5b]=1 
For at least one 
entity in MNE 
[5b]=1 
[6] 
The consolidated ETR is lower 
than the statutory tax rate in 
the headquarter country 
n.a. [6]=1 
Headquarter 
country: [5a] 
The global owner is in a country 
with no CFC rules n.a. [5a]=1 
Target 
country: 
[7aEMP] or 
[7aASSET] 
Lower pre-tax profitability in 
target country compared to rest 
of MNE group [7a] or 
[7b]=1 & 
[5b]=0 
[7a]=1 & 
[5b]=0 
[7bEMP] or 
[7bASSET] 
Lower pre-tax profitability in 
target country compared to 
domestic companies 
[7b]=1 & 
[5b]=0 
[9aEMP] or 
[9aASSET] 
Lower financial profits in target 
country compared to rest of 
MNE group [9a] or [9b]=1 & 
[5b]=0 
[9a]=1 & 
[5b]=0 
[9bEMP] or 
[9bASSET] 
Lower financial profits in target 
country compared to domestic 
companies 
[9b]=1 & 
[5b]=0 
[10aEMP] or 
[10aASSET] 
Higher interest payments 
compared to rest of MNE group 
[10a] or 
[11a]=0 & 
[5b]=0 
[10a]=0 & 
[5b]=0 
[10bEMP] or 
[10bASSET] 
Higher interest payments 
compared to domestic 
companies 
[10b]=0 & 
[5b]=0 
[11a] Higher debt share compared to rest of MNE group 
[11a]=0 & 
[5b]=0 
[11b] Higher debt share compared to domestic companies 
[11b]=0 & 
[5b]=0 
Lower tax 
country: 
[7aEMP] or 
[7aASSET] 
Higher pre-tax profitability in 
lower tax country compared to 
rest of MNE group [7a] or 
[7b]=0 & 
[5b]=1 
[7a]=0 & 
[5b]=1 
[7bEMP] or 
[7bASSET] 
Higher pre-tax profitability in 
lower tax country compared to 
domestic companies 
[7b]=0 & 
[5b]=1 
[9aEMP] or 
[9aASSET] 
Higher financial profits in lower 
tax country compared to rest of 
MNE group [9a] or 
[9b]=0 & 
[5b]=1 
[9a]=0 & 
[5b]=1 
[9bEMP] or 
[9bASSET] 
Higher financial profits in lower 
tax country compared to 
domestic companies 
[9b]=0 & 
[5b]=1 
[10aEMP] or 
[10aASSET] 
Lower interest payments 
compared to rest of MNE group 
[10a] or 
[11a]=1 & 
[5b]=1 
[10a]=1 & 
[5b]=1 
[10bEMP] or 
[10bASSET] 
Lower interest payments 
compared to domestic 
companies 
[10b]=1 & 
[5b]=1 
[11a] Lower debt share compared to rest of MNE group 
[11a]=1 & 
[5b]=1 
[11b] Lower debt share compared to domestic companies 
[11b]=1 & 
[5b]=1 
Source: Own consideration based on ATP study and ZEW study 
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Table 39: Combination of indicators: ATP via royalty payments 
ATP channel 2: Tax planning via royalty payments 
      usage for classification 
Role Indicator Description Standard strict 
General 
[5b] 
The MNE group has at least one 
subsidiary in a country with a 
lower tax rate 
For at least 
one entity in 
MNE [5b]=1 
For at least 
one entity 
in MNE 
[5b]=1 
[6] 
The consolidated ETR is lower 
than the statutory tax rate in the 
headquarter country 
n.a. [6]=1 
Headquarter 
country: [5a] 
The global owner is in a country 
with no CFC rules n.a. [5a]=1 
Target 
country: 
[7aEMP] or 
[7aASSET] 
Lower pre-tax profitability in 
target country compared to rest 
of MNE group [7a] or [7b]=1 & 
[5b]=0 
[7a]=1 & 
[5b]=0 
[7bEMP] or 
[7bASSET] 
Lower pre-tax profitability in 
target country compared to 
domestic companies 
[7b]=1 & 
[5b]=0 
[8aEMP] or 
[8aASSET] 
Lower operating profitability in 
target country compared to rest 
of MNE group [8a] or [8b]=1 & 
[5b]=0 
[8a]=1 & 
[5b]=0 
[8bEMP] or 
[8bASSET] 
Lower operating profitability in 
target country compared to 
domestic companies 
[8b]=1 & 
[5b]=0 
[12a]  Lower intangible assets ratio compared to rest of MNE group [12a] or 
[12b]=1 & 
[5b]=0 
[12a]=1 & 
[5b]=0 
[12b] Lower intangible assets ratio compared to domestic companies 
[12b]=1 & 
[5b]=0 
[15] The net bilateral royalty outflows  n.a. [15]=1 
Lower tax 
country: 
[7aEMP] or 
[7aASSET] 
Higher pre-tax profitability in 
lower tax country compared to 
rest of MNE group [7a] or 
[7b]=0 & 
[5b]=1 
[7a]=0 & 
[5b]=1 
[7bEMP] or 
[7bASSET] 
Higher pre-tax profitability in 
lower tax country compared to 
domestic companies 
[7b]=0 & 
[5b]=1 
[8aEMP] or 
[8aASSET] 
Higher operating profitability in 
lower tax country compared to 
rest of MNE group [8a] or 
[8b]=0 & 
[5b]=1 
[8a]=0 & 
[5b]=1 
[8bEMP] or 
[8bASSET] 
Higher operating profitability in 
lower tax country compared to 
domestic companies 
[8b]=0 & 
[5b]=1 
[12a]  Higher intangible assets ratio compared to rest of MNE group [12a]or 
[12a]=0 & 
[5b]=1 
[12a]=0 & 
[5b]=1 
[12b] Higher intangible assets ratio compared to domestic companies 
[12b]=0 & 
[5b]=1 
 [15] The net bilateral royalty inflows  n.a. [15]=2 
Source: Own consideration based on ATP study and ZEW study  
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Table 40: Combination of indicators: ATP via strategic transfer pricing  
ATP channel 3: Strategic transfer pricing 
      usage for classification 
Role Indicator Description standard strict 
General 
[5b] 
The MNE group has at least one 
subsidiary in a country with a 
lower tax rate 
For at least 
one entity in 
MNE [5b]=1 
For at least 
one entity in 
MNE [5b]=1 
[6] 
The consolidated ETR is lower 
than the statutory tax rate in 
the headquarter country 
n.a. [6]=1 
Headquarter 
country: [5a] 
The global owner is in a country 
with no CFC rules n.a. [5a]=1 
Target 
country: 
[7aEMP] or 
[7aASSET] 
Lower pre-tax profitability in 
target country compared to rest 
of MNE group [7a] or 
[7b]=1 & 
[5b]=0 
[7a]=1 & 
[5b]=0 
[7bEMP] or 
[7bASSET] 
Lower pre-tax profitability in 
target country compared to 
domestic companies 
[7b]=1 & 
[5b]=0 
[8aEMP] or 
[8aASSET] 
Lower operating profitability in 
target country compared to rest 
of MNE group [8a] or 
[8b]=1 & 
[5b]=0 
[8a]=1 & 
[5b]=0 
[8bEMP] or 
[8bASSET] 
Lower operating profitability in 
target country compared to 
domestic companies 
[8b]=1 & 
[5b]=0 
[14] 
The bilateral import/export price 
anomalies reflect profit shifting 
from target entity to lower tax 
entity 
n.a. [14]=1 
Lower tax 
country: 
[7aEMP] or 
[7aASSET] 
Higher pre-tax profitability in 
lower tax country compared to 
rest of MNE group [7a] or 
[7b]=0 & 
[5b]=1 
[7a]=0 & 
[5b]=1 
[7bEMP] or 
[7bASSET] 
Higher pre-tax profitability in 
lower tax country compared to 
domestic companies 
[7b]=0 & 
[5b]=1 
[8aEMP] or 
[8aASSET] 
Higher operating profitability in 
lower tax country compared to 
rest of MNE group [8a] or 
[8b]=0 & 
[5b]=1 
[8a]=0 & 
[5b]=1 
[8bEMP] or 
[8bASSET] 
Higher operating profitability in 
lower tax country compared to 
domestic companies 
[8b]=0 & 
[5b]=1 
[14] 
The bilateral import/export price 
anomalies reflect profit shifting 
from target entity to lower tax 
entity 
n.a. [14]=2 
Source: Own consideration 
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B.2. Combination of indicators to identify roles in all ATP structures 
This short description lays out how we combine the specific indicators to identify the 
role that an entity may play in an ATP structure. We start with the strict assumptions, 
which are also summarised in Table 41 and then present how we weaken the 
assumptions to get to the combinations for the standard use of the indicators in Table 
42.  
Strict use of indicators: Table 41 summarises how we use the strictest possible 
combination of indicators to determine the roles of the different countries for each of 
the ATP structures. As explained in Section 2, we derive five ATP scenarios. i.) The 
internal debt financing ATP structure, ii.) the hybrid loan ATP structure, iii.) the strategic 
transfer pricing ATP structure iv.) the intellectual property ATP structure and the vi.) 
patent box ATP structure. The columns in Table 41 describe the various roles 
subsidiaries can play in the Member States. We have the target entity which is the 
entity where the tax base is eroded. Second, there is the lower tax entity which is the 
entity which receives the tax base.92 Third we have a conduit entity, which is necessary 
to enable the ATP structure, but not necessarily gaining or losing tax base itself. Since 
not all MNE groups observed in the dataset are engaged in ATP, and for a number of 
the firms, the relevant data is missing we have two further categories. There are those 
firms where the data is inconsistent with the ATP study. It means that, for these 
observations the available data suggests that ATP is not taking place. And finally, there 
are observations where the data is unavailable or insufficient to make a clear 
statement about ATP strategies.  
These five categories are additionally split into the headquarter and subsidiary 
observations. The headquarter is already identified through the ownership structure. 
Whether this headquarter is part of a MNE which uses ATP structures will depend on the 
presence of the subsidiaries with indicators highlighting such behaviour. However, for 
the strict classification, we also require that the headquarter country has the relevant 
legal indicators. This is first and foremost the absence of a CFC rule (indicator [5a]=1) 
and more generally an ownership structure consistent with the ATP study structure. This 
is either (indicator [5b]=1) demanding that at least one subsidiary is in a lower tax 
country or (indicator [5d]=1) requiring the presence in a country with a patent box in 
place. Independent from the type of ATP, the strict classification always starts with the 
indicator [6] which measures a lower effective tax burden for the consolidated MNE 
account. In its strictest approach, we only would consider the MNE as relevant for the 
ATP structures, if it has a lower effective tax burden than its domestic counterparts. 
However, since the coverage for the consolidated accounts is limited, and the effective 
tax rate indicator is by construction only an imprecise approximation, we use a less 
strict version of this indicator. Specifically, we re-define the test on indicator [6]. This 
indicator is not met (i.e. indicator [6]=0) if the consolidated effective tax burden of the 
                                          
92 Note that this is not necessarily a zero/no tax entity. We define a country as lower tax if it has 
an at least 5-percentage-points lower tax rate compared to highest tax rate within the MNE group. 
For the purpose of this study, we define a country as being a zero/no tax country if it is outside 
the EU and identified on the EU Scoreboard as having a no or a zero corporate income tax rate. 
Curacao and the United Arab Emirates are additionally classified as zero/no tax country because 
of additional information sourced from PWC worldwide tax summaries.  
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MNE group is higher than the statutory tax rate. We treat these cases as inconsistent 
with any ATP structure. 
Key to the identification of both target and lower tax entities are the profitability 
measures. Note that we use two definitions of each of the profitability measure. We 
scale the profit measures by either total assets or by the number of employees. Since 
we have for neither of these two denominators a particular theoretical argument in 
favour or against it, we could put equal weight on them. However, since the coverage 
for employees is clearly less complete, we use the definition using total assets as the 
default. Additionally, we treat the indicator as fulfilling the criteria, if either one of the 
two indicators fulfils the criteria. This is reflected in the fact that we drop the superscript 
by defining [7a]=1 if [7aASSETS]=1 or [7aEMP]=1 & [7aASSETS] ≠ 0. In other words we 
define the pre-tax profitability as higher (than in the rest of the MNE group) if the pre-
tax profitability ratio to total asset is higher or if the pre-tax profitability ratio to total 
asset is not defined and the pre-tax profitability ratio to the number of employees is 
higher. The same procedure is done for all the profitability measures.  
For the target country, that is the country which loses corporate tax base, there is one 
common indicator for all five ATP structures, namely the pre-tax profitability measures. 
In the strict use of the indicators we require that the pre-tax profitability is lower 
compared to the rest of the MNE [7a]=1 and compared to the domestic comparison 
group [7b]=1. Equally, we demand the financial profits to be lower in both comparisons, 
hence we demand that both [9a]=1 and [9b]=1. In sum, for the strict classification we 
demand the entities of an MNE to have at least one (i.e. either scaled by total assets or 
employees) of each of the three profitability indicators in line with the prediction. For 
the target companies in the other three ATP structures we follow the same logic, but 
use the operating profitability measures instead of the financial profitability. That is we 
demand [7a]=1 and [7b]=1 and [8a]=1 and [8b]=1 for the classification as a target 
entity. In addition to the profitability indicators we demand for the internal debt 
financing ATP structure and the hybrid loan ATP structure that the indicators [10a]=0 
and [10b]=0 indicating that the interest payments are higher both in comparison within 
the MNE and to the domestic companies. And finally indicators [11a]=0 and indicators 
[11b]=0 look at the debt share which should measure the underlying cause of the 
interest payments and therefore be higher in both comparisons. Finally, we also require 
the target country to be a relatively high tax country. 
The combination of indicators for the target companies in the ATP channels involving 
intellectual property and royalties and patent boxes also build on indicator [12a]=1 and 
[12b]=1 which reflect less intangible assets in the target country. For the patent box 
ATP structure we use the indicators [13a]=1 and [13b]=1 reflecting the differences in 
patent holdings. The interpretation is the same for both sets of indicators. A subsidiary 
in the target country should exhibit lower holdings of the intangible assets/patents 
compared to either the rest of the MNE group or to domestic counterparts. Both 
indicators [10] and [11] aim to measure the amount of royalty bearing intellectual 
property. In principle, they can be used interchangeably, but the patent box regimes 
we will put more focus on the patent based indicators. In addition to the firm level 
indicators, we will require the bilateral royalty flows indicator [15]=1 to be in line with 
the ownership structure. Finally, for the ATP structure based on intellectual property, 
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we also require the target country to be a relatively high tax country, while the target 
country for the patent box scheme needs to be country without a patent box. 
For ATP via strategic transfer pricing we have no firm-specific indicator in addition to 
the pre-tax profitability based indicators. However, indicator [14]=1 denotes too high 
export prices or too low import prices at the bilateral country-industry level and helps 
to detect strategic transfer pricing. To attribute the individual subsidiaries to the ATP 
channel we merge the bilateral information on subsidiary pairs and broad industry 
classification. Finally, for the ATP structure based on transfer pricing, we also require 
the target country to be a relatively high tax country.  
The second category is the lower lower tax entity. For all ATP structure, except the 
hybrid loan structure, the lower tax entity is the mirror of the target entity. In 
consequence, we follow the logic of the indicator combinations of the target. That is, we 
require the exact opposite in the profitability, interest payments, debt, intangible assets 
or patent indicators. Note that the bilateral indicators for import price anomalies and 
royalty flows are defined in a manner that they need to be fulfilled for the lower tax 
country as well.  
The third category is a conduit entity, i.e. an entity, which is important to the 
mechanism of the ATP structure, even if it could not gain or lose tax base itself. Given 
that a conduit entity plays an intermediate role in ATP strategies it is difficult to conceive 
firm specific indicators. In the cases of the offshore loan, the hybrid loan ATP structures 
and the interest free loan, there are no significant consequences on tax base of the 
conduit country. For this reason, we reverse the identification process and start with the 
presence of target entity or a lower tax entity within the group. Given that a target or 
lower tax entity is in the group and the specific entity is not identified as a target or a 
lower tax entity, we will treat this entity as a conduit entity. In the strict version we 
furthermore demand that the entity is in a country which is useful for treaty shopping, 
measured through indicator [4d]>4. This should reflect the ability of the tax efficient 
repatriation. 
The category inconsistent with the ATP structure is defined by indicators, which are 
applicable to the whole group. Specifically, for the strict classification we classify all 
entities within MNE groups with a consolidated ETR higher than the statutory tax rate 
of the owner country (indicator [6]=0) as inconsistent with ATP. Furthermore, if the 
headquarter is in a country with CFC rules (indicator [5a]=0) or the MNE group has no 
subsidiaries in lower tax (patent box) countries (indicators [5b]=0 respectively [5d]=0 
for all entities), we also treat these MNE group as inconsistent with the ATP structures 
requiring these characteristics.  
Finally, the remainder of entities are classified into the category insufficient data or 
data not available. This approach ensures that all entities for which we have only partial 
information or where the information is contradictory in itself are allocated into the 
insufficient data category. Strictly speaking, therefore, the insufficient data category 
also includes observations where the data is partly inconsistent with the ATP structure. 
To avoid an imprecise distinction with the category of inconsistent with the ATP structure 
we combine these two categories in the description of the results.   
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Table 41: Combination of indicators and ATP channels – strict classification 
 
 Source: Own consideration based on ATP study  
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Table 42: Combination of indicators and ATP channels –standard 
classification 
  
 Source: Own consideration based on ATP study   
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Standard classification: 
Table 42 summarises the combination of indicators we use for the standard 
classification. In comparison to the strict use of the indicators we do not require that 
the headquarter is in a country with no CFC rules. Furthermore, we do not use the 
indicator that the consolidated ETR needs to be lower than the statutory tax rates, the 
bilateral import price indicator, the bilateral royalty flow indicator and the treaty 
shopping indicator. Additionally, we take either one of the profitability indicators as 
sufficient, together with either one of the interest or debt indicators for the internal 
finance or hybrid loan ATP structure or together with the higher tax (transfer pricing 
ATP) the higher tax and one of the intangible assets indicators (intellectual property 
ATP) or the patent indicators (patent box ATP).  
Note that this standard classification does not allow for any entity being inconsistent 
with the hybrid loan ATP structure.  
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C Dealing with complex ownership structures 
The ownership information provided by Bureau van Dijk includes detailed information 
about shareholders and subsidiaries of the companies. Typically, the information about 
the ownership structure is of cross-sectional nature in the sense that the information 
refers to the latest available information. Previous information is overwritten and only 
available through downloads at different points in time.  
The availability of ownership and shareholder information allows either a bottom up 
(using subsidiary information) or a top down (using ownership information) approach to 
identify more complex ownership structures. Since the information about the ownership 
structure allows for an approach, which results in a non-ambiguous allocation to 
corporate groups we chose a bottom up approach in this study.  
The ownership information contains data about direct and global ultimate owners and 
their respective shares of ownership, which are held either directly or indirectly. 
Additionally, the information includes basic information about the type of the 
shareholder. To end up with an unambiguous ownership structure we use only corporate 
owners with more than 50 percent direct ownership to build our corporate groups. We 
start from the individual corporate entities and repeatedly merge the owners with their 
ownership information until we i.) reach the reported global ultimate owner or ii.) find 
no further corporate owner. In a next step, we correct those cases where the reported 
global ultimate owner is a non-corporate entity by using the highest corporate owner. 
For example, in a case where a corporate group is ultimately owned by the government 
we will use the highest non-public owner as the alternative global ultimate owner. 
Similarly, if a corporate group is ultimately owned by an individual, or family, we will 
treat the highest corporate entity as global ultimate owner.  
Figure 20 illustrates a possible ownership structure of a corporate group. The example 
consists of seven corporate entities in three different Member States (A, B and C) and 
two non-Member States, where one is considered to be a zero/no tax country. While the 
example is arbitrary, it highlights the importance of an exact definition of the underlying 
ownership concept. If we abstract from the third country issues at the moment the 
example in Figure 20 consists of four subsidiaries in Member States within one corporate 
group with the global ultimate owner in a Member State.  
If we consider the relationship of subsidiaries with their direct owners only, we have 
the following four dyads: Company 4 owned by Company 3, Company 3 owned by 
Company 2, Company 7 owned by Company 6 and Company 6 owned by Company 1. 
While these combinations are representing an adequate description of the direct 
ownership links, none of the combinations captures the link with the zero/no tax 
subsidiary Company 5. Similarly, the existing indirect link between Member States A 
and C is also not captured.  
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Figure 20: Example ownership structure 
 
Source: own illustration 
 
Alternatively, if we only consider the relationship of subsidiaries with their global 
owners, we have the following four dyads: Companies 3, 4, 6 and 7 are all owned by 
Company 1. Again, these combinations are representing an adequate description of the 
links with the global owner, but still none of the combinations captures the link with the 
zero/no tax subsidiary Company 5. In contrast to the consideration of the direct owner 
the link between Company 7 and Company 1 is now taken into account. As a downside 
the link between Company 6 and Company 7 is no longer considered.  
Following the logic of Jungmann and Loretz (2016) we can also consider the link to the 
rest of the group. In this case, Companies 3, 4, 6 and 7 will be linked to all other 
corporate entities in the corporate group. This increases the number of combinations 
substantially, but since we are interested in country level indicators as final outcome, 
we can reduce the complexity by only considering the country combinations. This will 
result in the combinations MS A to MS A, MS B, MS C, non MS 1 and non MS 2 for 
Companies 3 and 4, MS B to MS A, MS C, non MS 1 and non MS 2 for Company 6 and 
MS C to MS A, MS B, non MS 1 and non MS 2 for Company 7. In a nutshell, the result 
is that for each of the subsidiaries the locations of all the other subsidiaries and the 
global ultimate owner are relevant. At the same time, the number of possible 
combinations increases substantially, which will result in a smaller weight when 
aggregating the information at the country levels.  
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D Gravity equation estimates to control for economic 
factors 
D.1. Using gravity equations for FDI estimates 
The decision to expand business abroad and to engage in foreign direct investment 
depends on numerous economic considerations. The potential to reduce the effective 
tax burden through ATP is only one of these aspects and a failure to account for other 
economic aspects will result in effects falsely attributed to the tax environment. 
One approach to empirically model the economic determinants of the FDI decision is the 
gravity approach. The gravity approach builds on Newtons law for the gravitational 
force, stipulating that the gravitational force (𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖) between two masses (𝑀𝑀) in 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑗𝑗 
is  
(1) 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 = 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 . 
In other words, the gravitational force between two objects is directly proportional to 
their masses and inversely proportional to their distance. The transfer of using this 
concept for bilateral trade data has been done already by Tinbergen (1962). Because of 
its strong empirical support, the gravity equation quickly established as a workhorse 
model in the international trade literature. Taking the logarithm of the gravity equation 
in (1) and using the respective GDP as measure for the economic size, the bilateral 
trade flow can be estimated as follows: 
(2) ln (𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖) = β1ln(𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑚𝑚) + β2ln�𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖� + β3 ln�𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖� + 𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖, 
where 𝜀𝜀𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 describes the usual error term. One of the main difficulties involved in the 
estimation of (2) is that the logarithm of zero trade flows is not defined. Furthermore, 
in the presence of heteroscedasticity results in biased estimates using a (log-)linear 
estimation technique. Therefore, it has become a standard approach to use the poisson 
pseudo maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator proposed by Santos Silva and Tenreyro 
(2006).  
The transfer from the estimation of international trade flows to the estimation of 
investment flows and stocks has been done by several authors. Particularly relevant for 
the current study is the approach by Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2006) which investigate the 
impact of international taxation on bilateral FDI. More generally see also Kleinert and 
Toubal (2010) for a discussion and a theoretical foundation of the use of gravity models 
for the estimation of FDI.  
D.2. Simulation of FDI stocks using a simple gravity approach 
In Table 11 we present the results for unexplained FDI stocks. The term unexplained 
refers to the part of FDI stocks which is not explained by a simple gravity model. 
Specifically, we use the simple relationship described in equation (1). This implies that 
we can infer for each country-pair the share of global FDI stocks from the shares of the 
global GDP and the distances between the country pair. Denote 𝑌𝑌𝑚𝑚 as the GDP of country 
𝑖𝑖 and 𝑇𝑇𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 we can simulate the share of the world FDI stock as  
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(3) 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶� 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 = 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 . 
In a second step, we scale the sum of the simulated FDI stock by the observed worldwide 
FDI stock to separate a tax induced distortion in the distribution of the FDI stocks from 
a general over or underestimation of FDI. Therefore, we have  
(4) 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶� 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖 = 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑌𝑌𝑗𝑗𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ∑𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗∑𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹� 𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  
as our final simulated FDI stock. 
D.3. Results gravity equations for geographical distribution of MNE 
entities and for aggregate FDI stocks 
A more data driven approach to the use of the gravity model is to estimate the tax effect 
directly. We use two different data sources to estimate a tax effect on the location of 
FDI. First, we use the information from the firm-level data regarding the ownership 
structure. We count the number of subsidiaries in each country 𝑖𝑖 by country of the global 
ultimate owner 𝑗𝑗. We use this number of firms variable (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁_𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑓𝑓𝐿𝐿𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖) as dependent 
variable in two regressions. In the first one we include the effective average tax rate of 
the parent country and the effective average tax rate of the subsidiary country. In the 
second regression, we include parent and subsidiary country fixed effects to control for 
unobservable country characteristics. Due to the cross-sectional nature of our data this 
fully captures the tax rates. Therefore, we include the bilateral effective average tax 
rate as our main variable of interest. Additionally, our regressions include a dummy for 
domestic subsidiaries, i.e. when the parent country and the subsidiary country are 
identical. Furthermore, we include dummy variables which identify if the parent and 
subsidiary country have a common official language or if they are contiguous.  
The second set of regressions in Table 43 use the bilateral FDI stock as dependent 
variable. The regression follows the same logic with the third regression including the 
effective average tax rates for sending and receiving countries and the fourth regression 
including home and host country fixed effects and the bilateral effective tax rate. Note, 
that we are not including the domestic investment, therefore no domestic dummy is 
included.  
Overall, we see the expected tax effects. In the case of the regressions explaining the 
geographical distribution of the subsidiaries we find the expected positive tax coefficient 
for the headquarter country together with expected negative tax coefficient for the 
subsidiary country. The bilateral tax burden is also clearly significant negative. For the 
regressions explaining the FDI stocks, the tax effects in the regression without country 
fixed effects are insignificant, while the bilateral tax effect in the regression with home 
and host country fixed effects is very large and highly significant. 
In fact, the tax effect in the last regression is extremely large, which hints at some form 
of misspecification of the regression or data problems. The latter are already evident in 
the fact that we lose several observations because of negative FDI stocks, which seems 
not very plausible. Additionally, the bilateral effective average tax rates are only an 
approximation of the tax burden and include tax burden upon repatriation. This could 
be misleading in the case of retained earnings.  
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Table 43: Results gravity estimates 
  No. of subsidiaries FDI stocks 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] 
log (GDP HQ) 
0.475***  0.301**  
(0.070)  (0.138)  
     
log (GDP subsidiary) 
0.583***  0.249*  
(0.064)  (0.146)  
     
EATR subsidiary 
-0.032**  0.045  
(0.014)  (0.030)  
     
EATR headquarter 
0.032***  0.040  
(0.012)  (0.028)  
     
Bilateral EATR 
 -7.651***  -26.379*** 
 (2.452)  (9.404) 
     
log (Distance) 
-0.396*** -0.680*** -1.377*** -0.716*** 
(0.085) (0.071) (0.186) (0.144) 
     
HQ and owner country are 
contiguous 
0.430** 0.603*** -1.216*** 0.300 
(0.187) (0.105) (0.370) (0.193)      
HQ and owner country have 
common official language 
0.221 0.249 0.583** -0.268 
(0.226) (0.158) (0.276) (0.243) 
     
Domestic subsidiary 
2.755*** 2.668***   
(0.238) (0.142)   
     
HQ and subsidiary country fixed 
effects included     
No. of observations 784 784 609 609 
R2 0.861 0.993 0.208 0.903 
Notes: All regressions use the tax rates for 2013. FDI stocks are average over the period 2010 to 2015. 
Semi-robust standard errors in brackets. *** denote significance at the 1 % level, ** at the 5 % level and 
* at the 10 % level. Estimated using the PPML command implemented in Stata. 
Source: Orbis (Bureau van Dijk), own calculations 
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E Appendix Tables 
Table 44: Comparison FDI stock data  
  inward FDI stock (IMF data) 
outward FDI stock 
(IMF data) 
Difference to Eurostat 
data 
  
in %  Mio. of 
Dollars 
in %  Mio. of 
Dollars 
FDI stock in % of GDP 
of GDP of GDP inward outward 
Austria 44.0 149708 55.7 189209 26.58 28.1 
Belgium 103.1 422034 100.9 413106 -0.92 -0.8 
Bulgaria 86.0 37982 6.3 2781 -0.06 -2.3 
Croatia 54.0 23701 11.2 4895 0.04 0.3 
Cyprus 715.3 126152 688.7 121472 189.40 217.8 
Czech Republic 62.2 103798 10.2 16967 -0.62 0.0 
Denmark 34.2 91019 64.6 172014 4.96 -1.6 
Estonia 83.3 16871 26.7 5408 2.92 1.2 
Finland 40.2 84089 41.3 86377 -4.75 -0.5 
France 31.9 695356 54.3 1183643 -4.08 -3.8 
Germany 33.4 1012822 54.0 1637143 -9.56 -12.3 
Greece 9.1 15941 13.6 23870 3.07 1.0 
Hungary 76.4 83760 31.9 35004 84.22 92.2 
Ireland 183.0 468026 333.3 852697 128.07 -14.7 
Italy 18.5 303327 25.7 422058 0.38 0.4 
Latvia 53.8 13097 4.5 1107 1.84 0.4 
Lithuania 35.0 13063 5.4 2022 1.16 1.0 
Luxembourg 357.1 186069 295.3 153889 5409.72 6454.0 
Malta 1668.3 146621 693.1 60909 63.66 7.3 
Netherlands 95.8 647785 145.5 984251 439.14 487.9 
Poland 44.9 191913 5.9 25074 -5.61 -0.6 
Portugal 57.4 103010 31.9 57326 1.37 -1.5 
Romania 39.0 62501 0.3 533 1.21 0.1 
Slovakia 55.6 43746 3.0 2327 -4.60 -0.2 
Slovenia 27.7 10684 12.8 4935 2.28 1.4 
Spain 44.5 478151 39.4 423289 2.28 2.5 
Sweden 57.2 255742 70.2 313837 4.95 6.7 
United 
Kingdom 51.1 1318250 54.0 1391267 -0.91 1.6 
EU 28 48.3 253758 58.4 306693 14.7 14.5 
Average 148.6  102.8    
Std. deviation 328.5  184.2    
High values MT, CY  MT, CY, IE, LU    
Low values       
Notes: Average refers to the weighted (for the ratios in % of GDP) respectively to the unweighted average. 
Source: Eurostat, IMF World Investment Database, own calculations 
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Table 45: Ownership structures MNE groups (by ultimate owner)  
  AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK ES EE FI FR UK EE HR HU 
AT 4158 33 1 42 4 1036 34 41 1 31 133 149 1 6 7 
BE 41 4656  2  357 54 71  49 1105 256 2   
BG 95 27 353 154 22 152 18 42 2 9 63 62 91 3 18 
CY 2 2 1 7926  10 3   2 9 31 42  7 
CZ 720 125 2 434 1097 1415 66 126 2 58 384 451 10 4 46 
DE 997 375 5 128 27 16814 424 297 4 177 1492 1343 21 6 22 
DK 23 47  25  292 4322 14 1 84 165 238 2 1  
ES 121 235  14 4 1350 158 7929 1 60 1454 873 11  4 
EE 24 9  47 1 69 59 4 466 428 32 65   2 
FI 22 22  3  155 176 6 21 2428 97 102    
FR 202 1866 1 27 10 2326 161 666 3 107 20597 1536 27 2 7 
UK 154 348 2 169 11 2242 384 486  169 2223 19203 34  5 
EE 19 22 1 299 1 152 20 61  7 122 116 732   
HR 247 16 1 21 8 185 26 11  6 49 35  440 34 
HU 115 49 1 9 3 242 14 27  22 114 52 4 2 761 
IE 7 46  19 3 329 31 52  14 199 786 1  1 
IT 282 253 27 89 18 1487 124 491 6 68 1798 1057 25 20 21 
LU 11 185  28  206 7 17  1 254 326 6   
LT 8 11  17 1 81 73 3 76 62 31 31   2 
LV 14 8 1 117 4 53 77 6 114 95 32 100   1 
MT 19 4  3  51 3 9 1 3 16 47 6   
NL 90 356 2 147 16 822 114 178 2 119 750 1138 16 1 10 
PL 308 238 5 340 77 1721 290 267 4 140 779 439 14 2 26 
PT 14 57  2  179 24 713  15 330 102 1  1 
RO 518 195 81 1843 64 742 134 487 8 32 531 319 197 7 462 
SK 192 39  52 255 260 30 21 1 10 127 52 1 2 19 
SI 67 3 1 5 1 57 6 2  3 18 9  17 1 
SE 44 65  8  338 436 23 3 468 292 261   1 
Non EU 1227 663 113 8945 176 5072 1120 899 130 1016 3537 5374 174 230 205 
Sum 9741 9955 598 20915 1803 38195 8388 12949 846 5683 36733 34553 1418 743 166
 
Source: Orbis (Bureau van Dijk) own calculations 
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Table 46: Ownership structures MNE groups (by ultimate owner) continued 
 
IE IT LU LT LV MT NL PL PT ROM SK SI SE Non EU Sum 
AT 18 233 104   1 93 5 5 3 12 6 58 1052 7267 
BE 66 81 336 1   633 1 4   1 148 1437 9301 
BG 5 63 49 2  21 78 7 4 4 1 9 16 503 1873 
CY 2 2 12  1 1 14 4     2 216 8289 
CZ 59 174 370 5  45 500 154 13 4 332 16 155 2006 8773 
DE 163 677 1128 1 3 31 1619 76 24 1 10 27 597 7760 34249 
DK 19 39 95  1 1 179 6 5   3 833 1258 7653 
ES 115 682 705 3 1 19 829 18 415 2 2 8 214 3284 18511 
EE 9 8 31 32 69 6 50 8     247 360 2026 
FI 15 34 59  2  109 2    1 816 676 4746 
FR 157 943 1965 2 1 10 1256 17 105 1 3 6 411 6137 38552 
UK 1152 523 1247 2 3 104 1538 24 41 1 1 4 695 20692 51457 
EL 14 70 115   1 70  2   1 24 373 2222 
HR 5 121 27  1 2 36 8 1 2 6 140 27 327 1782 
HU 5 48 36   1 50 10 3  4 3 34 275 1884 
IE 944 91 140 1  8 225 1 9  1 1 36 1867 4812 
IT 45 11239 1911 4 3 85 680 20 85 56 2 16 173 4426 24511 
LU 29 103 4367 1  15 88 2 5    28 1089 6768 
LT 3 5 17 392 28 6 31 34   1 2 90 181 1186 
LV 5 19 25 78 287 17 32 6 2  1 1 159 345 1599 
MT 3 8 6   393 5 1 2 6   31 104 721 
NL 181 227 883 4  62 8782 18 72 2 8 4 261 5774 20039 
PL 77 334 453 22 3 14 703 1655 49  21 15 388 1860 10244 
PT 6 87 99   13 101 1 1928 1  1 29 521 4225 
RO 55 943 354 13 3 31 580 96 72 147 44 17 81 2179 10235 
SK 12 54 37 1 1 1 71 21 1  491 2 30 307 2090 
SI 2 26 6    6     631 8 69 938 
SE 29 65 147  3 2 227 6 3   3 7911 1692 12027 
Non EU 693 1495 1282 137 115 62 2389 279 191 33 62 414 2836 71741 110610 
Sum 3888 18394 16006 701 525 952 20974 2480 3041 263 1002 1332 16338 138511 408590 
Source: Orbis (Bureau van Dijk) own calculations 
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Table 47: Ownership structures MNE groups (by direct owner)  
 
 
AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK ES EE FI FR UK EL HR HU 
AT 4158 33 1 42 4 1036 34 41 1 31 133 149 1 6 7 
BE 41 4656  2  357 54 71  49 1105 256 2   
BG 95 27 353 154 22 152 18 42 2 9 63 62 91 3 18 
CY 2 2 1 7926  10 3   2 9 31 42  7 
CZ 720 125 2 434 1097 1415 66 126 2 58 384 451 10 4 46 
DE 997 375 5 128 27 16814 424 297 4 177 1492 1343 21 6 22 
DK 23 47  25  292 4322 14 1 84 165 238 2 1  
ES 121 235  14 4 1350 158 7929 1 60 1454 873 11  4 
EE 24 9  47 1 69 59 4 466 428 32 65   2 
FI 22 22  3  155 176 6 21 2428 97 102    
FR 202 1866 1 27 10 2326 161 666 3 107 20597 1536 27 2 7 
UK 154 348 2 169 11 2242 384 486  169 2223 19203 34  5 
EL 19 22 1 299 1 152 20 61  7 122 116 732   
HR 247 16 1 21 8 185 26 11  6 49 35  440 34 
HU 115 49 1 9 3 242 14 27  22 114 52 4 2 761 
IE 7 46  19 3 329 31 52  14 199 786 1  1 
IT 282 253 27 89 18 1487 124 491 6 68 1798 1057 25 20 21 
LU 11 185  28  206 7 17  1 254 326 6   
LT 8 11  17 1 81 73 3 76 62 31 31   2 
LV 14 8 1 117 4 53 77 6 114 95 32 100   1 
MT 19 4  3  51 3 9 1 3 16 47 6   
NL 90 356 2 147 16 822 114 178 2 119 750 1138 16 1 10 
PL 308 238 5 340 77 1721 290 267 4 140 779 439 14 2 26 
PT 14 57  2  179 24 713  15 330 102 1  1 
RO 518 195 81 1843 64 742 134 487 8 32 531 319 197 7 462 
SK 192 39  52 255 260 30 21 1 10 127 52 1 2 19 
SI 67 3 1 5 1 57 6 2  3 18 9  17 1 
SE 44 65  8  338 436 23 3 468 292 261   1 
Non EU 1227 663 113 8945 176 5072 1120 899 130 1016 3537 5374 174 230 205 
Sum 9741 9955 598 20915 1803 38195 8388 12949 846 5683 36733 34553 1418 743 1663 
Source: Orbis (Bureau van Dijk) own calculations 
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Table 48: Ownership structures MNE groups (by direct owner) continued 
 
IE IT LU LT LV ML NL PL PT RO SK SI SE Non EU Sum 
AT 18 233 104   1 93 5 5 3 12 6 58 1052 7267 
BE 66 81 336 1   633 1 4   1 148 1437 9301 
BG 5 63 49 2  21 78 7 4 4 1 9 16 503 1873 
CY 2 2 12  1 1 14 4     2 216 8289 
CZ 59 174 370 5  45 500 154 13 4 332 16 155 2006 8773 
DE 163 677 1128 1 3 31 1619 76 24 1 10 27 597 7760 34249 
DK 19 39 95  1 1 179 6 5   3 833 1258 7653 
ES 115 682 705 3 1 19 829 18 415 2 2 8 214 3284 18511 
EE 9 8 31 32 69 6 50 8     247 360 2026 
FI 15 34 59  2  109 2    1 816 676 4746 
FR 157 943 1965 2 1 10 1256 17 105 1 3 6 411 6137 38552 
UK 1152 523 1247 2 3 104 1538 24 41 1 1 4 695 20692 51457 
EL 14 70 115   1 70  2   1 24 373 2222 
HR 5 121 27  1 2 36 8 1 2 6 140 27 327 1782 
HU 5 48 36   1 50 10 3  4 3 34 275 1884 
IE 944 91 140 1  8 225 1 9  1 1 36 1867 4812 
IT 45 11239 1911 4 3 85 680 20 85 56 2 16 173 4426 24511 
LU 29 103 4367 1  15 88 2 5    28 1089 6768 
LT 3 5 17 392 28 6 31 34   1 2 90 181 1186 
LV 5 19 25 78 287 17 32 6 2  1 1 159 345 1599 
MT 3 8 6   393 5 1 2 6   31 104 721 
NL 181 227 883 4  62 8782 18 72 2 8 4 261 5774 20039 
PL 77 334 453 22 3 14 703 1655 49  21 15 388 1860 10244 
PT 6 87 99   13 101 1 1928 1  1 29 521 4225 
RO 55 943 354 13 3 31 580 96 72 147 44 17 81 2179 10235 
SK 12 54 37 1 1 1 71 21 1  491 2 30 307 2090 
SI 2 26 6    6     631 8 69 938 
SE 29 65 147  3 2 227 6 3   3 7911 1692 12027 
Non EU 693 1495 1282 137 115 62 2389 279 191 33 62 414 2836 71741 110610 
Sum 3888 18394 16006 701 525 952 20974 2480 3041 263 1002 1332 16338 138511 408590 
Source: Orbis (Bureau van Dijk) own calculations 
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Table 49: Statutory corporate tax rates Europe and zero/no tax countries 
Country  Year(s)  Statutory tax rate Country Year(s) Statutory tax rate 
EU countries EU countries (continued) 
Austria 2010-2015 25.00 Sweden 2010-2012 26.30 
Belgium 2010-2015 33.99  2013-2015 22.00 
Bulgaria 2010-2015 10.00 United Kingdom 2010 28.00 
Croatia 2010-2015 20.00  2011 26.00 
Cyprus 2010-2012 10.00  2012 24.00 
 2013-2015 12.50  2013 23.00 
Czech Republic 2010-2015 19.00  2014 21.00 
Denmark 2010-2013 25.00   2015 20.00 
 2014 24.50    
 2015 23.50    
Estonia 2010-2014 21.00 Other European countries 
 2015 20.00 Albania 2010-2013 10.00 
Finland 2010-2011 26.00  2014-2015 15.00 
 2012-2013 24.50 Andorra 2010-2015 10.00 
 2014-2015 20.00 Belarus 2010-2011 24.00 
France 2010 34.43  2012-2015 18.00 
 2011-2012 36.10 Bosnia Herzegovina 2010-2015 10.00 
 2013-2015 38.00 Liechtenstein 2010 20.00 
Germany 2010-2014 30.18  2011-2015 12.50 
 2015 30.20 Gibraltar 2010-2015 10.00 
Greece 2010 24.00 Iceland 2010 18.00 
 2011-2012 20.00  2011-2015 20.00 
 2013-2014 26.00 Macedonia 2010-2015 10.00 
 2015 29.00 Moldova 2012-2015 12.00 
Hungary 2010-2015 20.60 Montenegro 2010-2015 9.00 
Ireland 2010-2015 12.50 Norway 2010-2013 28.00 
Italy 2010-2015 31.40  2014-2015 27.00 
Latvia 2010-2015 15.00 San Marino 2010-2015 17.00 
Lithuania 2010-2015 15.00 Serbia 2010-2012 10.00 
Luxembourg 2010 28.59  2013-2015 15.00 
 2011-2012 28.80 Switzerland 2010-2012 21.17 
 2013 29.22  2013-2015 21.15 
 2014-2015 29.20 Ukraine 2010-2011 25.00 
Malta 2010-2015 35.00  2012-2013 21.00 
Netherlands 2010 25.50  2014-2015 18.00 
 2011-2015 25.00    
Poland 2010-2015 19.00 zero/ no tax countries 
Portugal 2010-2011 29.00 Anguilla 2010-2015 0.00 
 2012-2014 31.50 Bahamas 2010-2015 0.00 
 2015 29.50 Bahrain 2010-2015 0.00 
Romania 2010-2015 16.00 Bermuda 2010-2015 0.00 
Slovakia 2010-2012 19.00 British Virgin Islands 2010-2015 0.00 
 2013 23.00 Cayman Island 2010-2015 0.00 
 2014-2015 22.00 Curacao 2010-2015 0.00 
Slovenia 2010-2011 20.00 Monaco 2010-2015 0.00 
 2012 18.00 United Arab Emirates 2010-2015 0.00 
 2013-2015 17.00    
Spain 2010-2014 30.00    
 2015 28.00    
         
Notes: Only those countries with firm-level data available are included. This implies that Turks and Caicos Islands are not 
included. Further, the firm-level data does not allow to clearly identify firms in Guernsey, Isle of Man and Jersey, Additionally, 
Curacao and the United Arab Emirates are classified as zero/no tax rates based on competing detailed information from PWC 
worldwide tax summaries. 
Source: ZEW study, KPMG corporate tax rate guides, PWC worldwide tax summaries, 
Scoreboard  
European Commission 
 
Aggressive tax planning indicators 
 
October 2017 | 157 
Table 50: Statutory corporate tax rates Africa, Americas, Caribbean countries 
Country Year(s) 
Statutory 
tax rate 
Country Year(s) 
Statutory 
tax rate 
African countries Americas and Caribbean countries 
Algeria 2010-2013 25.00 Antigua and Barbuda 2010-2015 25.00 
 2014 19.00 Argentina 2010-2015 35.00 
 2015 23.00 Aruba 2010-2015 28.00 
Angola 2010-2014 35.00 Barbados 2010-2015 25.00 
 2015 30.00 Belize 2010-2015 25.00 
Botswana 2010-2011 25.00 Bolivia 2010-2015 25.00 
 2012-2015 22.00 Brazil 2010-2015 34.00 
Burkina Faso 2010-2015 27.50 Canada 2010 30.00 
Cameroon 2010-2015 38.50  2011 28.30 
Cape Verde 2010-2015 25.00  2012-2013 26.00 
Central African Republic 2010-2015 30.00  2014-2015 26.50 
Chad 2010-2015 35.00 Chile 2010 17.00 
Congo 2010-2015 35.00  2011 20.00 
Congo (Brazzaville) 2010-2015 35.00  2012 18.50 
Cote d'Ivoire 2010-2015 25.00  2013 18.50 
Egypt 2010-2011 20.00  2014 20.00 
 2012-2014 25.00  2015 22.50 
 2015 22.50 Columbia 2010-2013 33.00 
Ethiopia 2010-2015 30.00  2014-2015 25.00 
Gabon 2010-2015 35.00 Costa Rica 2010-2015 30.00 
Ghana 2010-2015 25.00 Cuba 2010-2015 30.00 
Kenia 2010-2015 30.00 Dominica 2010-2015 25.00 
Lesotho 2010-2015 25.00 Dominican Republic 2010-2011 25.00 
Liberia 2010-2015 25.00  2012-2013 29.00 
Libya 2010-2015 20.00  2014 28.00 
Madagascar 2010-2015 20.00  2015 17.00 
Malawi 2010-2015 30.00 Ecuador 2010 25.00 
Mauretania 2010-2015 25.00  2011 24.00 
Morocco 2010-2015 30.00  2012-2013 23.00 
Mozambique 2010-2015 32.00  2014-2015 22.00 
Namibia 2010 35.00 El Salvador 2010-2015 30.00 
 2011-2012 34.00 Grenada 2010-2015 30.00 
 2013-2015 33.00 Guatemala 2010-2013 31.00 
Nigeria 2010-2015 30.00  2014 28.00 
Senegal 2010-2013 25.00  2015 25.00 
 2014-2015 30.00 Guyana 2010-2015 30.00 
Sierra Leone 2010-2015 30.00 Haiti 2010-2015 30.00 
Somalia 2010-2015 28.00 Honduras 2010 30.00 
South Africa 2010 28.00  2011-2013 35.00 
 2011-2013 34.55  2014-2015 30.00 
 2014-2015 28.00 Jamaica 2010-2012 33.33 
Sudan 2010-2015 15.00  2013-2015 25.00 
Swaziland 2010-2015 27.50 Mexico 2010-2015 30.00 
Tanzania 2010-2015 30.00 Panama 2010 30.00 
Togo 2010-2015 17.50  2011-2015 25.00 
Tunisia 2010-2013 30.00 Paraguay 2010-2015 10.00 
 2014-2015 25.00 Peru 2010-2014 30.00 
Uganda 2010-2015 30.00  2015 28.00 
Zimbabwe 2010 25.00 Puerto Rico 2010-2015 39.00 
 2011-2015 25.75 St. Kitts & Nevis 2010-2015 33.00 
   St. Lucia 2010-2015 33.33 
   
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
2010-2015 32.50 
   Trinidad and Tobago 2010-2015 25.00 
   United States 2010 39.40 
   
 2011-2015 40.00 
   Uruguay  2010-2015 25.00 
      Venezuela 2010-2015 34.00 
Source: KPMG corporate tax rate guides, own assumptions  
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Table 51: Statutory corporate tax rates Asian, Australia and Oceania 
countries 
Country Year(s) 
Statutory  
tax rate 
Country Year(s) 
Statutory  
tax rate 
Asian countries Australia and Oceania 
Afghanistan 2010-2015 20.00 Australia 2010-2015 30.00 
Armenia 2010-2015 20.00 Marshall Islands 2010-2015 3.00 
Azerbaijan 2010 20.00 New Zealand 2010 30.00 
 2011-2015 30.00  2011-2015 28.00 
Bangladesh 2010-2015 27.50 Mauritius 2010-2015 15.00 
Brunei 2010-2015 20.00 Sri Lanka 2010 35.18 
Cambodia 2010-2015 20.00  2011 35.00 
China 2010-2015 25.00  2012-2015 28.00 
Fiji 2010-2013 28.00 Western Samoa 2010-2015 27.00 
 2014-2015 20.00    
Georgia 2010-2015 15.00    
Hong Kong 2010-2015 16.40    
India 2010 33.99    
 2011 32.44    
 2012-2013 32.45    
 2014 33.99    
 2015 34.61    
Indonesia 2010-2015 25.00    
Iran 2010-2015 25.00    
Iraq 2010-2015 15.00    
Israel 2010 25.00    
 2011 24.00    
 2012-2013 25.00    
 2014-2015 26.50    
Japan 2010 40.80    
 2011 40.69    
 2012-2013 38.01    
 2014 35.64    
 2015 33.06    
Jordan 2010-2015 14.00    
Kazakhstan 2010-2015 20.00    
Kuwait 2010-2015 15.00    
Kyrgystan 2010-2015 10.00    
Lebanon 2010-2015 15.00    
Macao 2010-2015 12.00    
Malaysia 2010-2015 25.00    
Mongolia 2010-2015 10.00    
Nepal 2010-2015 20.00    
North Korea 2010-2015 28.00    
Oman 2010-2015 12.00    
Pakistan 2010-2013 35.00    
 2014 34.00    
 2015 33.00    
Philippines 2010-2015 30.00  
  
Qatar 2010-2015 10.00    
Russia 2010-2015 20.00    
Saudi Arabia 2010-2015 20.00    
Singapore 2010-2015 17.00    
South Korea 2010-2015 24.20    
Syria 2010-2015 28.00    
Taiwan 2010-2015 17.00    
Tajikistan 2010-2015 14.00  
  
Thailand 2010-2011 30.00    
 2012-2013 23.00  
  
 2014-2015 20.00  
 
 
Turkey 2010-2015 20.00    
Uzbekistan 2010-2015 8.00    
Vietnam 2010-2013 25.00    
 2014-2015 22.00    
Source: KPMG corporate tax rate guides, own assumptions  
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Table 52: Tax rates in Patent boxes (2015) 
Country Year of introduction Patent box rate Comment 
Belgium 2007 6.8  
Cyprus 2012 2.5  
France 1971 18.34 15 % plus surcharges and local taxes 
Hungary 2003 9.5  
Italy 2015 21.9 70% of corporate income tax plus local tax 
Luxembourg 2008 5.84  
Malta 2010 0  
Netherlands 2007 5  
Spain 2008 17.86 40% of corporate income tax plus local taxes 
Portugal 2014 14.75 50 % of corporate income tax plus local taxes 
United Kingdom 2013 10  
Source: ZEW study and Alstadsæter et al. (2015) 
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Table 53: Country grouping for comparison groups (part1) 
Country Country group 1 Country group 2 Country group3 Country group4 
Austria Austria Austria EU EU 
Belgium Belgium Belgium EU EU 
Bulgaria Bulgaria Bulgaria EU EU 
Croatia Croatia Croatia EU EU 
Cyprus Cyprus Cyprus EU EU 
Czech Republic Czech Republic Czech Republic EU EU 
Denmark Denmark Denmark EU EU 
Estonia Estonia Baltics EU EU 
Finland Finland Finland EU EU 
France France France EU EU 
Germany Germany Germany EU EU 
Greece Greece Greece EU EU 
Hungary Hungary Hungary EU EU 
Ireland Ireland Ireland EU EU 
Italy Italy Italy EU EU 
Latvia Latvia Baltics EU EU 
Lithuania Lithuania Baltics EU EU 
Luxembourg Luxembourg Luxembourg EU EU 
Malta Malta Malta EU EU 
Netherlands Netherlands Netherlands EU EU 
Poland Poland Poland EU EU 
Portugal Portugal Portugal EU EU 
Romania Romania Romania EU EU 
Slovakia Slovakia Slovakia EU EU 
Slovenia Slovenia Slovenia EU EU 
Spain Spain Spain EU EU 
Sweden Sweden Sweden EU EU 
United Kingdom United Kingdom United Kingdom EU EU 
Island Island Other European2 Other European2 non EU 
Moldova Moldova Other European2 Other European2 non EU 
Norway Norway Other European2 Other European2 non EU 
Serbia Serbia Other European2 Other European2 non EU 
Switzerland Switzerland Other European2 Other European2 non EU 
Ukraine Ukraine Other European2 Other European2 non EU 
Albania Other European Other European2 Other European2 non EU 
Andorra Other European Other European2 Other European2 non EU 
Belarus Other European Other European2 Other European2 non EU 
Bosnia Herzegovina Other European Other European2 Other European2 non EU 
Liechtenstein Other European Other European2 Other European2 non EU 
Macedonia Other European Other European2 Other European2 non EU 
San Marino Other European Other European2 Other European2 non EU 
Gibraltar Other European Other European2 Other European2 non EU 
Montenegro Other European Other European2 Other European2 non EU 
Bahamas Zero/no tax country Zero/no tax country Zero/no tax country non EU 
Bahrain Zero/no tax country Zero/no tax country Zero/no tax country non EU 
Bermuda Zero/no tax country Zero/no tax country Zero/no tax country non EU 
British Virgin Islands Zero/no tax country Zero/no tax country Zero/no tax country non EU 
Cayman Island Zero/no tax country Zero/no tax country Zero/no tax country non EU 
Curacao Zero/no tax country Zero/no tax country Zero/no tax country non EU 
Monaco Zero/no tax country Zero/no tax country Zero/no tax country non EU 
United Arab Emirates Zero/no tax country Zero/no tax country Zero/no tax country non EU 
Burkina Faso Africa, low income Africa Africa non EU 
Congo Africa, low income Africa Africa non EU 
Madagascar Africa, low income Africa Africa non EU 
Malawi Africa, low income Africa Africa non EU 
Sierra Leone Africa, low income Africa Africa non EU 
Togo Africa, low income Africa Africa non EU 
Uganda Africa, low income Africa Africa non EU 
Zimbabwe Africa, low income Africa Africa non EU 
Cote d'Ivoire Africa, mid income Africa Africa non EU 
Ghana Africa, mid income Africa Africa non EU 
Kenia Africa, mid income Africa Africa non EU 
Lesotho Africa, mid income Africa Africa non EU 
Mauretania Africa, mid income Africa Africa non EU 
Sudan Africa, mid income Africa Africa non EU 
Tanzania Africa, mid income Africa Africa non EU 
Zambia Africa, mid income Africa Africa non EU 
Angola Africa, upper middle income Africa Africa non EU 
Botswana Africa, upper middle income Africa Africa non EU 
Namibia Africa, upper middle income Africa Africa non EU 
Nigeria Africa, upper middle income Africa Africa non EU 
South Africa South Africa Africa Africa non EU 
     
Source: Own considerations  
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Table 54: Country grouping for comparison groups (part2) 
Country Country group 1 Country group 2 Country group3 Country group4 
Algeria Mahgreb Africa Africa non EU 
Morocco Mahgreb Africa Africa non EU 
Tunisia Mahgreb Africa Africa non EU 
Antigua and Barbuda Caribbean Caribbean Americas and Caribbean non EU 
Aruba Caribbean Caribbean Americas and Caribbean non EU 
Barbados Caribbean Caribbean Americas and Caribbean non EU 
Dominican Republic Caribbean Caribbean Americas and Caribbean non EU 
Grenada Caribbean Caribbean Americas and Caribbean non EU 
Jamaica Caribbean Caribbean Americas and Caribbean non EU 
St. Kitts & Nevis Caribbean Caribbean Americas and Caribbean non EU 
St. Lucia Caribbean Caribbean Americas and Caribbean non EU 
Argentina Argentina Latin America Americas and Caribbean non EU 
Brazil Brazil Latin America Americas and Caribbean non EU 
Chile Chile Latin America Americas and Caribbean non EU 
Columbia Columbia Latin America Americas and Caribbean non EU 
Costa Rica Costa Rica Latin America Americas and Caribbean non EU 
Guatemala Guatemala Latin America Americas and Caribbean non EU 
Panama Panama Latin America Americas and Caribbean non EU 
El Salvador El Salvador Latin America Americas and Caribbean non EU 
Uruguay Uruguay Latin America Americas and Caribbean non EU 
Bolivia Andean countries Latin America Americas and Caribbean non EU 
Ecuador Andean countries Latin America Americas and Caribbean non EU 
Paraguay Andean countries Latin America Americas and Caribbean non EU 
Peru Andean countries Latin America Americas and Caribbean non EU 
Guyana The Guyanas and Venezuela Latin America Americas and Caribbean non EU 
Suriname The Guyanas and Venezuela Latin America Americas and Caribbean non EU 
Venezuela The Guyanas and Venezuela Latin America Americas and Caribbean non EU 
Canada Canada NAFTA Americas and Caribbean non EU 
Mexico Mexico NAFTA Americas and Caribbean non EU 
United States United States NAFTA Americas and Caribbean non EU 
Trinidad and Tobago Trinidad and Tobago Trinidad and Tobago Americas and Caribbean non EU 
Honduras other, mid income other, mid income Americas and Caribbean non EU 
Nicaragua other, mid income other, mid income Americas and Caribbean non EU 
Japan Japan Japan Asia non EU 
South Korea South Korea South Korea Asia non EU 
Russia Russia Russia Asia non EU 
Turkey Turkey Turkey Asia non EU 
China China Chinese territories2 Asia non EU 
Hong Kong Hong Kong Chinese territories2 Asia non EU 
Taiwan Chinese territories Chinese territories2 Asia non EU 
India India Pakistan/India Asia non EU 
Pakistan Pakistan Pakistan/India Asia non EU 
Malaysia Malaysia Southeast Asia2 Asia non EU 
Philippines Philippines Southeast Asia2 Asia non EU 
Singapore Singapore Southeast Asia2 Asia non EU 
Thailand Thailand Southeast Asia2 Asia non EU 
Brunei Southeast Asia Southeast Asia2 Asia non EU 
Indonesia Southeast Asia Southeast Asia2 Asia non EU 
Vietnam Southeast Asia Southeast Asia2 Asia non EU 
Armenia Caucasus Caucasus Asia non EU 
Azerbaijan Caucasus Caucasus Asia non EU 
Georgia Caucasus Caucasus Asia non EU 
Egypt Middle East Middle East Asia non EU 
Iran Middle East Middle East Asia non EU 
Iraq Middle East Middle East Asia non EU 
Israel Middle East Middle East Asia non EU 
Jordan Middle East Middle East Asia non EU 
Kuwait Middle East Middle East Asia non EU 
Lebanon Middle East Middle East Asia non EU 
Oman Middle East Middle East Asia non EU 
Palestine Middle East Middle East Asia non EU 
Qatar Middle East Middle East Asia non EU 
Saudi Arabia Middle East Middle East Asia non EU 
Kazakhstan Central Asia Central Asia Asia non EU 
Kyrgyzstan Central Asia Central Asia Asia non EU 
Tajikistan Central Asia Central Asia Asia non EU 
Uzbekistan Central Asia Central Asia Asia non EU 
     
Source: Own considerations  
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Table 55: Country grouping for comparison groups (part3) 
Country Country group 1 Country group 2 Country group3 Country group4 
Afghanistan Other, low income Other, low income Asia non EU 
Bangladesh Other, low income Other, low income Asia non EU 
Mongolia Other, low income Other, low income Asia non EU 
Nepal Other, low income Other, low income Asia non EU 
Papua New Guinea Other, low income Other, low income Asia non EU 
Syria Other, low income Other, low income Asia non EU 
Yemen Other, low income Other, low income Asia non EU 
Australia Australia Australasia Australasia2 non EU 
New Zealand New Zealand Australasia Australasia2 non EU 
Mauritius Indian Ocean Australasia Australasia2 non EU 
Sri Lanka Indian Ocean Australasia Australasia2 non EU 
     
Source: Own considerations 
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Table 56: Number of observations with consolidated accounts by MNE status 
  Number of observations 
Country Domestic groups Multinational groups 
Austria 235 191 
Belgium 396 357 
Bulgaria 97 7 
Croatia 102 23 
Cyprus 103 42 
Czech Republic 34 8 
Denmark 1556 482 
Estonia 5 11 
Finland 1095 372 
France 2783 650 
Germany 2855 1145 
Greece 280 75 
Hungary 47 19 
Ireland 474 153 
Italy 3019 784 
Latvia 101 26 
Lithuania 54 4 
Luxembourg 32 58 
Malta 69 15 
Netherlands 4226 675 
Poland 771 107 
Portugal 337 92 
Romania 91 2 
Slovakia 23 7 
Slovenia 22 24 
Spain 1694 492 
Sweden 4208 954 
United Kingdom 12367 1142 
Weighted 37076 7917 
Notes: Based on the consolidated accounts from Orbis. The number of observations refers to the firms 
with consolidated accounts in Orbis.  
Source: Orbis data (Bureau van Dijk), own calculations  
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Table 57: Number of observations in dataset by relative tax rate status 
 Number of firms in Member States which 
Country are  domestic companies 
are NOT in a 
 lower tax country 
are in a  
lower tax country 
Austria 18006 6005 25222 
Belgium 93611 29755 17399 
Bulgaria 24847 1613 7857 
Croatia 190163 4351 5075 
Cyprus 823 104 621 
Czech Republic 42040 10866 36564 
Denmark 208341 16801 22751 
Estonia 11931 6074 4861 
Finland 46630 11683 13152 
France 418395 206190 5833 
Germany 184510 65277 81681 
Greece 8731 4872 6228 
Hungary 1806 856 5987 
Ireland 19137 757 23842 
Italy 318332 80965 50936 
Latvia 10196 2281 6419 
Lithuania 2650 1033 4218 
Luxembourg 7078 8137 9691 
Malta 10516 2784 70 
Netherlands 386838 16418 51966 
Poland 57278 7895 48303 
Portugal 62849 11578 10674 
Romania 13416 18490 40794 
Slovakia 5149 3695 6709 
Slovenia 2330 994 1761 
Spain 234403 45234 56820 
Sweden 212246 25220 32007 
United Kingdom 307524 50058 216234 
Total 2899776 639986 793675 
Notes: A lower tax entity is defined as having an at least 5 %points lower statutory corporate tax compared 
to the highest statutory tax rates within the MNE group. Pooled over the period 2010 to 2015. The ownership 
information is from 2013, while tax rate information is from the respective years 2010 to 2015. 
Source: Orbis data (Bureau van Dijk), own calculations  
  
European Commission 
 
Aggressive tax planning indicators 
 
October 2017 | 165 
Table 58: Profitability (PLBT/EMP), by Member States (2010-2015)  
  Domestic companies 
Entities within a MNE group in a 
higher tax country lower tax country 
  PLBT/EMP (1000€) 
No. obs. 
PLBT/EMP (1000€) 
No. obs. 
PLBT/EMP (1000€) 
No. obs. 
Country Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Austria 61.6 5.9 5983 60.6 6.8 2073 821.7 13.0 9995 
Belgium 35.6 6.0 70501 282.4 9.1 21747 520.6 13.9 13877 
Bulgaria 3.1 0.4 19201 -35.5 0.3 1262 -78.2 1.5 6290 
Croatia 0.6 0.3 120189 -10.5 0.5 3124 -17.4 2.2 3758 
Cyprus 19.6 3.7 173 935.5 28.0 25 649.2 9.4 88 
Czech Republic 9.2 1.1 23608 10.4 1.8 5909 47.9 4.0 23050 
Denmark 66.3 6.3 43072 110.4 11.7 6303 824.9 14.1 10298 
Estonia 26.3 2.1 6093 53.7 2.6 3753 87.0 5.7 3592 
Finland 52.2 6.0 26928 1.1 6.7 7126 0.3 11.3 8390 
France 15.4 5.0 153060 163.4 6.0 85815 554.5 10.4 2645 
Germany 97.3 5.2 56781 81.3 8.3 20027 329.7 13.1 33009 
Greece 74.5 -0.3 5636 -0.7 0.4 3176 -5.9 2.3 4683 
Hungary -0.8 2.2 1163 1023.9 3.6 624 44.3 4.4 4285 
Ireland 61.7 3.1 3166 -1.4 9.6 237 3383.8 12.5 8452 
Italy -8.5 3.0 187416 -72.4 4.1 48979 5.8 8.1 35396 
Latvia -5.4 0.2 7908 4.5 0.3 1738 47.3 2.3 5218 
Lithuania 13.2 1.4 1900 51.8 3.0 680 108.9 4.2 3097 
Luxembourg -69.0 5.7 712 40.5 25.1 893 1906.7 25.2 1978 
Malta 226.2 5.8 617 3065.9 29.1 348 6940.4 54.1 9 
Netherlands 185.3 5.6 16435 852.5 9.0 3142 3190.7 18.2 14758 
Poland 11.7 1.3 9239 16.4 1.9 1224 20.7 5.3 8564 
Portugal 26.0 1.4 42889 89.5 3.4 8484 277.7 5.8 7936 
Romania -10.5 0.4 9121 -26.5 0.0 9006 -36.5 1.0 24855 
Slovakia 21.3 1.2 3181 31.6 2.4 2656 32.6 4.9 5069 
Slovenia -22.1 1.5 1623 -34.1 1.9 771 -3.4 5.4 1468 
Spain -3.1 1.8 137633 -31.2 2.6 29417 36.9 5.7 40630 
Sweden 80.0 9.1 84343 131.7 10.0 14706 207.5 12.6 20723 
United Kingdom 64.2 6.1 89835 325.4 7.7 20676 539.8 11.5 98609 
EU 28 27.4 3.0 1128406 105.6 5.0 303921 445.0 7.8 400722 
Average 36.9 3.3  254.3 7.0  729.9 10.1  
Std. deviation 60.0 2.5  624.1 8.0  1508.4 10.3  
High values MT, NL SE, DK, 
UK, FI,  
BE, AT  
 MT, HU, CY MT, CY, 
LU 
 MT, IE, 
NL 
MT, LU  
Low values LU EL, LV, HR, 
BG, RO 
       
Notes: Based on the unconsolidated accounts from Orbis. No. obs. refers to firms serving as base for the mean 
and medians. Higher tax country is defined as not being a lower tax entity, hence includes also companies in 
MNE groups without a 5 percentage points tax differential within the MNE group. 
Source: Orbis data (Bureau van Dijk), own calculations   
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Table 59: Profitability (EBIT/EMP), by Member States (2010-2015)  
  Domestic companies 
Entities within a MNE group in a 
higher tax country lower tax country 
  EBIT/EMP (1000€) 
No. obs. 
EBIT/EMP 
(1000€) No. obs. 
EBIT/EMP (1000€) 
No. obs. 
Country Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Austria 86.6 6.1 6159 97.0 5.8 2067 288.8 11.5 10071 
Belgium 23.1 7.6 70888 33.2 8.7 22114 35.5 11.8 13991 
Bulgaria 9.3 0.6 19832 -23.7 0.3 1271 52.2 1.8 6330 
Croatia 2.2 0.5 120153 -1.5 1.1 3088 -3.4 3.2 3704 
Cyprus 28.7 8.8 172 1214.5 38.0 23 303.6 17.5 82 
Czech Republic 6.4 1.4 23663 8.9 2.5 5923 21.6 4.7 23308 
Denmark 33.4 7.0 43280 65.9 9.3 6398 145.2 11.8 10422 
Estonia 25.4 2.4 6142 55.0 2.7 3759 24.4 5.7 3580 
Finland 43.7 6.0 26922 34.3 6.6 7138 46.4 10.8 8468 
France 10.0 4.7 155558 31.4 5.4 86999 0.5 8.8 2611 
Germany 90.3 5.6 55896 95.4 8.6 20435 148.7 12.2 33617 
Greece 85.6 2.1 5734 37.2 3.0 3206 1.7 3.9 4760 
Hungary -4.7 2.3 1150 -0.7 2.7 617 90.9 4.7 4327 
Ireland 136.1 3.9 3320 169.0 10.9 237 3297.5 13.5 8476 
Italy 4.7 5.0 188816 -3.1 5.7 49605 14.0 8.9 35402 
Latvia 6.1 0.4 6193 2.4 0.6 1483 28.2 3.3 4469 
Lithuania 9.3 1.6 1913 23.0 3.1 691 62.9 4.7 3124 
Luxembourg 54.7 5.5 702 951.2 10.8 793 305.8 12.5 1830 
Malta 220.3 6.2 609 2492.8 16.5 321 892.5 5.1 7 
Netherlands -62.8 4.8 16739 336.8 4.4 3263 343.2 10.3 15612 
Poland 12.9 1.5 9363 4.3 1.9 1232 22.3 6.0 8867 
Portugal 42.6 2.7 43159 166.4 5.0 8508 307.0 7.1 8143 
Romania -1.6 0.6 9314 5.0 0.5 9016 -5.8 1.7 24951 
Slovakia 9.6 1.6 3164 9.5 3.0 2646 28.7 5.4 5071 
Slovenia 2.6 2.6 1597 -0.3 2.7 744 7.7 5.9 1450 
Spain 14.5 3.0 140243 80.7 3.8 30109 114.1 6.5 41465 
Sweden 33.2 9.1 85033 45.9 8.1 14955 48.1 11.0 21137 
United Kingdom 65.2 6.6 92636 26.0 7.7 20472 114.6 9.5 95560 
Total 22.9 3.8 1138350 46.7 5.4 307113 164.0 7.6 400835 
Average 35.3 3.9  212.7 6.4  240.6 7.9  
Std. deviation 52.8 2.6  528.4 7.3  627.3 4.0  
High values MT, IE, 
DE 
SE, CY, 
BE, DK, UK  
 MT CY, MT  IE, MT CY, IE, 
LU, DE 
 
Low values NL LV, HR, 
BG, RO 
     RO, BG  
Notes: Based on the unconsolidated accounts from Orbis. No. obs. refers to firms serving as base for the mean 
and medians. Higher tax country is defined as not being a lower tax entity, hence includes also companies in 
MNE groups without a 5 percentage points tax differential within the MNE group. Total refers to the overall 
number of observations, respectively the unweighted average and overall median. 
 Source: Orbis data (Bureau van Dijk), own calculations    
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Table 60: Financial Profitability (FIN_PL/EMP), by Member States (2010-
2015)  
  Domestic companies 
Entities within a MNE group in a 
higher tax country lower tax country 
  PLBT/EMP (1000€) 
No. obs. 
PLBT/EMP (1000€) 
No. obs. 
PLBT/EMP (1000€) 
No. obs. 
Country Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Austria -0.5 -0.1 4468 19.9 0.0 1448 528.6 0.0 6948 
Belgium 16.5 -0.8 46261 268.0 -0.5 15051 488.9 -0.4 9202 
Bulgaria -10.0 -0.1 12418 -10.6 -0.8 934 -165.9 -0.3 4564 
Croatia -1.5 0.0 73621 -12.8 -0.6 1975 -12.5 -0.4 2444 
Cyprus -10.5 -3.9 119 -235.9 -8.5 19 0.1 -1.6 68 
Czech Republic 1.6 -0.2 13950 0.4 -0.4 4108 28.1 -0.4 15701 
Denmark 55.6 -0.5 23034 37.4 -0.2 4012 903.7 -0.2 6634 
Estonia 2.0 -0.1 3546 -1.9 0.0 2605 71.9 0.0 2225 
Finland 3.4 -0.1 14580 -47.2 -0.1 4305 -72.1 -0.1 6232 
France -2.0 -0.1 80095 23.2 -0.1 54626 n. a. n. a. 0 
Germany 10.8 -0.5 40660 17.7 -0.7 13472 234.7 -0.4 23837 
Greece -14.0 -1.8 2978 -44.2 -1.0 2222 -7.9 -0.4 2806 
Hungary 6.1 -0.1 651 1090.0 -0.1 456 43.8 -0.2 3071 
Ireland -119.3 0.0 1661 -241.9 0.0 162 333.2 0.0 5414 
Italy -13.7 -1.1 121664 -37.1 -0.9 31583 -11.5 -0.4 27548 
Latvia -7.1 0.0 4663 1.2 0.0 1181 12.1 -0.1 3376 
Lithuania 5.8 -0.1 1099 28.6 0.0 451 35.4 -0.2 1903 
Luxembourg -199.4 -0.1 441 -1558.4 0.0 537 1418.7 0.0 1147 
Malta 18.5 0.0 372 30.8 0.0 229 n. a. n. a. 0 
Netherlands 354.4 -0.1 9963 734.8 -0.1 2046 4007.0 0.0 10578 
Poland -4.7 -0.1 2875 13.3 0.0 537 2.4 -0.2 3114 
Portugal -20.7 -0.4 24404 -97.9 -0.5 5888 -134.2 -0.1 5140 
Romania -12.4 0.0 5193 -28.6 -0.5 5856 -30.6 -0.4 16661 
Slovakia 11.9 -0.2 2131 26.5 -0.4 2095 3.2 -0.3 3626 
Slovenia -28.2 -0.7 1251 -51.2 -0.6 575 -12.8 -0.1 1142 
Spain -22.7 -0.5 74075 -118.2 -0.5 17476 -68.4 -0.2 29176 
Sweden 35.8 -0.1 74400 82.0 -0.1 10771 53.8 -0.1 16150 
United Kingdom 29.0 0.0 59710 348.9 0.0 10944 457.3 0.0 66760 
EU 28 8.3 -0.2 700283 37.2 -0.3 195564 337.8 -0.1 275467 
Average 3.0 -0.4  8.5 -0.6  311.8 -0.3  
Std. deviation 83.5 0.8  408.6 1.6  832.4 0.3  
High values NL CY, EL  HU, NL   NL, LU   
Low values LU, IE   LU CY   CY  
Notes: Based on the unconsolidated accounts from Orbis. No. obs. refers to firms serving as base for the 
mean and medians. Higher tax country is defined as not being a lower tax entity, hence includes also 
companies in MNE groups without a 5 percentage points tax differential within the MNE group. Total refers 
to the overall number of observations, respectively the unweighted average and overall median. 
Source: Orbis data (Bureau van Dijk), own calculations   
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Table 61: Number of observations in dataset, by Member States (2010-2015)  
  Observations in final dataset 
Country Subsidiaries Owner Total 
Austria 29255 1972 31227 
Belgium 43946 3208 47154 
Bulgaria 9369 98 9467 
Croatia 9044 382 9426 
Cyprus 541 127 668 
Czech Republic 46642 785 47427 
Denmark 36609 2928 39537 
Estonia 10314 381 10695 
Finland 22290 2544 24834 
France 207014 5005 212019 
Germany 139514 7440 146954 
Greece 10885 215 11100 
Hungary 6481 362 6843 
Ireland 23530 966 24496 
Italy 125589 6282 131871 
Latvia 8281 402 8683 
Lithuania 5043 208 5251 
Luxembourg 15472 2334 17806 
Malta 2313 481 2794 
Netherlands 63557 4823 68380 
Poland 55697 501 56198 
Portugal 21322 930 22252 
Romania 58788 77 58865 
Slovakia 9818 585 10403 
Slovenia 2562 191 2753 
Spain 96928 5126 102054 
Sweden 49882 7276 57158 
United Kingdom 261777 3942 265719 
Total 1372463 59571 1432034 
Notes: Based on the unconsolidated accounts in ORBIS and pooled over the years 2010 to 2015. A total of 
251,744 firms in 55,373 corporate groups.  
Source: Orbis data (Bureau van Dijk), own calculations   
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Table 62: Roles ATP structures using interest payments, by Member States 
  Subsidiaries Headquarter 
Country target lower tax conduit target lower tax conduit 
Austria 300 2762 12762 41 126 523 
Belgium 5551 2025 15293 281 36 687 
Bulgaria 0 1632 2510 0 15 17 
Croatia 133 291 2817 5 0 60 
Cyprus 0 5 178 0 4 22 
Czech Republic 78 4314 12924 9 17 41 
Denmark 369 1979 12817 66 54 691 
Estonia 196 187 2573 4 0 36 
Finland 583 1295 8054 35 64 263 
France 43153 0 65552 374 0 1243 
Germany 3362 6004 53204 161 286 1922 
Greece 235 843 3373 8 1 27 
Hungary 61 679 3330 4 1 23 
Ireland 0 2008 10795 0 43 105 
Italy 6954 9996 37336 302 298 1349 
Latvia 4 860 2058 0 31 16 
Lithuania 0 235 1464 0 1 22 
Luxembourg 255 894 5075 37 38 411 
Malta 153 0 814 9 0 54 
Netherlands 142 2511 30233 17 13 718 
Poland 97 6991 18702 1 32 47 
Portugal 1112 1319 6606 36 7 113 
Romania 84 5134 10184 3 2 8 
Slovakia 140 806 2992 9 2 22 
Slovenia 107 350 989 9 8 57 
Spain 3203 6831 33801 161 196 755 
Sweden 2005 4083 20309 129 284 1012 
United Kingdom 1828 20274 112431 12 101 537 
Total 70105 84308 489176 1713 1660 10781 
Strict classification: Entities (subsidiaries and headquarters) classified as 
Country target entity lower tax entity conduit entity 
Austria 10 47 0 
Belgium 89 34 0 
Bulgaria 0 4 0 
Cyprus 0 1 0 
Czech Republic 0 5 0 
Estonia 0 0 3 
Ireland 0 2 50 
Latvia 0 2 0 
Luxembourg 1 6 138 
Malta 0 0 2 
Slovenia 1 3 0 
Total 101 104 193 
Notes: Based on the unconsolidated accounts in Orbis, pooled over the years 2010-2015. Entries refer to the 
number of entities, i.e. the sum of subsidiaries and owners.  
Source: Orbis data (Bureau van Dijk), own calculations   
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Table 63: Roles hybrid loan ATP structure, by Member States  
  Strict classification Standard classification 
Country target lower tax conduit target lower tax conduit 
Austria 11 n.a. 0 534 n.a. 10472 
Belgium 111 n.a. 0 7807 n.a. 17385 
Bulgaria 0 n.a. 0 239 n.a. 2008 
Croatia 0 n.a. 0 211 n.a. 2442 
Cyprus 0 n.a. 0 0 n.a. 143 
Czech Republic 0 n.a. 0 1086 n.a. 10620 
Denmark 0 n.a. 0 1203 n.a. 12987 
Estonia 0 n.a. 0 511 n.a. 2651 
Finland 0 n.a. 0 1883 n.a. 8987 
France 0 n.a. 0 47237 n.a. 64684 
Germany 0 n.a. 0 4424 n.a. 44473 
Greece 0 n.a. 0 351 n.a. 3232 
Hungary 0 n.a. 0 122 n.a. 3142 
Ireland 0 n.a. 7 54 n.a. 8067 
Italy 0 n.a. 0 10503 n.a. 40651 
Latvia 0 n.a. 0 159 n.a. 1919 
Lithuania 0 n.a. 0 64 n.a. 1426 
Luxembourg 1 n.a. 61 513 n.a. 5101 
Malta 0 n.a. 0 176 n.a. 562 
Netherlands 0 n.a. 0 409 n.a. 24023 
Poland 0 n.a. 0 637 n.a. 16634 
Portugal 0 n.a. 0 2328 n.a. 7569 
Romania 0 n.a. 0 948 n.a. 8661 
Slovakia 0 n.a. 0 531 n.a. 3002 
Slovenia 1 n.a. 0 187 n.a. 935 
Spain 0 n.a. 0 6677 n.a. 33604 
Sweden 0 n.a. 0 5580 n.a. 23404 
United Kingdom 0 n.a. 0 4423 n.a. 84439 
Total 124 n.a. 68 98797 n.a. 443223 
Notes: Based on the unconsolidated accounts in Orbis, pooled over the years 2010-2015. Entries refer to 
the number of entities, i.e. the sum of subsidiaries and owners.  
Source: Orbis data (Bureau van Dijk), own calculations   
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Table 64: Roles transfer pricing ATP structure, by Member States  
  Strict classification Standard classification 
Country target lower tax conduit target lower tax conduit 
Austria 0 0 0 1023 7498 17456 
Belgium 0 7 0 13149 7658 16549 
Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 4327 2793 
Croatia 0 0 0 944 2616 2846 
Cyprus 0 0 0 0 78 350 
Czech Republic 0 0 0 250 19211 13346 
Denmark 0 0 0 2916 10689 13712 
Estonia 0 0 0 1102 2673 2494 
Finland 0 0 0 2339 6278 8173 
France 0 0 0 89166 2339 76975 
Germany 0 0 0 9629 17909 80886 
Greece 0 0 0 748 2825 3916 
Hungary 0 0 0 210 2690 3324 
Ireland 0 0 8 0 8476 13384 
Italy 0 0 0 22519 24887 40450 
Latvia 0 0 0 8 3396 2270 
Lithuania 0 0 0 9 2100 1727 
Luxembourg 0 0 0 763 2675 7709 
Malta 0 0 0 683 30 1226 
Netherlands 0 0 0 995 10101 41301 
Poland 0 0 0 285 25216 19832 
Portugal 0 0 0 2326 5440 6322 
Romania 0 0 0 342 25019 11742 
Slovakia 0 0 0 283 3570 2945 
Slovenia 0 0 0 319 963 950 
Spain 0 0 0 9126 25884 36305 
Sweden 0 0 0 4618 12192 22814 
United Kingdom 0 0 0 7637 67858 146452 
Total 0 7 8 171389 304598 598249 
Notes: Based on the unconsolidated accounts in Orbis, pooled over the years 2010-2015. Entries refer to 
the number of entities, i.e. the sum of subsidiaries and owners.  
Source: Orbis data (Bureau van Dijk), own calculations   
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Table 65: Roles intellectual property ATP structure, by Member States  
  Strict classification Standard classification 
Country target lower tax conduit target lower tax conduit 
Austria 0 62 0 445 4449 16916 
Belgium 2 3 0 7386 2627 21976 
Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 1908 2942 
Croatia 0 4 0 392 1077 3202 
Cyprus 0 0 0 0 26 260 
Czech Republic 0 4 0 102 6594 14943 
Denmark 0 0 0 1211 2056 17182 
Estonia 0 0 0 418 651 3163 
Finland 0 0 0 882 2943 10622 
France 0 0 0 57501 778 94995 
Germany 0 0 0 4018 11353 73107 
Greece 0 0 0 492 1287 4701 
Hungary 0 0 0 97 1410 4186 
Ireland 0 3 10 0 1132 14835 
Italy 0 0 0 10222 15750 49970 
Latvia 0 0 0 8 1011 2416 
Lithuania 0 0 0 4 1063 1870 
Luxembourg 0 3 154 368 602 7285 
Malta 0 0 5 353 0 964 
Netherlands 0 0 0 336 1771 38808 
Poland 0 0 0 161 11040 22608 
Portugal 0 0 0 1526 1758 9102 
Romania 0 0 0 158 9015 11662 
Slovakia 0 0 0 164 1373 3813 
Slovenia 0 5 0 158 620 1017 
Spain 0 0 0 4539 12667 43806 
Sweden 0 0 0 2529 3314 28146 
United Kingdom 0 0 0 2539 11537 155806 
Total 2 84 169 96009 109812 660303 
Notes: Based on the unconsolidated accounts in Orbis, pooled over the years 2010-2015. Entries refer to 
the number of entities, i.e. the sum of subsidiaries and owners.  
Source: Orbis data (Bureau van Dijk), own calculations   
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Table 66: Roles in patent box ATP structure, by Member States  
  Strict classification Standard classification 
Country target lower tax conduit target lower tax conduit 
Austria 0 0 0 181 0 3241 
Belgium 0 0 0 0 247 5569 
Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 0 503 
Croatia 0 0 0 0 0 681 
Cyprus 0 0 0 0 0 15 
Czech Republic 0 0 0 19 0 3610 
Denmark 0 0 0 98 0 3045 
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 406 
Finland 0 0 0 130 0 2050 
France 0 0 0 0 819 35206 
Germany 0 0 0 1162 0 17275 
Greece 0 0 0 1 0 786 
Hungary 0 0 0 0 6 1403 
Ireland 0 0 0 19 0 2546 
Italy 0 0 0 0 0 7748 
Latvia 0 0 0 0 0 432 
Lithuania 0 0 0 0 0 289 
Luxembourg 0 0 62 0 26 1304 
Malta 0 0 0 0 1 237 
Netherlands 0 0 0 0 118 7208 
Poland 0 0 0 11 0 4919 
Portugal 0 0 0 3 4 1824 
Romania 0 0 0 0 0 2144 
Slovakia 0 0 0 1 0 1182 
Slovenia 0 0 0 0 0 208 
Spain 0 0 0 0 241 9557 
Sweden 0 0 0 239 0 5489 
United Kingdom 0 0 0 352 381 28266 
Total 0 0 62 2216 1843 147143 
Notes: Based on the unconsolidated accounts in Orbis, pooled over the years 2010-2015. Entries refer to the 
number of entities, i.e. the sum of subsidiaries and owners.  
Source: Orbis data (Bureau van Dijk), own calculations   
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